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SUMMARY
This thesis seeks to explore, with reference to the phenomenon 
of wage militancy, the relationships between a national union leadership, 
the membership of that union and the influence within it of radical 
or revolutionary politics.
The method chosen to explore these relationships is that of a 
historical study of a noted 'leftwing’ union, the Technical, Administrative 
and Supervisory Section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, 
formerly the Draughtsmen's and Allied Technicians' Association. The 
historical material is drawn, in the main, from published union sources 
such as the shorthand transcripts of the annual policy-making conference 
and the monthly union journal.
Certain questions are posed with respect to the role of revolutionary 
politics in the development of the union, e.g. what circumstances allowed 
the union to promote and sustain a 'leftwing' leadership in the 1950s 
when almost all other 'leftwing' national leaderships were eroded?
In answering these questions, attention is concentrated on what are seen 
as central issues - the development of the union's wages and industrial 
policies and practices and its responses to incomes policy and industrial 
relations legislation, particularly for the decade of the 1960s.
The material thereby generated, and the conclusions drawn on the 
questions specific to the case-study union, are used to explore the more 
general relationships between wage militancy and revolutionary politics 
by way of a review and analysis of three areas of controversy in academic 
industrial relations literature, the 'blue-collar/white-collar' debate, 
the 'pluralist/marxist' debate and the 'Ross/Dunlop trade union wage 
policy' debate.
The conclusions drawn on the general relationships are somewhat 
tentative. It is suggested that the 'hlue-collar/white-collar* debate 
as it is usually rehearsed in the literature is not helpful in explaining 
the case-study union’s experience, in particular that the definition of 
class consciousness used by the major theorists is of limited usefulness 
and differs sharply from that adopted by the union’s leadership, class 
consciousness being held by the latter to be the primary aim of their 
trade unionism. On the ’pluralist/marxist' debate, attention is drawn 
to a convergence between one school of marxist thought and certain pluralist 
hypotheses. On the basis of certain features of the development of the 
case-study union it is argued that the classical marxist postulates rather 
than those of the convergence school have greater empirical support.
With respect to the 'Ross/Dunlop' debate both sides offer insights into 
the formation of trade union wage policy but it is suggested that neither 
fit completely the wage aims of the case-study union.
Finally, and included as an Appendix, is a preliminary statistical 
analysis of a time-series of wage rates pertaining to the union's membership 
which allows the inferences that both aggregate demand and trade union 
pushfulness are causal factors in the wages paid to this union's membership.
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
In the history of the British trade union movement the period 1945 
to 1975 is characterised, inter alia, by rising wage militancy.^ T h e  
period includes the massive upsurge of strike activity in 1969-1970, the 
violent strikes of miners and building trade workers in 1972, and culminates
( 2)
in the dramatic strike actions of 1973-74. The years I969 to 1974 are
further characterised by the first widespread use of strike action for
(
political ends since 1926.^
Study of this militancy has been very uneven. Thus there has been 
much interest in wage militancy at union membership level, whilst much 
less attention has been given to the role of national union leaderships with 
respect to militancy, and in particular to the relationships between leader­
ship and membership, and almost no consideration of the influence within 
the trade union movement of those who see the role of unions as going 
beyond collective bargaining to the revolutionary transformation of society, 
in particular of the influence of 'leftwing' national leaderships.
This thesis sets out to explore, with reference to wage militancy, 
the relationships between a national union leadership, the membership of
(1) For a useful review of the evidence for the period up to 1965, see 
the 'Royal Commission on Trades Unions and Employers' Associations: 
Report, 1968'. The Report emphasises the emergence of shop 
steward-led shopfloor militancy. For later years, see footnotes
2 and 3*
(2) The years 1969-70 and 1973-74 are often referred to as years of 
wage or pay "explosions". See, for example, 'A non-monetarist view 
of the pay explosion', Phelps Brown, Three Banks Review, March 1975. 
At least one writer has characterised the few years up to 1971 as 
years of "wage and strike 'explosions'"; See Hyman, 'Marxism and the 
Sociology of Trade Unionism', p.28, 1971.
(3) The following can be viewed as disputes with political objectives 
though some scholars might disagree: the NUPE members' strikes over 
Health Service pay-beds; the UCS work-in; the stoppages over the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971, e.g. the 'Pentonville-5' stoppages; 
the 1973-74 miners' strike.
4.
that union and the influence within it of radical or revolutionary 
politics.
The union is the Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section 
(TASS) of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers . Because of its 
particular development from 1945 to the early 1970s, this union provides 
an immense amount of data and a number of features which facilitate some
( 4)study of national leadership, politics and membership wage militancy.
For example, the union experienced changing levels of wage militancy result­
ing in a strike record in the latter half of the period unmatched by any 
other British white-collar union in the same period; it operated what was 
probably the highest strike-pay policy among its contemporaries and had 
almost no unofficial strikes; it was led for most of the period by a 
'leftwing' national leadership which came to power out of a battle over
f 5)wages policy in which the 'left' defeated a 'rightwing' leadership; 
the union actively campaigned against all Governmental proposals in the 
incomes policy and industrial relations fields from 1964 onwards and the 
leadership openly exhorted the membership to break the law in the period 
1965 to 1969; the union's present General Secretary was the first Communist 
for many years to be elected to the General Council of the TUC; and its 
amalgamation with the Amalgamated Engineering Union, ten times its size, 
to form what was seen by the TASS leadership as the core of a 'class-based' 
industrial union in engineering represents the only major case of a white- 
collar union voluntarily joining with a blue-collar union.
Features such as these raise a number of questions pertinent to the 
relationships to be studied: -
(4) In terms of analysis the thesis treats of the period up to 1970
but as an aid to analysis data is taken up to 1975* Sources for the 
examples cited in this paragraph are given in later chapters.
(5) Definitions of the 'left' and 'right' concepts are discussed below,
p. 30.
(a) What conditions or circumstances allowed TASS to promote and sustain 
a 'leftwing' leadership in the 1950s when almost all other 'leftwing' 
national leaderships were eroded?^^^
(h) What aims did the 'left' pursue and what place had wage militancy 
within them? and
(c) What was the 'left' leadership's estimate of its success in pursuing 
its aims and how far does the estimate accord with the factual record; 
in particular, how far did the 'left' generate the militancy displayed 
by the membership and how far did it determine the form of this militancy?
More generally, political scientists see the period 1945 to 1974 as 
one in which 'class voting' declined, culminating in the Labour vote 
falling to 38^ of votes cast in 1974.^^^ On this basis it is argued that 
the importance of the factors generating a political identification with 
the Labour Party as the party of the trade unions diminished. Does TASS's 
record indicate the presence of countervailing factors among some sections 
of the white-collar labour force? And if so, how would such a development 
fit into modern theories of trade unionism and industrial relations?
These latter questions notwithstanding, the present work remains 
exploratory with respect to national leadership, politics and membership 
wage militancy. Therefore, only questions (a), (b) and (c) are of central 
concern to the present enquiry though comment will be made on the others.
(6) Under the impact of, inter alia, the 'cold war' and Khruschev's
'revelations' at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a number of unions
moved away from overt 'leftwing' influence. For example, given 
the TUC's campaign against Communists in 1948-49, a number of 
unions including the TGWU excluded Communists from holding office 
by a rule-change, leading in the case of the TGWU to the removal 
of Communists from its executive and from among its full-time 
officers. In relationship to Khruschev's speech, the entire 
Communist Party membership on the Fire Brigade's Union executive 
resigned from the Communist Party for example.
(7) This view is well argued for the period up to 1966 by Butler and 
Stokes, 'Political Change in Britain', 1969.
By way of introduction, attention is turned to a brief survey of 
recent industrial relations literature on 'left-wing' practice in British 
unions and this is followed by an outline of the method of the thesis.
1. 'LEFTWING' PRACTICE IN BRITISH UNIONS
Clegg(^) provides a useful description of the 'left' in British 
unions. He notes that the 'left', whether in leadership or not, is 
usually an alliance of members of different political groups and indicates 
the main groups as:
"Communists along with anyone who is prepared to vote with 
them. In many unions, this includes leftwing Labour Party 
supporters."(9)
In an important passage in his Research Paper for the Donovan 
Commission, H u g h e s i n  discussing the role of the Communist Party with 
respect to democracy in British unions, covers the main views on 'leftwing' 
activity. Two areas of interest are identifiable. Firstly, statements 
or assertions on 'leftwing' aims; and secondly, some analysis of the inter­
action between 'left' oppositions and union memberships out of which the 
'left' has achieved some measure of power in unions. Consider both areas 
in turn.
1.1 'Leftwing aims'
The generally accepted view of 'leftwing' aims is probably encompassed 
by Wigham's statement that the 'left'
"are constantly spreading and prolonging strikes, and 
advocating unreasonable wage demands ... their primary 
concern is to forward the interests not of the (union) 
members, except possibly in a vague long-term sort of 
way, but of the Soviet Union".(11)
(8) 'The system of industrial relations in Great Britain', Clegg, 1970.
(9) Ibid., p.97.
(10) 'Trade union structure and government', Hughes, Research paper no. 5, 
(Part 2), HMSO, I967.
(11) "What's wrong with the unions?", Wigham, p.129, I96I.
Apart from this statement, it is difficult to find further, more 
concrete statements on ’left' aims in British industrial relations 
literature. Clegg, for example, in 'The System of Industrial Relations
( 12)in Great Britain' , ^ spends no more than a dozen pages, out of a total
of around 450, on 'left' activity in unions and never tackles the question
of aims. Flanders, while berating 'leftwing' intellectuals for their work 
(13)
on unions,  ^ ' fails to address himself to the question of the aims of
'leftwing' activists in unions. The same is true for contemporary 'left- 
wing' theorists. Neither Allen nor Hyman, for example, probe in any depth 
the aims of the 'left' in British u n i o n s . T h i s  lack of interest in 
'leftwing' aims by industrial relations theorists is not helpful to 
empirical study in that there are few guidelines to follow and no hypotheses 
to test.
Hughes notes that any discussion on 'left' activity in unions faces 
an additional difficulty, namely that 'left' activity
"is a subject on which there is little likelihood of 
establishing an area of agreement even as to the 
vocabulary to be used in describing the situation / 
let alone as to the facts or principles involved."^ '
One interpretation of this statement is that it restates the common­
place that theorising in the social sciences is not value-free and that 
principles, vocabulary and definitions of facts are often disputed. It 
goes further than this however. The conflict between 'left' and 'right* 
can be viewed in practice as well as in theory, as representing for the 
participants the crucial ever-present struggle based on what are in effect
(12) Clegg, op.cit.
(13) 'Management and Unions', Flanders, p.38-39, 1970.
(14) See, for example, 'Militant trade unionism', Allen, 1966, and Hyman, 
op.cit.
(15) Hughes, op.cit.
world-outlooks which, no matter the variations held by individuals 
or 'schools' within each, are diametrically opposed. This conflict 
entails attitudes to national and international political, economic and 
industrial issues^^^^ as well as to local and union matters, which 
are derived from the assumptions underlying both world-outlooks which 
themselves give rise to the disagreement over vocabularies and principles 
noted by Hughes.
It is not possible to elucidate the detailed nature and scope of this
disagreement in this introduction; such elucidation as is required, is given
in later sections of this thesis. But at a general political level, the
dispute over principle and vocabulary can be seen in many textbooks; see,
for example, Popper's 'The Open Society and the Enemies' and one of the
('17')
replies to it, Cornforth's 'The Open Philosophy'.^  ^ In industrial 
relations theory compare, for example, Flanders' 'Management and Unions' 
with Allen's 'The Sociology of Industrial Relations'.
1.2 'Leftwing' paths to power
The second area of interest identifiable in Hughes' Research Paper 
deals with analyses of the interaction between 'left' oppositions and 
union memberships out of which the 'left' has achieved some measure of 
influence in British unions. Hughes argues that historically the main 
basis of 'leftwing' influence in unions arises from the 'left's' ability 
to connect some version of socialist ideology onto spontaneous industrial 
militancy, but that
"this does not mean ... that there are not special 
features attaching to its mode of operation."(19)
(16) As even a cursory glance at a TUC annual report will reveal
(17) Popper, 1945, reprinted I966, and Cornforth, I968.
(18) Flanders, op.cit, and Allen, 1971.
(19) Hughes, op.cit, p.70.
Hughes indicates three examples in which special features can be 
seen to affect the operation of the socialist ideology/industrial militancy 
c o n n e c t i o n . F i r s t l y ,  the 'left' have achieved a measure of power
"where they were able to identify themselves with 
historical - and often local - militancies specific 
to particular industries."(21)
The special feature in this example is the historical/local rather 
than national factor, Hughes points to South Wales, Glasgow, North East 
England and the factory trades in London as such areas of localised 
militancy. The relative ease of achieving power based on local militancy 
is counterposed to the difficulty of doing so nationally; Hughes notes, in 
paraphrasing Turner, that the period of 'leftwing' control in the Electricians' 
Union was the one case in which the 'left' were able to exploit an association 
with the engineering industries' tradition of shop steward militancy to the
(22)point of achieving national control.^ ^
Secondly, Hughes argues that the 'left' provide a readymade vehicle 
for canalising rank-and-file protest. In particular he emphasises not 
simply the subversive manipulation of votes but the provision of policy cum 
election platforms, thus:
"Once both publicity and a platform have ... been secured, 
the low participation of members in union elections only 
facilitates the capture of union office by fraction 
methods."(23)
The special feature is the interaction of 'left' platforms and low member­
ship participation.
The third example is where the 'left', by filling a vacuum created 
by the official trade union leaderships' unwillingness to alter the 
policy-making machinery of the movement, have gained influence if not in
(20) Hughes indicates that these examples are drawn from Turner, 'Trade 
union growth, structure and policy', I962.
(21) Turner, quoted by Hughes, op.cit, p.70.
(22) Hughes, op.cit, p.70-71.
(23) Turner, quoted by Hughes, ibid, p.71.
fact a real measure of power. Hughes refers to the 'left's* leading role 
in establishing combine committees of shop stewards, and this can be extended 
to industry-wide and occasionally national bodies. An example of the 
latter in the 1920s and 1930s would be the National Minority Movement 
and in the 1960s and 1970s, the Liaison Committee for the Defence of 
Trade Unions.
A fourth example is drawn from the case-study union, TASS, by Roberts,
Loveridge and Gennard. They argue that an influx of dilutees into the
union during the Second World War, in that they were promoted in the main
from the shop floor and had acquired no 'professional' identity, was the
basis upon which the 'left' were able to organise an eventually successful
challenge to the 'rightwing' leadership. Roberts et al do not argue that
the dilutees were militant, only that their lack of a professional identity
enabled the 'left' to organise them, though the tenor of the argument
(24)suggests that such militancy can be imputed.^ ^
One interpretation which can be put on all four examples, or more 
correctly, on the underlying connection between socialist ideology and 
industrial militancy, is that the 'left' has. a parasitic relationship 
with union memberships, identifying with and reinforcing but not creating 
the conditions out of which they, the 'left', achieve power; that the 
forces generating militancy are unconnected with those generating socialist 
ideology and that the 'left' emerging from the latter, live off the former.
This separation of the roots of industrial militancy from those of 
socialist ideology would seem to find a parallel in 'leftwing' literature 
on trade unions. For example, the most familiar statement of Lenin's 
position is that
"the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is 
able to develop only trade-union consciousness ...
The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the 
philosophical, historical and economic theories
(24) 'Reluctant militants', Roberts, Loveridge and Gennard, p.83, 1972.
elaborated by educated representatives of the 
propertied classes, by intellectuals",(25)
A more detailed reading of Lenin on trade union consciousness leads 
however to a more complex relationship. In the formative years of 
capitalism and thus trade unionism, those forms of expressions of working 
class resistance such as revolts, machine-breaking, industrial rioting, 
what Lenin called the 'spontaneous element',
"represents nothing more nor less than consciousness 
in an EMBRYONIC FORM".(26)
This primitive consciousness stems from
"workers losing their age-long faith in the permanence 
of the system which oppresse(s) them ,,."(27)
These early actions are more in the nature of outbursts of desperation
and vengeance than of conscious struggle, but subsequent and better organised
strike action represents only revolutionary "class struggle in embryo",
is not yet revolutionary consciousness, and is in effect trade union
(28)consciousness,
"The history of all countries shows that the working 
class exclusively by its own effort, is able to 
develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e, the 
conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, 
fight the employers, and strive to compel the govern­
ment to pass necessary labour legislation, etc."(29)
Such trade union consciousness
"gravitates towards socialism ... in the sense that 
socialist theory reveals the causes of the misery 
of the working class more profoundly and more
correctly than any other theory, and for this
(25) 'What is to be done?', Lenin (1902), Progress Publishers, 9th 
printing, 1973, p.31-32.
(26) ibid., p.31, emphasis in the original.
(27) ibid.
(28) ibid.
(29) ibid., p.31-32
reason the workers are able to assimilate it 
so easily ..."(30)
Thus for Lenin, there is an organic rather than parasitic relation­
ship between industrial militancy and socialist ideology. Primitive 
activity such as machine-breaking is seen as indicative of working class 
appreciation of the impermanence of capitalism and thus as entailing its 
replacement. Better organised trade union action is seen as revolutionary 
class struggle in embryo and when combined with the explanatory power of 
socialist theory, leads to revolutionary consciousness. It is this latter 
connection which Lenin sees as providing the foundation for 'left’ advance 
in trade unions rather than a straightforward parasitic connection.
The two views outlined, one which sees the 'left' as parasitically 
and the other as organically connected to militancy, concentrate on an 
observable industrial relations process: as such they are of relevance 
to later sections of this thesis.
X X X  X X
This brief survey of British industrial relations literature on 
'leftwing' practice in British trade unions serves as an introduction 
to the central area of enquiry of this thesis - the investigation of the 
relationships between a national union leadership, revolutionary politics 
and membership wage militancy. It also highlights a major problem facing 
such an investigation; the existence of diametrically opposed assumptions 
and vocabularies with respect to revolutionary politics. This raises 
the question of how to approach the material to be studied, in essence 
what methodology to adopt. The method chosen is that of a historical 
study, based on certain of the union's records. The principal sources
(30) ibid., f.n. p.42.
consist of the published shorthand transcripts of the annual policy­
making conferences and the monthly union journal. The former contain not
only records of votes, policy decisions and extensive statistical reviews,
(31)
but also the dialogue of all debates,' ’ while the latter record monthly 
reports of the work of the union's executive committee as well as 
editorial and other policy material. Attention is focused on particular 
issues to see how the 'left' reacted to them and how it developed its 
policy responses. The key issues are seen as the development of the 
union's wages and industrial policy and its responses to incomes policies 
and industrial relations legislation. This particular selection of issues 
involves making a judgement as to their relative importance as against 
others, but the choice may be defended on the ground that they provide 
strong tests of the union's response to political and economic events.
As will be seen in later chapters, these issues provoked important policy 
discussions within the union. They are set in the context of a short, overall 
history of the union for the period under consideration. This should permit 
reasonable evaluation of the questions posed earlier in relation to TASS, 
specifically:-
a. what conditions or circumstances allowed TASS to promote and 
sustain a 'leftwing' leadership?
b. what aims did the 'left' pursue and what place had wage militancy 
within them? and
c. what was the 'left' leadership's estimate of its success in pursuing 
its aims and how far does the estimate accord with the factual 
record; in particular, how far did the 'left' generate the wage 
militancy displayed by the membership and how far did it 
determine its form?
(31) Such dialogue is available up to 19^7; thereafter the format 
of annual reports change and dialogue is excluded.
This evaluation having been completed, the results obtained are 
used to investigate the more general relationships, i.e. those between 
leadership, revolutionary politics and wage militancy, by way of setting 
the results against certain industrial relations controversies connected 
with wage militancy, specificallyi-
a. The 'blue collar/white collar' debate.
b. The 'pluralist/Marxist' debate, and
c. The 'Ross/Dunlop' trade union wage policy debate.
The first three questions, the TASS-specific questions, provide the 
focus for Chapters 2 to 5. Each of the second group of questions provides 
the focus for Chapters 6 to 8 respectively.
CHAPTER II
TASS - MEMBERSHIP STRUCTURE. ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP IDEOLOGY
The primary purpose of Chapters II, III, IV and V is to trace out 
the major strands of the union’s development. These chapters are mainly 
descriptive and are intended to provide a necessary basis of fact which will 
form a foundation for the development of the questions posed in the thesis. 
Of necessity the approach to the material has been selective and a number 
of facets of the union's development central to the focus of the thesis 
are singled out and treated in some detail.
This chapter covers membership, organisation and leadership ideology. 
Chapter 111 deals with developments in wages and industrial policy and 
related financial questions. Chapter IV looks at developments in the 
union's platform on incomes policy for the period 1945 to I963. Finally, 
Chapter V looks at the same area of policy for the period 1964 to 1970.
Major emphasis is placed on the development of wages and industrial policy 
which is treated for the full period of the union's existence and is seen 
as providing some continuity of historical perspective in an area which 
is central to the thesis, whereas the other facets are tackled in the 
main for the post-1945 period.
A number of other writers have discussed the history or workings of 
TASS, e.g. Mortimer,Wootton^^^ and C l e g g . T h e  following chapters 
reappraise the work of these authors and qualify their conclusions in a 
number of respects. In particular, it would seem necessary to re-assess 
the implication in Mortimer's official history that the growing wage mili­
tancy of the late 1940s and early 1950s was simply a continuation of
(1) Mortimer, 'History of the AESD', I96O - the official union history.
(2) Wootton, 'Parties in Union Government: the AESD', Political Studies, 
June, 1961.
(3) Clegg, 'The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain', 1970.
a pre-1939 militancy. There is no evidence to support a continuation 
of militancy thesis; all the evidence points to a fundamental break between 
the pre-1939 period and the post-1950 period, with the decade of the 1940s 
providing a transitional period from non-militancy to militancy. This 
qualification applies even more forcibly to Wootton's statements cate­
gorising the pre-1939 period as 'guerilla warfare' militancy. These
(4)points are detailed where appropriate in the ensuing text.
There also emerges from the work of this chapter a reconciliation 
of Clegg's claim that TASS has been controlled from 1950 by 'left-wingers' 
with that of Vootton which dates 'left' control from 1958. The recon­
ciliation has to do with aspects or levels of leadership; the 'left' provided 
leadership on official union policy from roughly 1950 onwards, but only gained 
a majority on the executive committee and among the full-time officials 
and hence control of policy implementation in 1958.
It may facilitate understanding of the work of this chapter and of 
the next, if the overall structure of the conclusions with respect to 
'left-wing' advance and the progression to 'militancy' is given here.
Dealing only with the post-1945 period, the 'left' dominated official 
union policy formation on all major issues through their majority control 
of the union's annual conference for the full period of the late 1940s 
up until 1973 and, after becoming the majority on the Executive Committee 
and among the full-time Divisional Organisers in 1958, coupled policy 
implementation to policy formation.
This progression from policy formation to policy formation and 
implementation - the translation of militant policies into militant 
activities -, is made more dynamic and complex on the one hand and somewhat 
tempered on the other, by the existence in practice of a quite distinct 
separation between what may be called 'internal' and 'external' policy 
implementation.
(4) See below, p. 45-47.
On the one hand, the 'left', because of their majority at annual 
conference and thus control of delegations to the TUC, Labour Party, etc., 
were able to implement policy at 'external* bodies prior to 1958 even 
with a 'rightwing' majority on the Executive Committee. Prior to 1958 
the 'left' were able to implement all those policies which were in the 
first instance external to the union, i.e. essentially those not requiring 
an immediate membership response. After 1958 external implementation was 
reinforced by internal implementation, i.e. essentially those requiring 
an immediate membership response.
The internal/external distinction, when superimposed on the policy 
formation/policy implementation progression, provides a useful classifi­
cation of the dynamics of 'left' advance and the progression to 'militancy''. 
Policy formation coupled to external implementation provided a major 
foundation for 'left' majority control in 1958. For example, some of 
those who promoted 'left' policies at the union's conferences were chosen 
to pursue them at external bodies and were eventually promoted to become 
the majority on the Executive. The legitimacy accorded to the 'left' by 
the union's conference for its work both in policy formation and in external 
implementation enabled them in the 1960s to maintain and develop militant 
policies and to pursue internal implementation even to the extent of calling 
for activity from the membership which was technically illegal, e.g. in 
breaking the 1965 and 196? incomes policy. At no time after 1958 was the 
'left's' legitimacy seriously questioned and they were able to utilise 
the full machinery of the union to obtain positive membership responses 
to their policies.
On the other hand, the 'rightwing' Executive were forced into a 
partial internal implementation of certain policies prior to their replace­
ment in 1958, e.g. they were forced to introduce the payment of 100^ net 
wages as strike pay but were able to resist pressure to give official 
encouragement to strike.
1. MEMBERSHIP
1.1 Structure
TASS is the main and longest running 'continuous association' 
representing draughtsmen, tracers and engineering technicians in the 
British trade union m o v e m e n t . I t  was founded in 1913 on Clydeside^^^ 
out of the general disturbance created in the draughtsmen's 'craft' due 
to the rapid technological change in the engineering and shipbuilding 
industries. Induced by military expansion and further stimulated by the 
Clydeside employers' 'no-poaching' agreement and the wartime Government's 
arbitrary use of 'leaving certificates', the AESD had built up a rudi­
mentary national organisation by 1918. It had 11,500 members in 1922 and
signed its first procedure agreement with the Engineering and Allied
(?)Employers' National Federation in 1924.  ^ ' A similar occurrence took place 
during the Second World War so that whereas in 1939 membership stood at
( s)around 19,000, extended 'procedural cover'^  ^ coupled to wartime expansion
and further technological change had boosted membership to around 39,000
(9)by 1946.
As Table I shows, membership^fluctuated during the inter-war
(5) See Mortimer, op.cit., pp. 8-10, for prior 'associations' of 
draughtsmen and technicians.
(6) Up until a few years ago 'custom and practice' in the union ensured 
that the Clydebank Branch was always located in the No. 1 division.
(7) Mortimer, op.cit., p.l, 431 and IO6,
(9) Mortimer makes no mention of Governmental intervention to achieve 
this extended 'procedural cover', a point Bain, 'The Growth of White- 
Collar Unionism', 1970, p.l6l-2, sees as important.
(10) The union uses three methods of calculating 'membership'. Firstly,
'book membership', i.e. those "on Branch Registers at the Beginning
of Each Year"; secondly, 'paying membership' i.e. "based on the annual 
branch financial statements"; thirdly, 'virtual membership' i.e. total 
annual subscription income for membership class divided by the full 
year's subscription per member for the class, the various class 'virtual 
memberships' then added to give a total. (Source: Reports of Union 
Conferences). As might be expected, where figures are available for all 
three calculations, 'book membership' is higher than 'paying membership' 
which in turn is higher than 'virtual membership'. As is probably the 
case with most union membership figures, major discrepancies are apparent 
in the time series available for this study and these are noted where 
applicable. In general, however, 'paying membership' is used throughout 
this study supplemented where necessary by the figures for 'book membership
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years, yet Mortimer is probably correct in pointing out that while
"the increase in membership which took place in the 
latter months of 1930 and throughout 1931 was a 
reflection of the favourable rates of the Association’s 
unemployment benefit ... (as) ... workers ... joined
the AESD as an insurance against unemployment ...
the stability of the AESD during the depression was 
a sure indication that it had assumed a permanent 
place in the engineering industry and in the structure 
of British trade unionism."(ll)
While this permanence was thus established early in its life, and 
while membership expanded rapidly both during and after the Second World 
War, the union's rate of growth had fallen significantly by 1954 and this 
stagnation re-opened a debate around the questions of recruitment policy 
and the job categories eligible for recruitment. The eventual outcome
was a fundamental change in the union's rules in I96I. This 'opened'
the union up to a range of technicians who had previously been considered 
outside the 'closed' cluster of skills surrounding the draughtsman. This 
expansion of membership categories was reflected in the change in title 
from the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen to the 
Draughtsmen's and Allied Technicians' Association, a change suggested 
as early as 1943 during a previous debate on recruitment and degrees of
( 12)'openness'.' ' In the ten years during which this change was operational, 
i.e. 1961-70, membership rose from 60,000 to 77,000 though nearly 7,000 
of this difference is accounted for in the twelve months April I969 to 
April 1970, a growth phenomenon which continued into 1971 with an increase 
of 16,000 as shown in Table I, and which affected most unions.
In 1970, in a very high postal vote, the overwhelming majority of the 
union's membership decided on an initially federal merger with the AEU, 
the Constructional Engineering Union and the Foundry Workers to form the 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers of which DATA was to become the
(11) Mortimer, op.cit., p.164-3.
(12) R.C. Conference Reports, 1955, I96I and 1943.
Technical and Supervisory Section, i.e. TASS. In 1973 this title was 
changed to Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section, so that since 
then TASS has operated as an 'open' white-collar union recruiting, e.g. 
typists, foremen, technologists, etc. mainly in the field of engineering. 
Membership expanded from 93,120 to 101,508 in the first three years of the 
TASS period.
Other merger negotiations also took place. A proposed merger with
the Scientific Workers in the 1960s was rejected by TASS partly on the
grounds that the A.Sc.W. membership was not primarily based in engineering
and partly on the grounds that this membership was unlikely to be able
to pursue a militant industrial policy. Recent events have shown this 
( 14)
view to be false. Negotiations were held with APEX with a view to
amalgamation, but again did not come to fruition; in the words of the 
Executive Committee Report to the TASS 1973 Conference:
"The basic reason has been the unwillingness of APEX 
to regard engineering as its main sphere. This union 
(a p e x) prefers to attempt to compete with ASTMS in the 
general white-collar field of commerce, banking, 
insurance etc." (l5)
The amalgamation with the three blue-collar engineering unions is unlikely 
to produce a classical industrial union due to the existence of other 
particularly general unions in the field,yet the objective of an industrial
union in engineering is official TASS policy although it still recruits
, . . (16) outside engineering.' '
Procedure agreements with respect to all membership categories from
the relevant employers' organisation have not been forthcoming for the
TASS period of the union's history. They were never fully achieved for
(13) R.C. Conference Reports, 1971 and 1973*
(14) R.C, Conference Report, 19^7 and ASTMS strikes of 1971-74.
(15) Report of E.C. to 1973 Conference, p.24.
(16) R.C. Conference Report, 1971, p.171.
either the DATA or AESD periods as there was a continued lag between the
union's claim to procedural coverage and the employers acceptance of it
nationally. However, this lack of national success did not prevent TASS
from pursuing recognition at local or plant level and the leadership
increasingly encouraged drawing office committees and groups of members
to recruit outside their own occupational g r o u p s , A  long list of
occupations from which recruits are being drawn is published regularly in
/13)
the union's monthly journal.^
No precise information is available on the numerical strengths of the 
various occupational groups within the membership for any point in the 
union's history. All that can be said with any safety is that prior to 
1961 the bulk of the membership were draughtsmen (recruited to the 'craft' 
mainly from blue-collar sources)^^^^ plus related occupations, e.g. tracers, 
planning engineers, estimators, etc., that this occupational grouping 
was probably declining as a proportion of the membership in the late 1950s 
and that it continued to decline during the 1960s, such that by January 
1972 only some 70^ of the membership were in the 'traditional occupations',
i.e. pre-1961 occupations clustered around the 'draughtsmen'.
1.2 Concentration and Density
Membership concentration in the sense of the proportion of membership 
employed by any one or a few employers, is not often used in discussions 
on trade unionism apart perhaps from those on the public sector or in 
regional or local situations. While it is not possible to present such 
concentration figures for TASS for different time periods, some indication
(17) See for example, Roberts, Loveridge &  Gennard, 'The Reluctant 
Militants', p.87, 1972.
(is) Such a list of occupations is attached as Appendix I.
(19) Mortimer, op.cit., p.415.
(20) Figure supplied by TASS Research Dept,
can be given for recent years which may represent an important trend and
which may bear on the main theme of this study.
Thus, in 1972/3 approximately 50^ of the membership was accounted
for by 30 separate firms and 70,000 members, rougdy 70^, were employed
in 120 separate firms, (These figures do not allow for some 6,000
'single members' whose exclusion would increase the percentages to 53^ and
73^.) Three separate firms accounted for some 19-24^; GEC Ltd., 7-10^;
( 21 )Rolls-Royce Ltd., 7-8^; and Hawker-Siddeley, 3-6^u Since no statistics
are available for earlier years, it cannot be concluded that the mergers 
'boom' of the late 1960s and early 1970s alone produced this concentration, 
though the union's reaction to it is perhaps salutory in this respect.
Thus :
"Conference has recognised for a number of years the 
impact that monopolisation of industry will have 
upon the whole field of industrial relations. The 
1969 R.C. Conference approved arrangements for 
organisation within the large combines".
The 1971 Conference subsequently approved detailed arrangements 
for the establishment of some 40 'combine' or 'group' industrial representa­
tion committees to be co-ordinated and serviced by a Divisional Organiser 
and E.C. member (in addition to their territorial duties) under the overall 
co-ordination of the Deputy General Secretary, thus tightening up the loose
( 22)
'combines' organisation of earlier years.' '
Looked at from the point of view of density of white-collar unionism, 
TASS achieved a marked degree of success among draughtsmen. Bain's work 
on the growth of white-collar unionism shows that density among draughtsmen 
in 1964 for all manufacturing industries (all of whom were organised by 
TASS) was 48.7^, the highest of any white-collar union and ranged from 3.8^
(21) R.C. Conference Reports, 1973, p.23 and 164 for GEC; 1971, p.13 for 
R-R; TASS Research Dept, supplied figures for Hawker-Siddeley,
(22) R.C. Conference Report, 1971, p.l66 and I69.
in Chemicals, through 50^ in Metal Manufacturing and Electrical Engineering 
and 67^ in Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, to 80^ in Vehicles.
2. ORGANISATION AND CONSTITUTIQN^^^^
Few changes have taken place in either the organisational or 
constitutional structure of TASS over its history which might bear on 
the subject matter of this study. The treatment here, therefore, is 
in the main static with relevant changes inserted where applicable,
2.1 Offices, Branches and Divisions
In its evidence to the Donovan Commission, the union stated that:
"The basic unit of organisation in DATA is the office 
in which members are employed." (25)
Each'office' is required by rule (dating from 1919) to elect a 
'corresponding member' (CM), the TASS equivalent of a shop steward, and 
an 'office committee'. The CM's functions are varied and include the 
distribution (annually) of the individual salary census forms and the 
completion of the master census form^^^^ on general conditions of employ­
ment, etc., the monthly distribution of the union journal, the weekly
(23) Bain, op,cit.. Table 3*8, p.35.
(24) This section is included in order to aid the later analysis 
of the power-struggle within the union and of leadership 
implementation of militancy. The position given is at 
December 1973.
(25) Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associa­
tions, Minutes of Evidence no. 36, HMSO, I966. See also 
Mortimer, op.cit., p.75.
(26) Individual census forms are filled in privately by each member 
and forwarded to the Divisional Organiser by the CM. The general 
statistics are compiled by the DO in such a way that no one individual's 
wages can be ascertained, and the stats, are then sent back to the CM 
for the perusal of his members; an 'open* copy is sent by the DO to 
headquarters. Also see below, p. 39 and 47.
( 27)distribution of the 'Vacancy List',  ^ the distribution of all letters 
and literature received from the branch, Divisional Council (DC) and 
'headquarters', as well as the normal negotiating functions of shop steward.
He may also act as secretary to the 'office committee'.
Branches are groups of 'offices' in one or a few 'plants' in a 
specific geographical area, i.e. are based on place of employment rather
than place of residence, (though the number of 'factory* branches is
small), and are made up solely of lay members meeting monthly with sub­
committees, e.g. the 'minimum wage committee'. Each branch is responsible 
for the election of its Divisional Council Delegate, (annual) Representative 
Council (,RC) Conference Delegate and has one vote in each of the periodic 
elections for the Divisional Council Chairman, Secretary and Executive 
Committee Member (all lay members). With the exception of motions and 
amendments submitted by the Executive Committee,. branches alone are 
responsible for motions and amendments to the supreme policy-making bo<%", 
the RC Conference. Branches can mandate both their DC delegate and RC
Conference Delegate. There were 1?1 branches in 1950, 199 in 1958 and 247
in 1973.
The Divisional Councils, i.e. groups of branches which are territorially 
based, have a full-time Divisional Organiser (DO) assigned to them by 
the Executive Committee. The DCs, made up of one delegate from each 
branch plus Chairman, Secretary, EC member and DO, are responsible for 
the month-to-month running of the Divisions, lay members only having
(27) Journals, one per member, and TASS News (Vacancy List) two per 
office, are posted by headquarters to the CM's private address, 
not to the branch, as is much of the general correspondence 
from both Divisional Council and EC. Various leadership pro­
nouncements indicate that mailing to the CM's private address rather 
than the branch is seen as ensuring a greater likelihood that the 
material actually reaches the members in the CM's offices. See 
below, p. 40, for role of Vacancy List.
(28) Divisional Councils are not in fact responsible for a 'district 
rate' with respect to wages as Roberts et.al., op.cit., p.76 claim. 
The really operative rate is the nationally set 'minimum rate' of 
which more below, p. 39/ 48, though of course a 'Divisional average 
wage’ will be used in negotiations on occasions.
voting powers. They are also responsible for certain Divisional commit­
ments, e.g. holding youth and adult weekend schools, agreeing to the DO's 
monthly report on claims, disputes etc. to the EC and where applicable, the 
election of delegations to the regional TUCs and regional Labour Party 
conferences etc.
DCs can, and often do, make suggestions to the EC or send motions 
to the EC, as can branches, office committees and individual members, but 
perhaps the real strength of the DCs lies in their ability to mandate their 
EC member with respect to forthcoming issues at the EC. There were 14 DCs 
in 1950, 15 in 1958 and 26 in 1975.
2,2 Representative Council Conference
While branches and Divisional Councils are obviously policy-making 
bodies with respect to their particular level of operation, the supreme 
policy-making body is the Representative Council Conference held annually 
by rule (or more often if required). RC Conference is made up of one 
delegate from each branch and with the exceptions noted below, only branch 
delegates have voting powers. On policy motions and amendments each 
delegate carries a vote equal to the (paying) branch membership, but on 
changes to rules (Rules Revision Conferences take place every three years) 
and in electing officials, delegations and Conference committees, each 
delegate exercises one vote only. Given 171 branches in 1950 expanding to 
247 in 1975» RC Conference remains a fairly intimate gathering.
Conference elects the union's President and Vice-President and both 
have full voting powers, the President serving for one year then becoming 
the 'immediate' Past President.
(51 )The Divisional EC members, the General Treasurer, the General
(29) Rule no. 57, sections a, b and c.
(30) Rule no, 57, section d, parts 2 and 3.
(31) General Treasurer - lay member elected by the EC.
Secretary, Deputy General Secretary, and the two Assistant Secretaries 
plus all the DOs attend Conference with full rights of participation in 
debate but with no voting powers.
Conference, however, does not directly elect the full-time officials 
(i.e. General Secretary, Deputy and Assistants and DOs who all serve for 
'life') but does elect the committees which select them, these committees 
usually being composed of EC members, though Conference retains the right
(32)to accept or reject the choice of the committees.^ '
Thus while the EC is only formally responsible for the general manage­
ment of the union between Conferences under policies laid down by Conference, 
the power of the Divisional mandate plus the almost constitutional right 
to select the full-time officers, places the EC in a powerful position. 
Decisions of the EC can, of course, be challenged by Conference, though
policy decisions rather than personnel decisions would seem more likely 
(33)
to be overturned.' /
The President chairs the EC and is charged by Conference to guard
its rights and policies on the EC.
2.3 The Executive Committee
Membership of the EC has both a territorial and functional basis.
The territorial element comprises the lay EC member elected by the
branches in each Division, i.e. 26 territorially-based EC members in 
1973* The functional members are of two kinds, lay and full-time. The 
former are the President, Vice President, 'immediate' Past President,
General Treasurer, and a Women's R e p r e s e n t a t i v e . T h e  full-time
(32) This right of acceptance or rejection has always resulted in 
acceptance perhaps because the person selected has taken up the 
appointment prior to the exercise of the right, thus rejection 
would be tantamount to 'sacking'.
(33) See below,p.49/55, with reference to policy debates in the early 1950s.
(34) Women's Rep. - a product of the 1922 absorption of the Tracers' union
and commitment to EC representation; elected by the National Women's 
Sub Committee which is made up of one delegate per Division.
officials are the General Secretary, the Deputy General Secretary and
two Assistant Secretaries. Only lay-memhers vote, so that as of 1973»
there were 31 voting members and 4 non-voting members. While as in most
unions the full-time officials and in particular the General Secretary,
carry great influence in discussions and hence decisions at any level in
the union (including the EC), the territorial vote is always able to command
a majority over the functional vote should division occur.
It has been said of this organisational and constitutional framework
that it has much in common with the fine balance of the Nineteenth Century
craft association particularly in terms of the formal division of power 
( 13)
within TASS, and this has changed little if at all over the history
of the union.
There have, of course, been changes in the scope of organisation, 
e.g. new branches and Divisional Councils, new sub-committees at all levels, 
and in the bureaucratic functions and posts relating to the number of 
full-time officials. There have also been changes in the balance of power 
between the various levels in the union, particularly during the "struggles 
for national power which have punctuated the unionfe history". Some 
of these changes in organisation and in the 'balance of power' are dealt 
with in the next section on 'Leadership Ideology'.
Changes have also taken place in a whole range of advisory bodies 
set up over the union's history, and the previous section examined changes 
in 'combine advisory committees', for example.
3. LEADERSHIP IDEOLOGY
3.1 The Generally Accepted View
That TASS has a reputation not only for industrial militancy but also 
for a 'left-wing' bias across a whole range of policy issues and a 'left'
(35) Roberts, et al., op.cit., p.76.
(36) Ibid., p.77.
dominated leadership, is well documented in academic sources.
Clegg, writing in 1970, has noted (as part of a wider survey);
"There is a much smaller number of instances of 
continuous control by a left-wing alliance, including 
the Draughtsmen, among whom such an alliance has held 
power for nearly twenty years" (37)
and as already noted he describes such an alliance as:
"Communists along with anyone who is prepared to vote
with them. In many unions, this includes left-wing 
Labour Party supporters." (38)
Roberts, Loveridge and Gennard, writing on the period up to 1968, also
(39)accept the 'left-wing* dominance in the TASS leadership,' and accept 
Wootton's date of 1958 for the shift, formally, from 'right' to 'left' 
at EC l e v e l . I t  will be shown below that the 'left' still dominates 
the leadership (as of 1973) so that accepting Wootton's date of 1958, the 
'left' has been in control for fifteen years as against Clegg's twenty
up to 1970 or twenty three up to 1973* This difference depends in fact
upon the definition of 'leadership' used with respect to this particular 
union and is resolved if Clegg's period is taken to refer to RC Conference 
only (for the period prior to 1958) and Wootton's period to the EC, full­
time officials and RC Conference (for the period post-1958).
3.2 The Two 'Parties'
It will perhaps expedite the work of this section (and of Chapter III 
on 'wages and industrial policy') if before a history of their relative 
strengths is given, something is said on the major differences between 
the two 'parties'.
f 41)Wootton indicates that the birth of the 'two-party' system' ^
(37) Clegg, op.cit., p.97.
(38) ibid.
(39) Roberts et, al., op.cit., p.83.
(40) Wootton, op.cit., p.150.
(41) Wootton defines "'party' as a 'group of persons holding the same 
opinions, forming an opposing side' in controversial issues of 
Union policy". op.cit., f.n. p.141.
in TASS takes place in the 1940s over a bitter dispute on wages policy 
in which the Communist Party members in the union emerge as a small 
but cohesive g r o u p . T h e  dispute went as follows:
"In 1940, the Executive Committee survived the 
first attack on its position ... but in the 
following year, it had to admit defeat. In 
1942 ... again it was defeated .. (And) in 1943 
... after a hard battle ... and again in defiance 
of the Executive Committee ... (the opposition’s) 
policy ... was at last securely established as an 
Association objective". (43)
Out of these policy battles emerged the ’two-party’ system (the 
’right’ according to Wootton being the initiators) with policy programmes, 
group meetings, voting lists and chief whips on both sides at RC Conferences^^^^ 
which structured the policy debates and voting for official union positions 
from the late 1940s through until the mid-1960s and which resulted in the 
’left’ party replacing the ’right’ as a majority on the EC in 1958.
The central difference between the two parties is to be found - 
in line with Clegg's description of 'left-wing alliance' - in different 
perceptions of the role of C o m m u n i s t s i n  the union. At one level this 
relates purely and simply to whether or not the non-Coramunist majority 
will tolerate them in the official structure of the union. Generally 
the 'right' in TASS was only prepared to work with them under the duress 
imposed by the democracy of the union, i.e. not to work with them would be 
undemocratic while the non-Communist 'left' accepted them as part
(47)of the normal trade union scene. At another level, however, the central
difference relates to different perceptions of what (international)
(42) Ibid., p.147.
(43) Ibid., p.146.
(44) Ibid., p.131.
(45) 'Communists' in both Clegg's and in Wootton's usage, refers to members
of the Communist Party of Great Britain, the largest 'marxist' or
'communist' party in Britain, The other smaller groups are usually 
referred to in the labour movement as 'ultra—left', i.e. to the left 
of the C.P.G.B.
(46) Discrimination on certain political grounds in general and on
Communists in particular was rejected by RC Conference in 1949.
(47) Wootton, op.cit., p.143, 144, 145 and I50.
capitalism Is, how it operates and how it can he changed, and thus is about 
trade unionism's place under capitalism and about what policies the union 
should pursue both industrially and politically. Essentially this resolves 
itself into a question of ideologies and finds its expression in the union 
around the role of the mass party of the working class, the Labour Party, 
and in particular. Labour Governments. The 'right* usually accept the 
managed-capitalism approach of social democracy as an ideology, thus reject­
ing the class analysis of marxism, the inevitability of class struggle and 
the overthrow of capitalism as a social system. To a greater or lesser 
extent the non-Communist 'left' see marxism as an acceptable ideology and 
thus will work with Communists and accept Communist leadership.
At the risk of over-simplifying the actual position in the union, 
'left' and 'right' when used in this thesis with respect to the union imply 
marxist and anti-marxist social democratic respectively. When used to refer 
to the wider trade union and labour movement, the terms imply the broader, 
heterogeneous groupings of normal usage.
3.3 Relative Strengths of the 'Parties'
A survey of motions carried at annual RC Conferences from the mid- 
1940s to 1958 shows that on almost every policy issue the 'left' could 
command a majority. TASS policy on German rearmament, Suez, NATO, 
relationships with East European trade unions etc. was almost continuously 
on the 'left' within the British trade union movement. The position 
on wages and industrial policy is detailed in the next chapter and some 
indication is also given there on how the 'left' conference isolated the 
'right' EC and forced it into a partial implementation of policy. Thus 
Clegg's claim that TASS has been controlled since around 1950 by the 'left'
(48) Ibid., p.144-145.
(49) RC Conference Reports, 1953, 54, 55, and 56.
is correct in so far as it relates to leadership on policy rather than 
leadership on implementation.
It would seem that it was much more difficult for the 'left' to 
gain majorities for full-time union official's posts or to unseat the sitting 
'right-wing' EC members in the Divisions and a more gradual changeover at 
these levels is detailed by Wootton. Thus for the years up to and including 
1958, the following changes took place. In terms of full-time officials 
appointed to 'headquarters', Wootton notes that
"a virtual signal victory for the left was secured 
in 1948, when a dedicated leftist, J. E. Mortimer 
was appointed to the editorship of the Draughtsman.
Four years later another ardent left-wing member of 
the Labour Party, G. H. Doughty ... was elected to 
t h e  vacant General Secretaryship, in the most 
bitterly contested election in the whole history 
of the Union".
Both, however, and Doughty in particular, were selected with support 
outwith the 'left'; in effect the 'right' were not able to maintain a 
completely monolithic vote.^^^^ In retaliation to these 'left' victories, 
the 'right' majority on the EC was able in 1955, through altering the
(51)selection procedure, to select an anti-Communist' ' as Assistant General 
Secretary though while the appointment was allowed to stand, the RC 
Conference gave the EC a "severe drubbing". (it can be noted at this 
juncture that this 1955 appointment is the last occasion for which it has 
been possible to find evidence that a 'right-winger' obtained a full­
time post).
By 1955 therefore, all three 'headquarters' officials were Labour 
Party members split 2:1 in favour of the 'left'.
At the level of full-time Divisional Organiser, Wootton notes
(50) Wootton, op.cit., p.148.
(51) Ibid.
(52) Ibid., p.149.
"in 1948, when there were eight Divisional Organisers 
in the field, who split Right-Left in the proportion 
of 5:3 the balance of power gradually changed, 
until, with a new appointment in 1957, the ratio 
became perhaps 6:3 in favour of the Left",
(53)Only one of the six was a Communist however.
On the EC the balance gradually changed either by new ’left' members 
replacing 'right-wingers' or by some of the uncommitted moving 'left', such 
that by 1958 the balance depended on the election of the Vice-President,
The result was a decisive shift to the 'left' in terms of the vote on the 
EC which the 'left' then consolidated by not re-electing the 'right-wing' 
Treasurer (an EC-elected appointment), replacing him by a "man of moderate 
Labour views" who voted with the 'left' thus effectively further reducing 
the 'right' vote on the EC,
The 'right-wing's' reaction to this perfectly democratic move was 
bitter and highly undemocratic in terms of the union's constitution and 
perhaps went a long way towards removing their grass-roots support among
( 55)the active membership.  ^ Contrary to the union rules, a document was 
circulated amongst the membership which "claimed that the Executive Committee 
had fallen under Communist domination", and there was open talk of 
"secession" and"thirty or forty thousand marching out". Whether Wootton, 
writing closer to the events than the present author is correct or not 
in his view that
"... a breakaway of a substantial number of branches 
was a possibility, given vigorous leadership and 
the help - which would surely have been forthcoming - 
of press and television" (57),
the fact is that the 'left' which included Communists, took majority control
(53) Ibid., p.149-150.
(54) Ibid., p.149. See also correspondence in DATA Journal for Jun., Jul., 
and Aug., 1958.
(55) See below, p. 127 and 128.
(56) Wootton, op.cit., p.150.
(57) Ibid., p.151.
in the union in 1958 and consolidated it in 1959 and I96O, in this latter 
year electing a "powerful Communist member of the Executive Committee" as 
Vi c e - P r e s i d e n t , a n d  have maintained that control ever since. This 
shift to 'left' majority control took place during a period of bitter 
anti-Communism in the British trade union and labour movement. Further 
detail is given in Chapter IV on membership responses to leadership
(59)policies.
By way of concluding the pre-1958 period it is perhaps important 
to note that on Wootton's evidence it would seem that the telling points 
were that the 'right' activists reacted within the union in a hostile way 
to valid democratic decisions, themselves behaving undemocratically in 1955 
and again in 1958, and that they were unable, perhaps because of this, to 
regain the policy initiative at RC Conference and thus present a credible 
alternative to the 'left'.^^^^
A post-1958 estimate of the strength of the parties is difficult 
to give in the same degree of detail as for the pre-1958 period, TASS 
policy on all major issues has continued to be on the 'left' of the trade 
union movement reaching a high period in its campaigning against the I966 
Labour Government's Prices and Incomes policy and then against both 'In 
Place of Strife' and the 1971 Industrial Relations Act. To give two 
examples, longstanding TASS policy on complete opposition to US involvement 
in Vietnam and calling on the British government to dissociate itself from 
such involvement was eventually carried at both Labour Party and TUC 
C o n f e r e n c e s a n d  the union is on record for the removal of all bans
(58) Ibid., p.149.
(59) Anti-Communism perhaps reached its post-1945 high between 1956 - 
the Hungarian 'uprising' and the 20th Congress of the C.P. Soviet 
Union, and I96I - the high Court trial of Communists for 'ballot
rigging'. See p. 86 below.
(60) See below, p. 84-85.
(61) Reports of Labour Party Conference and TUC for I967.
and proscriptions within the Labour Party.
The position with respect to 'headquarters' staff is that with Mortimer's 
resignation from the editorship in I968, Ken Gill, a C o m m u n i s t ^ w a s  
appointed replacement. Consequent upon a reorganisation in 1971, Gill was 
appointed Deputy General Secretary while another Communist, Harry Smith, 
was appointed editor, a post which was reclassified as an Assistant Secretary­
ship with Bob Dickinson, the 'right's' 1955 appointment to Assistant General 
Secretary, also being regraded to Assistant Secretary in charge of administra­
tion. Thus by 1971, of the four 'headquarters' officials, two were in the 
Labour Party and two were members of the CPGB and since there is no evidence 
that either Doughty or Dickinson had changed their political positions, 
they split 3:1 in favour of the 'left'. In May 1974, Gill was appointed 
General Secretary on Doughty's retirai and John Forrester (previously 
a DO as Doughty, Dickinson, Gill and Smith had been prior to their appoint­
ments to 'headquarters') was appointed Deputy General Secretary; he sits on 
the Labour Party's NEC as a TASS-sponsored TU member and is a well-known 
Labour ' leftist*"7^ .1. e. . a~ Warxijst ',
Little detailed information is available on the strength of the parties 
either among EC members or among DOs, though it seems likely not only that 
the 'left's' strength has increased among both groups (Wootton noted that 
soon after the 1958 change in 'government' the sub-committees appointed by 
Conference also reflected the change and this is of particular importance 
in selecting DOs, the 'selectors' usually being EC m e m b e r s ) , but also 
that by the mid- to late-1960s the 'right' had ceased to exist as an
(62) EC Conference Reports, 1972, p.151 and 1973 p.l62-l63.
(63) '.The Sunday Times', 8th September, 1974.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Public Statement at TASS Summer School, 1974, at which the present 
author was in attendance. John Forrester died in October 1978.
(66) Wootton, op.cit., p.149. See also p. 27 above.
organised force within the union at all. It is also likely that the 
Communists have maintained, perhaps even increased, their proportion of 
members among the EC and DOs as well as taking the General Secretaryship 
and Editorship.
Some corroborative material relative to these conclusions is found 
in an article written by a TASS member immediately prior to the 1973 
Conference and published in the weekly paper of the International Socialists, 
the 'Socialist W o r k e r ' . T h e  author of the article is a "TASS office
c o n v e n e r " a n d  was a branch delegate to the 1973 Conference. The
article probably overstates the degree of Communist domination - no 
mention is made of Labour Party members - not least because it is written 
in opposition to the Communists in TASS and to Communists in general.
The article is quoted here at some length in order to allow its tenor to 
be appreciated:
"The leadership of TASS (is) provided predominantly 
by Communist Party members .., Faced with the open 
and vicious Tory attack on wages, TASS retreated.
The once prized tradition of the union had been
set aside. The leadership is no longer responsive
to rank and file activity. Instead, the rank and 
file is encouraged to be submissive to the executive.
There was always a possibility that this note of 
the leadership's song could become dominant. The 
tendency to believe it was more important to win 
a full-time organiser's job for a 'left' than to 
develop rank and file activity was always apparent.
This preoccupation with manning the bureaucracy 
with 'lefts' had its most serious implications for 
the 'broad left'.
At every annual conference the regular broad left 
meeting (69) will attract 95-98 per cent of the 
delegates. The support given to it by activists 
is general and overwhelming.
Yet/
(67) 'Socialist Worker', 3th May 1973, article entitled 'In Memory of
a Great Union'. See also the articles of 27th April and 18th May, 1974,
(68) Ibid., Socialist Worker, May 1973»
(69) See Wootton on such 'meetings', op.cit., p.133.
Yet in recent years, the broad left has been 
involved in no more than making a yearly list (?0) 
of supported candidates for positions within the 
union. The situation has become ridiculous. The 
right wing has been vanquished long ago, but every 
time the broad left merely discusses the mechanics 
of electioneering ... some activists within the 
broad left are being increasingly excluded as the 
Communist Party asserts its domination. The Party 
now holds all the positions of strength inside TASS 
and has done so increasingly since amalgamation with 
the AEU two years ago,"(7l)
While this quotation throws no direct light on the numerical strength 
of the 'left' and of Communists within it at any level in TASS, and while 
it probably over-estimates the extent of Communist influence (as noted 
above, the role of Labour 'lefts' is not dealt with at all), and also of 
the numbers present at the RC Conference "broad left" meeting (95-98^ 
of the delegates leaves only 2-5^ as uncommitted or 'rights' which while 
possible seems highly improbable), it does nevertheless substantiate 
Clegg's 1970 view, Roberts et al's I968 view and the general 'left' 
position which is apparent in the wide range of Conference policy from 
1958 through to 1973»
X X X X"X
The picture that emerges is on the one hand of a tight-knit and 
intimate 'craft-type' organisational structure with the concomitant reliance 
on lay-member control at all levels leading to open hierarchical democracy. 
Membership growth was not markedly fast over the union's history as a whole 
and the bulk of the membership were still as of 1972, from the 'craft 
cluster' around the draughtsman. There was a marked degree of membership 
concentration by company of employment by the early 1970s, though it is 
impossible to be precise about this for earlier years. Organisationally,
(70) See above, p. 30 on 'voting lists' and Wootton, op.cit., p.152 and 153.
(71) 'Socialist worker', op.cit., 1973* See the TASS leadership's reply
to the charge that it retreated under the Tory Government in 1972-74 -
TASS Journal, May, 1974.
the union remained small; the number of branches rose from 171 in 1950, 
to 199 in 1958 and 247 in 1973; these branches were grouped in divisions 
the number of which rose from 14 in 1950, to 15 in 1958 and to 26 in 1973; 
the numbers sitting on the executive committee rose from around 17 in 1950 
to 35 in 1973 and the numbers attending the annual policy-making conference, 
from around 200 to just over 300,
On the other hand is the picture of bitter policy and personnel 
battles based on two party 'machines', out of which the 'left' emerge as 
dominant on policy as early as 1950 and as the democratically elected 
majority both on the EC and among the full-time divisional organisers 
in 1958. The 'rightwing' reacted undemocratically over both the appoint­
ment of the Assistant General Secretary in 1955 and the emergence of the 
'left' majority on the EC in 1958. The 'left' thereafter as will be shown 
in the chapters which follow, coupled policy implementation to the earlier 
policy formation , making the union one of the most wage militant in Britain 
and leading it into amalgamation with the AEU and others.
jy
CHAPTER III
TASS - WAGES AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY
For reasons which will become clear as this chapter develops, the 
history of the union with respect to wages and industrial policy can 
be split fairly easily in the first instance into two periods, pre-1951 
and post-1951.
1. EARLY MILITANCY
Within a few years of its foundation, TASS had evolved a general 
policy on wages and industrial strategy. By 1914, within 15 months 
of its formation, a primitive 'statistical schedule' on wages and 
conditions had been devised and circulated to all unionised offices, 
the results collated nationally (i.e. centrally) and made available to 
the membership generally. This statistical collection has been carried 
out annually^since around 1921-23 with increasing sophistication.
1.1 Early Wages Strategy
In 1919 this statistical information which enabled the union to 
assess with reasonable accuracy the 'going rate' for draughtsmen of 
different age groups, was worked into a wages strategy. Firstly, the 
union intended to establish unilaterally a 'minimum rate* based on an 
evaluation of the 'going rate', below which no member was to accept new 
employment; generally, the minimum rate was seen as a 'target' for bargaining 
purposes for those below the 'rate' and maintenance of differentials with 
respect to the 'rate' was to be the objective of those getting above the
(1) It is not supplemented by a monthly return from all CM's as claimed 
by Roberts et al,, op.cit., p.82, though CMs are requested to submit 
a census return after each change in wages and working conditions.
A modern 'census form' is attached as Appendix II.
'rate’, Secondly, all members were to be required to actually apply 
for jobs through the medium of the union though individuals could accept 
private offers of employment providing these were cleared with the relevant 
union authority. This was called the 'employment control' component.
When voting took place on this proposition - 'minimum rate/employment 
control' - known as the 'control scheme', over 80^ of the membership of 
10,911 voted and over 90^ of those voting, voted in favour though given 
the rules attached to this particular vote, the majority in favour was
(2)
not sufficient to enable the leadership to put the scheme into operation.^ 
Linked to this control scheme was the use of a 'vacancy list' which 
was circulated to all unionised offices on a monthly basis. This listed 
all those firms which had notified the union of job vacancies and who 
thereby received free national advertising of their vacancies, wages and 
conditions, providing these latter were acceptable to the union which 
usually meant those on or above the unilaterally set rates. The Vacancy 
List was also used to inform the membership of firms where conditions were 
particularly bad, a technique known as 'posting'.
In essence this early wages strategy envisaged very tight and 
detailed control of the supply of union labour to individual plants, 
transferring labour to those plants paying the 'minimum rate' or better, 
and reducing the supply to those plants paying less than the 'minimum 
rate'. It never became operational. In the depression of 1921 attention 
was concentrated on the 'minimum rate' component though the membership 
were still encouraged to avail themselves of the statistical information 
held at head office when thinking of moving to another job.
This use of minimum rates (either defensively as a 'line to be 
held' or offensively as a 'height to be gained') coupled to the Vacancy 
List (used to inform the membership of both acceptable and unacceptable
(2) Mortimer, op.cit., p.70. The very high poll obtained in this
and other early elections and ballots has remained a feature of 
national ballots in the union, the most significant one in recent 
years being the 70^ vote on the question of amalgamation with 
the AEU and others in 1970.
firms) became from 1921 one part of a two-part strategy which remained 
union policy up until the late 1940s as shown on p. 44 below.
1,2 Early Strike Policy
The other part of the strategy was known as the 'strike-in-detail'. 
This concept was first proposed nationally in the union in an article 
in its journal, The Draughtsman, in Noyember, 1918,^^^ in contradistinction 
to the 'go-slow' - called the 'ca canny' - and the all-out strike - called 
the 'open' strike. The 'strike-in-detail' entailed the gradual rundown 
of the drawing office staff of the firm with which the union was in 
dispute by encouraging men to leave individually to take up jobs with 
other firms, the union helping to find such jobs or providing unemployment 
pay in the event of no suitable vacancies being found. The union had also 
of course to be able to control the supply of labour to the firm and thus 
'posting' such firms in the Vacancy List linked the minimum rate concept 
to that of the strike-in-detail.
The strike-in-detail was seen as less expensive than the open strike 
which might take a considerable time to "hurt" an employer due to the 
tendency for draughtsmen to work well in front of production schedules and 
thus their bargaining power was initially w e a k e r . I t  was also seen
( 5)as less "harmful to the dignity of labour"^ ' than the go-slow. However, 
both the open strike and the go-slow were not entirely ruled out; indeed 
the former was used nearly as often in the first ten years as was the 
strike-in-detail. Nevertheless, this latter was still formal policy as 
late as 1945 when it was once more incorporated in a successful resolution
(3) Mortimer, p.53/54.
(4) Great stress was laid by the 'left' during the 1969-70 amalgamation 
debate on the need for support from the 'shop-floor' to help 
overcome this initial lack of bargaining strength, that this 
would be more forthcoming under amalgamation.
(5) Mortimer, op.cit., p.53*
before RC Conference.
Some measure of the scope and success of the combined strategy - 
'minimum rates', the Vacancy List and the 'strike-in-detail' - in the 
early years is given by Mortimer who notes that:
"In the first half of 1920 this kind of pressure 
(i.e. strike in detail and posting in the Vacancy 
List) proved to be effective in gaining improved 
conditions at no less than twenty firms".
And with respect to minimum rates and the Vacancy List:
"In the first half of 1920 over 900 (acceptable) 
vacancies were circulated ..." (?)
2. LIMITED MILITANCY
2.1 The Early Strike Record
However, as the accompanying Table II shows, strikes were few and
(8)far between. The ten years 1925 to 1934 were completely strike-free'  ^
and there were few strikes from 1935 through to 1950. Throughout most 
of the period 1925 to 1945 only the 'minimum rate'/Vacancy List component 
of the wages strategy was operational and given the general economic 
climate of the late 1920s and the 1930s and the tendency to reduce money
(9)wages' * in the early 1930s, the main use of this' component was simply 
defensive. The level of unemployment was relatively high among 
draughtsmen throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and in each year from 1920 
to 1950 the union paid out substantial unemployment benefit from its own 
funds and, from 1928-1948, from Government s o u r c e s . T h i s  certainly
(6) Ibid., p.261.
(7) Ibid., p.78.
(8) Ibid., p.144 and 179.
(9) The average wages for draughtsmen over 3O as determined by the 'census' 
fell in each year from 1930 to 1933 inclusive, Mortimer, op.cit., p.472,
(10) Mortimer, op.cit., p.179, says: "/ÂESD members had for a number of years 
prior to 193^  little alternative but to defend what they had already 
established, to resist wage cuts and to hope that there would be 
sufficient work available to keep them in employment."
(11) Ibid., p.459.
• TABLE II - MAIN DISPUTES - 1919-1930
YEAR FIRM AREA
rOTAL 
J^O. OF 
DISPUTES 
IN YEAR
fïPAQnU ACTION
COMMENTS 
FROM THE 
OFFICIAL HISTORY
FOR
DISPUTE
AND
MEMBERS
INVOLVED i «CO p.
'
iiCO A H E-
1919 Kolroyd
<err Stuart & 
]o.
T.C. ThompBonB
Sandycroft 
Foundry Co.
Rochdale
Stone on 
Trent
Manchester
Chester
flfages & 
lours 
Wages 17
Wages & 6 
Sours
N.A. .
X
X X
First recorded official 
di spute.
1920 Grayson's Ltd 
Drydock Co,
Liverpool
Ayrshire
Wages
O/T pay.13 
Hours
O/T pay 31
X
X
Use of ’strike-in-detail' 
in a number Of disputes
1921 Royce Ltd Manchester Wage 
Cuts 
+ "a number of 
see Mortimer
X
serio
* p .9
X
us an 
0
X
d pr
Strike lasted for 18 
months
0traded disputes” -
1922/
23
English Elect. 
Co.
Meehans Ltd
Rankin & 
Blackmore
Rugby Wages 40
N.A.
N.A.
X X
1924 Glenfield & 
Kennedy
And. Barclay 
Kilmarnock 
Eng. Co.
Thompson & Sons
Kilmarnock
Sunderland
) Wages
1 0/T Pay 
Î and 60 
) Holidays
Wages
X
X
X
X
1935 Coal & Allied 
Ind's Ltd
Seaham o/t
pa)Taent
X
1943 Av.Roe & Co. Manchester Wages "Biggest single wartime 
dispute" - Mortimer, p. 
The suggestion being th 
there were others.
1946 Cossors
Fords
N.London 
Dagenham
SjTupathy
strike
Negotia- 
ti one 
ri ghts
+ "a number of disputes 
involving .. withdrawals 
of labour" Mortimer p .26
1949 Vandervell 
Products Ltd
London Vi ctimi sa- 
ti on
First post-war official 
di spute
1950 Air Industrial 
Bevelopments
Valsail Member 
unfairly 
di luni Bsed ■
r union aourcre*
affected both the ability of the anion to finance strike activity and the 
membership's desire to strike.
Nevertheless, while the economic climate certainly militated 
against militant activity to improve wages and conditions, there is no 
evidence to suggest that militant activity was used to maintain wages and 
conditions. There is no material support from RC Conference Reports for 
example, for the proposition that the leadership in particular adopted 
a militant posture, e.g. asking for, and not receiving, a militant response 
from the membership.
Yet there is a policy continuity between the early 1920s position 
and the 1945-50 position in terms of the projected use of the strike-in- 
detail. This concept, a major component of the wages strategy of the early 
1920s, reappears in a successful resolution of the 1945 RC Conference 
and again in 1950 in what might be called 'militant policy foundation 
resolutions' of the late 1940s and early 1950s and there is thus some 
semblance of continuity. This continuity is in essence superficial as 
shown both by the lack of militancy displayed by the leadership and by the 
low propensity to strike of the membership as indicated in Table II. The 
apparent continuity hides a basic shift in wages strategy from a spon­
taneous individualistic and piece-meal approach to a co-ordinated collective 
national level approach. The 'left' were able in the decade of the 1940s 
to organise opposition to the "piece-meal" bargaining policy of the 
'rightwing^ EC. In opposition to unco-ordinated plant bargaining, the 
'left' posed "national advance through national negotiations" and this 
was seen as both an alternative wages strategy and the basis of a belief
(121in "trade unionism as class action" as against the prevailing individualism.^ ^
'National advance through national negotiations' was accepted as 
policy in 1945 after the 'left' had won a series of skirmishes around
(12) See Roberts, et al., op.cit., p.83.
the question of wages policy/ At the core of the policy was national
negotiations with the Engineering Employers’ Federation on the question 
of implementation of the union’s unilaterally set minimum rates, this 
being backed up by militant activity at office level. With respect to 
national negotiations, the successful resolution called for a national 
ballot to be held when "appropriate ... (on) ... the question of strike 
action to establish the minimum rate". The militant activity at office
( 14)level was to be the strike-in-detail.
This shift from a piece-meal non-militant bargaining policy to 
national negotiations for the establishment of national minimum rates is 
important in terms of a fundamental change in strategy. Equally important 
however, is the explicit attachment of the need for organised militant 
activity to make the strategy effective. As will be shown below, when 
the 'left' were able to implement the strategy beginning in 1951 and 1952, 
the strike-in-detail was not used. Normal all-out strike action became 
the norm. The strike-in-detail was as far as can be ascertained, never 
actually used between 1945 and 1950. The proper interpretation of its 
inclusion in policy between 1945 and 1950 would seem to be that the emerging 
'left' used it symbolically or expediently to establish the foundations 
of militancy by linking a very early policy which had been used infrequently 
in the twenty years prior to 1945 but which had never been rescinded, to 
its own wages strategy of national advance through national negotiations 
backed up by militant action,
2.2 The "Continuation of Militancy" Thesis
It is this policy continuity with respect to the strike-in-detail 
which more than anything else gives rise to the implication in Mortimer's
(15)history of the union of a continuation of militancy thesis.^ ' As shown
(13) See the quote from Wootton, p. 30*
(14) Mortimer, op.cit., p.26l.
(15) The other major foundation for this implication in Mortimer's history
is continued quotes from editorials in the 'Draughtsman', the editor
of which was a "syndicalist" and in a distinct minority in the leader­
ship. See Mortimer, op.cit., p.87, 134, I9I and 211, for example.
above there is no basis in fact from the actual record of strike 
activity or from leadership pronouncements to support such a thesis. 
Further, basically the same leadership who in the 1930s did not call 
for militant activity on wages, argued against such activity, as will be 
shown below, in the 1950s.
It needs to be recorded however that Mortimer indicates that the 
union did display a willingness to take part in wider trade union 
questions, from giving donations to assist a strike of agricultural workers 
and to the Daily Herald in the 1920s for example, to circulating the 
membership for money to assist trade unionists in Germany and Austria 
who "were ... suffering persecution from the fascists", in the 1930s.
He also indicates that early in its history the union affiliated to the 
TUG (1918), the Scottish TUG (l923), the GSEÜ (1943) and Labour Party 
(1944-45).^^^^ But all these taken together, while Mortimer builds wage 
militancy on to them, do not alter the factual record that the leadership 
did not encourage wage militancy for some twenty years and the membership 
displayed little if any wage militancy. It is not clear in fact, whether 
Mortimer is implying that the membership were militant but leaderless or 
that the leadership were militant and could obtain no membership response.
Wootton argues a different proposition with respect to the 'new 
militancy' of the 1940s. His interpretation of the policy difference 
is as follows: the philosophy of the ruling leadership was challenged
in the late 1930s and early 1940s by a nascent 'left-wing' advancing 
a militant collective wages policy as against the leadership's "policy 
of guerilla warfare, that is, of piecemeal advance achieved by pressure 
on vulnerable firms". There is no evidence to support Wootton's claim 
of "guerilla warfare ... on vulnerable firms", indeed the term guerilla 
warfare first appears in the I95I RG Gonference report in support of the
(16) Mortimer, op.cit., p.107 and 177; see also list of donations, 
p.460-462 and list of affiliations, p.446.
f 17)* left ’ s'policy on minimum rates/  ^ To the extent that 'guerilla 
warfare' implies a central aim or strategy, it seems more applicable
( is)
to the post-1960 period rather than the late 1930s and early 1940s/
In concluding this section of the union's history, i.e. 1913 to 
1950, then with the exception of the first few years, the period can be 
viewed from the point of view of wages and industrial policy, as one of 
relatively little militancy at both leadership and membership levels 
though the decade of the 1940s was, in effect, a transitional period of 
increasing militancy at official (conference) level leading to the militant 
years of the post-1930 period. This having been said, however, Mortimer 
is almost certainly correct in stressing the role of the Vacancy List 
linked to the centralised statistical material, in the development of the 
union's wages p o l i c y . R o b e r t s  et al. also emphasise that the build­
up in the pre-war period of expertise in statistical collection and the 
tendency to the institutionalisation of the use of this data-bank by the 
membership, was carried over into the militant period. Thus
"the system that was evolved for individual bargaining 
became the basis upon which the Association was able 
to build a most effective strategy and organisation 
for collective bargaining in a full-employment economy.
In the changed market conditions following the second 
world war, the Association's statistical service became 
the focus of a network of communications which enabled 
DATA to become unique in its use of 'pattern bargaining' 
and in the strategic use of the strike".(20)
Some of the implications contained in this quote will be challenged 
later in this study, in particular that the strategy was directed towards 
'collective bargaining' and that this was bound up with 'pattern bargaining'
(17) Wootton, op.cit., p.146 and RC Conference, 1951, p.110. 
(is) See below, p. 57.
(19) Mortimer, op.cit., p.7S.
(20) Roberts et al., p.82.
and the 'strategic' use of the strike.
From another point of view, this use of statistical information and 
circulation of the Vacancy List can he looked at as the provision of 
'market information' which would otherwise not have been readily available.
3. CONSTRAINED MILITANCY
Writing in the 1973 Report to RC Conference, the union's General
Treasurer stated
"Since January 1st, 1951 (to December 31st 1972) over 
£2,920,000 has been paid to 36,783 members at 659 firms, 
representing an average of approximately £132,000 per annum.
During this period, the percentage of union funds used 
to support our members in pursuance of their claims is 
the highest of any trade union in Britain and reflects 
the continuing high level of industrial activity by our 
Section (of the Amalgamated Union) and its members".
Adding in expenditure on strikes of £199,870 for 1973 gives a total expendi-
( 2l)
ture on disputes over the period 1951 to 1973 inclusive of £3,119,870.^
By comparison with the expenditure on disputes by the two other 
white-collar unions with bases in engineering, APEX and ASTMS, TASS's 
total is enormous. APEX spent little on strike pay before 1968 while its 
expenditure totalled £112,100 for the years 1969-70 and ASTMS's total 
dispute expenditure for the years 1960-70 was only £230,500 and it
( 22)also spent little prior to I96O.^  ^ In the high strike years of the
late 1960s this expenditure reached a peak, and in 1970 all three 
unions spent over 50^ of their total benefit expenditure on dispute 
pay. Of all the unions for which a disputes expenditure comparison is 
possible for the years 1960-70, the highest spender in this category is
(20) Report of the 1973 RC Conference, p.67; also see Table III, p.50,
(22) Indeed in a joint strike action in the mid-50s TASS 'gifted' ASSET 
(ASTMS) some £35,000 to pay dispute benefit during the dispute - 
ASSET could not afford the necessary dispute pay; see RC Conf. Report, 
1958, p.201. See also Mortimer, op.cit., p.378. TASS was the largest 
of the three unions in I96O with 67,000 members ; APEX had 60,000 and 
ASCW/ASSET had 37,000. By 1979, TASS had 87,000 members and the others 
101,000 and 124,000 respectively. It is doubtful if membership size 
contributed to the differences in dispute expenditure.
(23)
TASS with 41^ of total expenditure going on disputes/ Some further
comparison is gained from Figure I which gives total trade union dispute 
expenditure per member per annum and similar figures for TASS,
Annual expenditure on dispute benefit for the period 1951 to 1973 plus 
the number of strikes per annum and numbers of workers involved, is given in 
Table III. Annual expenditure on dispute benefit is also shown separately 
in Figure II. Thus expenditure in the ten years 1951-1960 totalled £550,208; 
in the ten years I96I-I97O the total was £2,026,817; while the total for 
the three years 1971 to 1973 vas £730,897 approximately.
There were on average 9.2 strikes per annum in the years 1951-60, 24 
strikes per annum for the years I96I-7O and 82 strikes per annum for the three 
years 1971-73.
While no exact figures can be given for the average number of members 
involved in disputes per annum (see Table III), the average figure has almost 
certainly risen.
3.1 The Policy Foundation for Financially-Supported Militancy
The 'policy basis' for this dispute expenditure is found in a series 
of resolutions accepted by Conferences in the period 1950 to 1953 though no 
clear interpretation by the leadership at EC level emerges until 1958-60.
A number of resolutions from the period 1940 to 1950 have been 
mentioned on pages 44 and 45 above and these formed the basis for a 
series of 'minimum wage' campaigns which were run almost every year after 
1948. At the 1950 RC Conference the following 'policy foundation' motion 
was put and accepted:
"MINIMUM RATES
(This RC) believes that the time has come for a 
serious and practical attempt to better (members) 
conditions ... This RC accordingly instructs the EC 
in conjunction with the divisional offices to conduct.
(23) Figures taken from Latta, 'Trade Union Finance', B.J.I.R., Nov. 72.
(24) No figures are available for strikes in I96O. Figures relate to 'main 
disputes', see Table III.
TABLE III. TABLE OF ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON DISPUTE BENEFIT,
NUMBER OF DISPUTES AND NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED
YEAR
DISPUTE
BENEFIT
BENEVOLENT 
GRANTS TO 
MEMBERS ON 
DISPUTE
NUMBER 
OF 'MAIN 
DISPUTES' 
(1)
TOTAL NO. 
OF
DISPUTES
NO. OF 
MEMBERS 
INVOLVED 
IN 'MAIN 
DISPUTES'
TOTAL NO. 
OF MEMBERS 
INVOLVED
1951 322 3 ) N.A.
19-52 1,815 4 ) N.A.
1953 3,593 20,874 5 ) - 27 N.A.
1954 2,450 12,663 7 ) 229
1955 536 4,402 10 ) 394
1956 6,375 45,555 18 ) - 75 692
1957 10,793 74,587 18 ) 1760
1958 2,214 13,309 7 ) 270
1959 7,105 51,916 11 ) 670
) - 59
i960 91,699 N.A.) N.A.
1961 139,015 13 ) I3O8
1962 136,629 17 27 2021
1963 158,464 19 19 2473
1964 113,705 18 31 1361
1965 128,956 16 39 1558
1966 260,666 23 27 2187
1967 321,933 34 76 1957
1968 126,240 26 35 1295
1969 192,990 18 32 1925
1970 448,219 56 57 3371
1971 262,241 67 67 3031
1972 268,786 91 91 N.A.
1973 199,870 87 87 N.A.
SOURCES; RELEVANT REPORTS OF RC CONFERENCES
(l) ’Main Disputes' are those mentioned in Conference Reports by 
name and location of firm and plant. As can be seen from the 
Table the total number of strikes for each year is not available, 
The difference between the number of 'main disputes' and the 
total number of disputes refers, it would seem, to very small, 
short and unsupported disputes.
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if necessary, a survey of the offices most widely 
affected by non-payment of the AESD rates and to 
promote within these, an intensive campaign for 
the operation of the strike in detail viewing with 
the utmost sympathy those cases where it may be 
necessary to pay enhanced compensation to members.
This RC instructs the EC to prosecute this campaign 
during the ensuing year with the utmost vigour and 
to report back fully to the 1951 RC".(25)
This rather broad formulation was reinforced in 1952 as follows:
"WAGES AND MINIMUM WAGE RATES
This RC endorses the action of the EC in increasing 
the minimum rates and instructs the EC to approach 
the Employers’ Federation for the establishment by 
agreement of the Association’s minimum rates. In 
the event of no agreement being reached, this 
Conference instructs the EC to give maximum support 
to any appropriate action taken by our members.
Conference further instructs the EC to keep within 
constant review the wage position, and authorises the 
EC to make any increase in the minimum wage rates 
necessary to protect the economic position of our 
members, including an approach to the Employers'
Federation for a suitable advance in wages in line 
with the change in the minimum rates. In the event 
of no agreement being reached the maximum support 
shall be given by the EC to any appropriate action 
taken by the members for the purpose of establishing 
the claim, and for this purpose Conference gives all 
active support to the CSEU in the common effort to 
defend the economic conditions of the w o r k e r s (26)
(emphasis added)
In the period 1950-1958 the EC’s general interpretation of these 
instructions was that where a group of members requested strike pay this 
was forthcoming, usually at 100^ nett wages, though as Wootton notes "when 
a strike has been mounted ... the Right (wing) within the privacy of the 
Executive Committee, may have expressed doubts and reservations" before
(27)agreeing to strike pay.  ^  ^ The EC did not go out of its way either to
generate such requests or to pressurise the divisional organisers into 
generating them. Nevertheless, the pattern of paying 100^ nett wages -
(25) Report of 1950, RC Conference, p.l6l-l65.
(26) Report of 1952, RC Conference, p.241-248.
(27) Wootton, op.cit., p.145.
the interpretation of "maximum support"-vas laid down in the 1951-1958 period. 
As shown in Table III the bulk of the money spent on strikes for the period 
1951 to 1959 is recorded under 'Benevolent Grants' and the rest under 
'Dispute Benefit'. This suggests that such expenditure was viewed by the 
'rightwing' majority on the EC including the Treasurer, as representing 
a passing phase rather than a rigid long-term policy.
There is no evidence arising from the 1951-1958 period to suggest 
that the level of applications for strike pay was such that selection of 
strikes was forced on the EC. Every application for strike pay was capable 
of being met by the union in financial terms. As will be shown below, the 
post-1958 period differs markedly in this respect and 'strike selection' 
from a 'strike waiting list' (built up with EC exhortation) does take place 
so that policy implementation meets Wootton's concept of guerilla warfare 
on vulnerable firms.
3.2 A Technique of 'Left' Advance
Conference reports for the period 1951-1958 invariably contain either 
motions openly criticising the EC's lack of activity on wages or, what 
amounts to the same thing, details of attempts to move 'reference back* 
of the relevant section of the EC’s report to Conference detailing its
(29)activity arising from previous Conference motions.^ '
This quite legitimate demand for an explanation of the EC's conduct 
with respect to prior policy decisions or the charge that such policy 
had not been carried out positively enough which was the substance of critical 
motions and 'references back', seems to have been used by the 'left' to 
progressively isolate the 'right' majority on the EC by winning over the 
'middle ground' Conference delegates and/or swaying branches to the 'left'
(28) See above, p. 46 and below, p. 57»
(29) E.g. 1950 RC Report, p. 153 on 'reference back' and 
1953 RC Report, p. 230 on 'lack of activity'.
between Conferences on the basis of such criticisms. An example of how 
this was perceived at RC Conference perhaps highlights this mechanism. 
During the debate on the (eventually successful) motion on 'Minimum Rates' 
quoted at length on p. 49 the following statements were made by delegates 
opposing the motion or attempting to amend it to remove its implied 
criticisms. Thus from the shorthand transcript:
"Mr. L. R. SIeaman (Southampton) ... remarked that 
his branch were slightly amazed to see the (first) 
paragraph. They thought it was a direct attack 
upon the EC and the integrity of the divisional 
organisers. It was their firm belief that the 
divisional organisers had intensively carried out 
the minimum wage campaign."
Further;
"Mr. E. L. Hughes (Peterborough) ... (argued) that 
if the motion was carried in its original form 
there would be a repetition of what they had 
already seen that morning, a constant stream of 
delegates going up to the rostrum and attacking 
the EC for not carrying out a previous RC resolution".^ ^
3.3 Links with the Broader TU Movement
By the early 1960s the range of maximum support strike issues had
expanded and RC Conference "had authorised the EC to give full support
on minimum rates, three weeks holidays, the 35-hour week and 100^
( 31 )membership",  ^ though most strikes over the whole period 1951-73 were 
over wages issues and were linked to the annual wage campaign.
However, this seemingly independent and to some extent unique 
"maximum support" policy was not in fact completely isolated from the 
broader trade union movement. From its affiliation to the CSEU in 1943 
TASS's wages policy was linked to that of the CSEU in general and the
(30) RC Conference Report, 1950, p.l64-l65.
(31) RC Conference Report, I962, p.371.
AEü in particular. Thus at the 1953 Conference, for example, the following 
motions were carried:
"WAGES, POLICY AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH CSEU
... Conference pledges its full support to the CSE 
Unions and confirms the need for vigorous campaigning 
in conjunction with the other unions in common efforts 
to defend the economic conditions of the workers and 
to raise their living standards.
WAGE CLAIM
That this RC authorises the EC in conjunction with 
the CSE Unions, to take appropriate action to 
initiate a wage claim on a 15^ basis ..." (32)
This relationship with the manual unions led Roberts et al. to note 
that since the Engineering Employers* Federation insisted on settling the 
claims of the manual unions first, TASS generally initiated its national 
campaign by local bargaining designed to restore the differentials dis- 
turbed by the manual workers ' settlement,' As late as January 1962
when the CSEU called a one-day token stoppage in support of a wage claim, 
the TASS EC called "upon all members at firms where shop workers take
(34)action ... to take similar action in support of our national wage claims."'  ^
On the other hand, from mid-1962 onwards more requests for dispute 
benefit were received than could be met financially, i.e. there was an almost 
continuous ’strike waiting list*, so that while TASS continued to be active 
in the CSEU in a broad way, the EC attempted to shift the emphasis away 
from ’following in the wake* of the CSEU and AEU towards a more independent 
wages policy as detailed below. Thus from I962 onwards, while references 
are made at Conferences to the helpful role of the AEU and CSEU in wage 
claims (this is particularly noticeable in arguments in favour of amalga­
mation with the AEU with respect to claims at plant l e v e l ) , n o  motions
(32) RC Conference Report, 1953, p.385 on ’Motions Carried". See also 
the 1952 motion quoted on p. 53,
(33) Roberts et al., op.cit., p.84.
(34) RC Conference Report, 1962, EC Report p.12.
(35) RC Conference Reports, I968 and I969.
on wages policy specifically mention co-operation and/or dependence 
on these organisations nationally as was the case in the 1940s and 
1950s. From this it can he argued that the use of 'pattern bargaining' 
in an independent way and to achieve an independent wages policy only 
became operational in the period from I962-63. TASS-therefore became 
"unique in its use of 'pattern bargaining' and in the strategic use of the 
strike" with the concomitant highly centralised control, linked to a 
"network of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s " n o  earlier than I962/63 though of course 
there were indications of this 'uniqueness' prior to 19^2.
4. INDEPENDENT MILITANCY
This independent use of 'pattern bargaining' by TASS can be simplified 
and stylised as follows. The presentation is based on material from 
various motions and debates at Conferences.
4.1 'Pattern Bargaining'
In the few months prior to national negotiations with the employers 
on a (wage) claim, the EC would choose those firms from the 'strike 
waiting list' which it considered would be capable of achieving settle­
ments that would show the claim had been met by federated firms (usually 
those which it was assumed the Employer's Federation would consider signi­
ficant). It could also be used to exhort other groups of members not only 
to lodge claims but also to push them through 'procedure'. All groups 
or offices were requested to submit such claims at the beginning of a 
'wage campaign'. This would not only increase the numbers on the waiting 
list but might result in the necessary increases in some firms without
(36) See quote from Roberts et al. on p.47 above. For detailed discussion 
of 'pattern bargaining' see: Seltzer, 'Pattern Bargaining and the 
United Steelworkers', Journal of Pol. Econ., Aug., 1951 and in the 
Monthly Labor Review, Feb., I96I; and Levinson, 'Pattern Bargaining:
A Case Study of the Automobile Workers', Qtly. Journal of Economics, 
May i960.
resort to strike action.
After the conclusion of national negotiations (or in the event of 
no agreement being reached) strike selection would take place to 'pattern' 
the negotiated or established key increases across the membership usually 
in the form of 'maintenance of differentials'. Thus both 'pattern setting' 
and 'pattern following' were attempted after 1962 rather than simply
'pattern following' the manual workers as was largely the case prior to
1962 as noted on p. 56 above. The 'Vacancy List', circulated on a weekly 
basis throughout the period,would be used as the main means of mass 
communication as outlined on p. 25 above, coupled to DC and branch level 
activity.
This wage campaign 'strategy' is apparent in Conference-supported 
motions as far apart as 1962 and 1971• In a I962 debate on "Wage 
Differentials" the following motion was carried^
"This RC urges intensified organised activity at
all levels of DATA structure, particularly in the
offices, before and during national wage claims, 
to make possible increased differentials existing 
between ourselves and the manual workers in settle­
ment of claims with the Employers' Federation".
(emphasis added)
In another motion carried at the same Conference, the RC
"agrees that the EC shall continue to have authority 
to provide full support in future disputes affecting 
members pressing for Conference Policies".
Indeed in a debate on 'Industrial Disputes and DATA Funds' at the
1962 Conference, it is quite apparent from the General Secretary's
( 37^statements that a strike waiting list had built up.' ^
At the 1968 Conference the following resolution was accepted:
"This RC instructs the EC to press for an acceptable 
national agreement ... in accordance with DATA's
(37) RC Conference Report, 1962, p.368-380, 440 and 441
policies with the Employers' Federation.
Conference calls on members to assist the 
EC by domestic action on local claims." (38)
(emphasis added) ...........
And in 1971, after the EC had failed to reach agreement with the 
Engineering Employers' Federation and had terminated the National Minimum 
Wages Agreement with the Federation, the RC urged
"all members at office level to submit claims 
in accordance with existing DATA national wages 
policy, this to be improved in all cases where 
conditions make this possible; the EC to have 
overall authority in selecting those cases 
requiring DATA funds to pursue."(39)
1974, as a result of the amalgamation into the AtfEW, RC Conference 
accepted that "TASS shall endeavour to participate in national claims 
with the Engineering Section and whenever possible, take part in joint 
claims with other union members at their factories, for improvement in 
wages and c o n d i t i o n s t h o u g h  at the present time of writing this 
has not become operational_J7
4.2 Overview of Wages Policy. 1951-1973
It is possible, therefore, to outline TASS's general wages and 
industrial policy over the main period of concern to this study. From 
1951 through to 1958-60 there was a fairly continuous build-up of 
expenditure on disputes - mainly on wages disputes - based on an outlook 
expressed in Conference industrial policy which saw such activity as 
essential to the aims as agreed by Conference. The major change which 
is apparent after 1958 is that the EC actively encouraged such activity 
as against its passive posture of the pre-58 period and that efforts 
directed towards an independent wages strategy are apparent by I962-63.
(38) RC Conference Report, 1968, p.154.
(39) RC Conference Report, 1971, p.174.
(40) RC Conference Report, 1974, p.140.
Annual expenditure on disputes continued to rise with few exceptions 
over the decade of the 1960s, reaching a peak in 1970. The number of 
disputes per annum showed a similar trend and the increases in both annual 
average expenditure on disputes and the numbers of disputes for the decade 
of the 1960s over those of the 1950s have continued into the 1970s, and 
wages policy has accounted for the bulk of this activity over the period 
as a whole associated increasingly with annual wage campaigns . ■
Two more recent trends are perhaps worth noting at this point. 
Firstly in 1967, the union instituted a scheme known as 'Divisional 
Development Funds' which allowed the separate Divisional Councils to 
hold a certain amount of money to finance local disputes although the
f 4 1 )dispute still required EC authorisation.' Thus the highly centralised
control was maintained while drawing the divisions financially into the 
activity. Figures for such Divisional-level activity are not available. 
(Some indication is given below in terms of expenditure - see p. 69 )• 
Coupled to this there is evidence that the EC and RC Conference have 
encouraged members to strike without "full support". Thus for the years 
1972 and 1973 a number of strikers received " d o n a t i o n s " w h i c h  are in 
effect nominal payments made by the EC to members in lieu of wages lost 
during (short) disputes, i.e. members striking without EC permission or 
support receive some reimbursement, ^ n d  this "flexibility" with respect 
to dispute pay was accepted by Conference in 1974^ (^3) years I967
to 1969 also saw the introduction of such non-strike activity as 'working 
without enthusiasm', 'days of rest, cleaning, meditation etc.' which seem 
to one writer to have been s u c c e s s f u l t h o u g h  they are not now used. 
Secondly, 'maximum support' has itself undergone change. The 
100^ nett wages figure was reduced in I967 to 80^ nett wages and further
(41) Report of RC Conference, 1967, p.42.
(42) RC Conference Reports, 1972, 73,74, Sections on Finance.
(43) RC Conference Report, 1974, Successful motion on Dispute Pay, p.140.
(44) Clegg, op.cit., p.300.
reduced to 60^ or £15 in 1971, or if members are on strike with members
of another section of the AUEW, then strike pay of £6 per week is paid,
(45)
i.e. the Engineering Section rate.  ^  ^ This reduction in dispute benefit
to the individual striker has also been coupled since 19^5 to an 
institutionalised appeal for extra cash payments from members over and 
above subscriptions, (’the first weeks increase donation scheme’ - see p.68 
below), to help maintain the high level of dispute activity.
While these changes may reflect a financial problem, this has not 
yet, as of 1975, been translated into decreasing absolute financial 
commitment on average on behalf of the leadership or in reduced dispute 
activity on behalf of the membership.
5. MILITANCY AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
In concluding this section on ’wages and industrial policy' 
attention must be given to a previously unmentioned expectation of the 
'left' leadership with respect to the effects of strike militancy in 
particular and industrial militancy in general. That is, given that the 
'left' argued that militancy was necessary to maintain and improve wages 
and conditions, they also expected that industrial militancy would lead 
the membership firstly to be more 'trade union conscious'and secondly 
that this consciousness would eventually be translated into 'political 
or class consciousness'.
Reference will be made in later chapters to analyses of the 
concepts of trade union and class consciousness. The immediate intention 
is to outline the leadership's expectations in these areas. This presents 
a difficulty. Nowhere in the available material is there an explicit 
statement of these expectations, possibly because claims to be setting 
out to change members' outlooks or ideology would either be interpreted
(45) RC Conference Reports, I968, p.380-589 and 1971, p.114-116.
as pretentious, or would be seen by the membership as subversive or both. 
Such claims would be counter-productive.
Nevertheless the whole tenor of the ’left’s’ leadership suggests 
that such expectations existed. In particular the role of the union's 
monthly journal firstly under Mortimer's editorship and then under both 
Gill and Smith, was almost certainly seen as politically educational.
The quite explicit class analysis in almost all major editorials and 
leadership articles over the whole period from 1949 onwards must make the 
union's journal one of the longest-running 'leftwing' periodicals in the 
trade union movement. The general method of presentation of the expec­
tations was to argue that industrial militancy for economic ends - 
'economism' in Marxist terminology - would eventually prove ineffective 
in providing solutions to the economic problems facing the WORKING CLASS 
so that the class would eventually turn, given political leadership, to 
political action to solve economic problems, i.e. they would become 
CLASS CONSCIOUS. Industrial militancy provided the basis for TRADE UNION 
CONSCIOUSNESS which was seen as a necessary precondition for class 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B y  stating the proposition in this way the references 
to the membership were to some extent hidden in the term 'class'.
There are some specific indications of such 'consciousness' expecta­
tions. For example, Wootton, who had access to Executive Committee meetings 
for a period, and who personally interviewed most of the national leader­
ship of the period of the late 1950s, noted:
"A few (of the leadership), primarily the Communists, 
credit strikes with an almost therapeutic value, toning 
up the membership in a particular establishment, healing 
old weaknesses, although perhaps the most appropriate 
metaphor is still the hackneyed military one in which 
the strike is the equivalent of the armed patrol."(47)
(46) E.g. see the article in TASS journal of Nov., 1968. See also 
the view from Roberts et al. on p. 44 above, on the 'left's' view 
of ’Trade Unionism as Class Action'.
(47) Wootton, op.cit., p.144.
A 'left' delegate to the 19^7 RC Conference drew the conclusion 
that the strike militancy policy had in fact made the membership more 
trade union conscious, suggesting perhaps that this had been expected 
to occur.
The most explicit statement of the 'consciousness expectation' is 
seen in reflection as it were, in the reasons adduced by the leadership 
for the large majority vote in favour of amalgamation with the AEU in 1970. 
In an unsigned - therefore leadership - article in the July journal of that 
year, the proposition is put thus:
"To decide to amalgamate with another union while 
successful required a level of understanding and 
an ability to anticipate the future needs of our 
membership not usually found in the rank and file 
of any union.
This is not to say that the ordinary members of 
any union lack intelligence, but is an expression 
of the pragmatism inherent in British trade unionism.
... The three-to-one majority repeated itself many 
times throughout the union, HIGHLIGHTING A NUMBER OF 
FEATURES WHICH COULD ONLY BE THE SUBJECT OF SPECULATION 
PREVIOUSLY.
One was the wide support of the industrial and social 
logic expressed by the union's leadership.
Another was the LONG ACCEPTED but never proved unity of 
outlook of a social stratum throughout a whole nation 
and beyond. (it is doubtful whether any other country 
could produce the evenly developed consciousness 
portrayed in the vote. Divergence in regions is much 
more a dominant feature in countries without the long 
history of industrial capitalism which is ours.)
An all-important factor is the heightened consciousness 
of a membership which has now a lengthy tradition of 
militancy and a cohesiveness born of a unity between 
policy and action".
(emphasis added)
This excerpt contains the classical Marxist formulation and 
expectation - role of the leadership, homogeneity of stratum or class 
interest and industrial activity leading to heightened consciousness.
Thus, in conclusion, the policy of industrial militancy was seen
(48) RC Conference Report, 19^7, p.381.
by the 'left' as performing two inter-related functions - maintaining 
and improving wages and conditions and raising the consciousness of the 
membership,
6. FINANCE AND MILITANCY
Finance is treated here at some length with two interests in view 
and since neither relate to the pre-1958 period, only the post-1958 period 
is considered. Firstly, while membership response to the high level of 
strike pay provided by the TASS leadership might be one way of measuring 
the success of the 'militant policy' phase of the union^'s history, another 
perhaps complementary one might be the response of the membership to the 
appeals for extra financial aid mentioned above, to support the high level 
of dispute pay. Secondly, it may be instructive to look at a possible finan­
cial constraint from the point of view of amalgamation, i.e. the view which 
links union assets, or rather lack of them, with the desire to amalgamate.
6.1 Subscriptions/Average Contributions
Membership subscriptions are the major source of income for the union 
as with all unions and traditionally TASS's annual membership subscriptions 
have been high relative to those of other unions.
It is difficult,to compare subscription levels between unions due 
to different subscriptions rates based on age or 'skill' class, or sometimes 
on wage level, but some information can be obtained from the article 
by Latta referred to previously. In order to remove some of the diffi­
culties Latta uses average contributions per member per annum which, while 
not necessarily coming close to subscription per annum, is sufficient 
for present purposes. Thus in I960, out of 39 unions for which reasonable
(49) Latta, op.cit., p.398.
(50) Ibid., p.396-399.
comparisons could be made, TASS came tenth highest in terms of the average
annual contribution per member, excluding the political fund, and had
moved to fourth highest out of the same 39 unions in 1970, the figures
being £3.62 and £8.11 respectively against averages of £2.85 and £4.61
f 5l)for all registered unions.'  ^ Out of the eight white-collar unions included
(52)in the thirty-nine,^  ^ TASS was placed highest in terms of average
contributions in both I96O and 1970,
In terms of the highest increase in per capita contributions over 
the period, TASS ranked third out of 39 with an increase of 124^ against 
an average for all registered unions of 61.8^. Once again TASS was top 
white-collar union and its increase of 124^ compares with that of APEX 
with 85^ and ASTMS with 27.2^, Neither of these unions were in the top 
ten in terms of average contributions in either I96O or 1970, thus in 1970 
both had figures of less than £6.02 (the tenth highest figure in 1970) 
against TASS's £8.11.(53)
That the subscriptions in TASS were well above those of ASTMS in 
particular, did cause some concern to the TASS leadership and on a number 
of occasions the leadership pointed to a (short-run) negative relationship
( 54)
between increased subscriptions and membership.^ *
6.2 Investment Income and Per Capita Assets
Over the period of Latta's study TASS was not as dependent on 
membership subscriptions as were some other unions. In neither I96O nor 
1970 does TASS appear in the top ten unions out of the 39 with the highest 
percentage of income derived from contributions while - to continue the 
comparison with APEX and ASTMS - both these unions do so appear. In 
fact, in i960 TASS was in the top ten unions which had the highest
(51) Ibid.
(52) I.e. TASS, ASTMS, APEX, CSU, TSSA, IRSF, NTJBE and the CPSA,
(53) Latta, op.cit., p.399.
(54) For example, see TASS Journal, Apr., 19^4, p.19.
percentage of income from investments, being ranked ninth with l j . 6 % - 
again the top white-collar union. By 1970, however, the union had
( 55)dropped out of the top ten in terms of investment income. ^
In terms of per capita assets, TASS ranked sixth highest in I96O 
with £18.90 as against an average of £10.58 for all registered unions 
and again was top white-collar union, but by 1970 the union had dropped 
out of this 'top ten' and ceased to be top white-collar union in this 
category.(5^) Over the period TASS had the second lowest percentage rise 
in per capita assets of all 39 unions, a negative 32^ - the worst figure
( 57)of all white-collar unions.^
Nevertheless, this still placed TASS above both APEX and ASTMS in 
terms of per capita assets in 1970. The TASS figure was £12.85 against 
£2.30 for ASTMS and while an accurate figure cannot be given for APEX, 
Latta's statistics show that it could not have been above £9.1.^5®)
6.3 Financial Militancy?
The use of special levies has a long history in TASS. As early as
1920/21 a levy of 3d. rising within months to ls.6d. per week was imposed
ith :
(60)
to ease the payment of unemployment b e n e f i t and w few exceptions
unemployment benefit and levies are directly related.
The two post-1945 exceptions occurred in 'lock-out' situations. 
The first, in I967, was a dispute with the shipbuilding employers in 
which the national membership of 1,443 was involved - the bulk of them
(55) Latta, op. cit., p.400.
(56) Ibid., p.405.
(57) Ibid., p .403 - Latta argues that this decline was due to the 
high expenditure on strikes.
(58) Ibid., p.405.
(59) Mortimer, op. cit., p.458.
(60) Levies are imposed upder the rules of the Union . Members 
must therefore pay them.
•locked out' - at a cost to the union of £195,038 in strike pay. A levy 
of approximately 3Op. per member per month was imposed for a short period 
raising a total of around £ 5 5 , 0 0 0 . In addition to this some £55,500 
was raised in special appeals both to the membership and to other 
unionists etc., although some of this figure would have been raised even 
if the lock-out had not taken p l a c e . T h e  levy alone covered over 25^
of the expenditure on the 'lock-out'. Of the £55,500 raised by appeal, 
roughly £35,000 was raised inside TASS and £20,000 outside, so that TASS
membership covered approximately 45^ of the expenditure on the 'lock-out' 
or 28^ of the total dispute expenditure in I967 of £321,932.(^5)
The second levy not associated with unemployment benefit was imposed 
in 1970 during a major dispute at the Coventry establishments of Rolls 
Royce Ltd. Around 1,000 members were involved, the majority of them 
'locked-out', at a cost to the union of £239,428 in dispute pay. A levy 
of approximately 25p. per member per month was imposed raising a total amount 
of £46,000, In addition to this, £54,500 was raised from the membership 
in a special appeal, although again some of this money would have been 
raised in the absence of the dispute.(^^^ Thus the levy covered 19^ of 
the expenditure on the dispute in terms of strike pay. Adding in the money 
from the special appeal, the TASS membership covered approximately 43^ 
of the expenditure on the dispute or 22^ of the total dispute expenditure 
in 1970 of £448,219.(^5)
The only post-Wbrld War II levy imposed in relation to unemployment 
benefit took place in 1971 and was operational from July of that year 
up until July 1973* The levy averaged 15p. per month per member and over
(61) RC Conference Report, I968, p.112; RC Conference Report, I967, p.366.
(62) See below, p. 68.
(63) See Table III and RC Conference Report, I968, p.112-113*
(64) See p. 68 below.
(65) See Table III and RC Conference Report, 1971, p.85*
the twenty four months produced £430,704 against a total expenditure on 
unemployment benefit over the thirty six months of 1971 to the end of 1973 
of £552,037, i.e. the levy covered 78^ of expenditure. The rules applying 
to this levy guaranteed its use for unemployment benefit only.
'Special Appeals' and calls for 'donations' are of course a part 
of trade union procedure usually linked to some special event, e.g. costly 
disputes, Red Cross aid, special legal defence funds, etc, and on these 
general and usually infrequent matters, TASS is no exception. The area 
wherein TASS may stand alone is in its attempt to institutionalise such 
'appeals/donations' on roughly an annual basis, linked to its militant 
industrial policy. This relates to the appeal that 'the first week's 
wage increase should be donated to the u n i o n ' . T h i s  proposition 
was proposed and accepted at the 1965 RC Conference and every year since 
then the leadership has campaigned to get the membership to donate their 
first week's wage increase (in each year) to union funds whether or not 
this increase has been achieved with official union aid.^^^^ In the nine 
years for which figures are available, i.e. 1965-73, a total of £180,595 
has been raised in this way representing 8^ of the total dispute expenditure 
over the same period. (Annual figures are given in Table IV).
As was noted above, some of this money was raised as a direct result 
of the two 'lock-out' situations and as can be seen from Table IV, the two 
'lock out' yeara were also the highest income years in terms of the appeal. 
If allowance is made for the 'lock-out' appeals, the total raised by appeal 
of £180,595 would be reduced by up to £90,000. On the other hand, the 
introduction in 1967 of the 'Divisional Development Funds' meant that 
donations which might have otherwise been sent to national level were 
syphoned off at Divisional level, i.e. Divisional Development Funds were 
supported by local donations and although the EC could help DDEs
(66) RC Conference 1965, p.579. See also p. 6l above.
(67) See successful motion reiterating the need for the scheme, 
p.150, 1972 RC Conference Report,
TABLE IV
INCOME FROM THE 'FIRST WEEKS WAGE 
INCREASE SCHEME' AND LOCK-OUT APPEALS
YEAR
AMOUNT 
£' s
AS A ^ OP
DISPUTE
BENEFIT
1965 17,367 13.4
1966 9,786 3.8
1967 55,489 17.2
1968 5,239 4.1
1969 9,963 5.1
1970 54,301 12.2
1971 22,094 8.4
1972 23,264 8.6
1973 2,892 1.4
TOTAL 200,595
SOURCE ; Relevant Reports of RC Conference
TABLE V
ANNUAL EXPENDITURE FROM 
'DIVISIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND'
For No. 1 Division
YEAR AMOUNT - £'s
1967 N.A.
1968 N.A.
1969 612
1970 2,000
1971 374
1972 643
1973 N.A.
TOTAL 3,629
SOURCE: DIVISIONAL ORGANISER.
financially, there la no evidence of support from central funds.
Unfortunately these Funds, which were used in the main to finance strike 
and related activity, were not incorporated in the National Accounts 
of the union in such a way that the flow of funds through the Divisions 
can he assessed. Thus there is no way of quantifying the total amount 
of money raised under the 'first week's increase scheme
In concluding this section one point should he noted regarding 
union funds which sheds some light on how the leadership assessed the finance 
available to it for expenditure on disputes and which almost certainly 
influenced the timing of subscription increases, levies and appeals.
Faced with the need to allocate the flow of funds between current expendi­
ture and reserves, the leadership opted for a fixed reserve in money rather 
than real terms so that anything over and above reserves and ordinary 
running expenses could be used for such things as dispute expenditure.
Should this latter look like depressing reserves too much, subscriptions 
could be increased, levies imposed and special appeals launched. This 
position is accepted explicitly as early as 1964 when Conference after 
"congratulating all those concerned on the very high level of industrial 
activity", goes on to accept
"that our ability to maintain a high level of industrial 
activity, and to continue our present practice of paying 
full pay to members engaged in dispute, is restricted 
by the financial resources available, and therefore 
instructs the EC to carry out a continuous educational 
campaign to convince our members of the necessity of 
paying a higher level of subscription. ... Conference 
also agrees that if, as a result of (industrial activity), 
the EC believes that the funds of the Association are 
likely to drop below £800,000, then the EC shall use 
the power which it possesses within the rules to impose 
a levy upon the membership to secure additional income 
and thus avoid too heavy a drain on the Association's 
funds." (70)
(68) RC Conference Report, p.43, 1967*
(69) Some indication of such expenditure is given (in Table by the 
annual expenditure in one Division, the total being £3,629. 
There is no way of assessing how typical this expenditure was in 
relation to the other Divisions.
(70) RC Conference 1964, p.437-438.
This remained the position np until 1974 when a motion before 
Conference suggested that the operative figure with respect to the 
instituting of a levy to protect the funds, should be £900,000 and an 
amendment to the motion suggested £1,000,000. In the event the 
Conference agreed to give the EC "power to institute a levy when the
(71)funds fall below a viable level"^  ^ and while this represents a move to
some flexibility with respect to the 'floor' to the national funds, at the 
present time of writing, actual practice would seem to set the 'floor' 
at £1,000,000. This figure has remained substantially unchanged since
(72)
1951.
*****
While a broader and more detached view of the development of the 
union's wages policy is undertaken in Section 4 of Chapter V, a few 
pertinent conclusions can be drawn here. Firstly, the "many strikes/ 
high strike pay" policy shows a fairly consistent expansion from its 
inception in 1951 through to 1973* By the early 1960s this controlled 
militancy was by and large independent of the behaviour of other trade 
union organisations and was used to pattern-bargain, or even more 
strongly, pattern-impose settlements across the membership. By the 
late 1960s the membership was being encouraged to finance local 
divisional strike activity by donations rather than relying entirely on 
central funds out of subscriptions, and two levies were imposed with 
fair success to support central funds during lock-outs. In the early 
1970s the unemployment benefit levy was a marked success and there is 
some indication both that members were prepared to accept substantial 
reductions in strike pay and still go on strike and that some members 
were prepared to strike without strike pay.
(71) RC Conference Report, 1974, p.100-102 and p.140.
(72) See RC Conference Reports and monthly journals, 1951 to 1975*
While the leadership's success in carrying through the foregoing 
policies entailed a weakening of the union's financial resources relative 
to other unions, there is no reason to suppose that this was a major 
factor in deciding to amalgamate with the AEU and others.
Finally, the 'left' leadership in RC Conference, and, from the 
evidence in the union's journal, in the EC and in the branches, spent a 
disproportionately large amount of time and effort on the wages aspect 
of union policy and held the view that militant activity on wages 
coupled to 'left-wing' ideology would make the membership trade union 
conscious and eventually class conscious.
CHAPTER IV
TASS - INCOMES POLICY INITIATIVES, 1945-1963
This chapter is concerned with the TASS leadership’s interpretation 
of and responses to incomes policy and with the membership's responses in 
the light of the positions taken np by both the leadership and Government. 
Attention is centred on Government initiatives 1945 to 1963, and with 
the material presented in Section 3 of Chapter III, provides a fairly 
complete picture of the union's wages and industrial policy for that period.
1. THE 1948-51 WAGE FREEZE
The return of a Labour Government in 1945 committed to a programme 
which included inter alia the maintenance of full employment, extensive 
nationalisation and major legislation on social services, brought into 
being a state of affairs which had been central to the aims of the dominant 
forces in the British trade union movement. Not only was there the return 
of the first majority Labour Government committed to a programme which 
the TUC had been instrumental in forging, but it was also returned at a 
time when extensive co-operation between Government and TUC had become 
an accepted part of the management of the economy. Such co-operation was 
at the centre of the TUC's aims^^^ and the new government seemed amenable 
to a continuation of this state of affairs.
When, under the impact of a worsening economic situation, particularly 
a severe deterioration in the Balance of Payments deficit, the Government 
demanded in effect a wage freeze in its White Paper 'Statement on Personal 
Incomes, Costs and Prices' in early February 1948, the General Council of 
the TUC, while maintaining some semblance of negotiations, capitulated
(l) Throughout this chapter reliance is placed for TUC/government incomes 
policy positions, on Dorfman, 'Wage Politics in Britain', 1973*
to all major government demands. The 'bargain' struck between the 
Government, employers and the TUC in March, 1948, was aimed at stabilising 
the economy in the face of the deterioration in the balance of payments.
Its central goal according to all three -parties was to boost exports both 
by restraining export prices and by increasing the output or potential 
output from the export industries through direction of labour to those 
industries. Prom the point of view of restrainipg export prices, this was 
to be achieved by the TUC accepting a wage freeze, the employers' organisa­
tions limiting dividends and profits, and the government enforcing strong 
price controls.
1,1 Interpretations and Responses within TASS
The TASS leadership was no doubt kept fully conversant with the course
of negotiations between TUC and Government which took place from October
1946 to March 1948 if only because the editor of its journal was the
(2)
president of the TUC for most of the period, ^ He was not, however, 
a member of the 'inner cabinet' of the General Council who negotiated 
directly with Atlee and other Ministers, The EC's response to the 'bargain' 
of March 1948 was one of unqualified support. At both the special con­
ference of Executive Committees of affiliated unions held in March 1948 
and at the full TUC of that year, the TASS delegation voted in favour of 
the General Council's interpretation of the 'bargain' as embodied in the
( 3)General Council-supported motions.
At the RC Conference held a few days after the March special 
conference, the nascent 'left*, who had already won a policy position
/ I \
for a fairly militant national wages policy,^ ' challenged the leadership's 
position by initiating a debate on the issue through moving reference back
(2) Mortimer, op.cit., p,442.
(3) Ibid., p.282-283.
(4) See p. 45 above.
( 5)of the relevant section of the EC Report, The debate which took place
is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it allows an assessment 
to be made of the different interpretations of the immediate issues relating 
to the 1948-51 wage freeze. Secondly, it represents the beginning of the 
brief yet bitter battle on incomes policy out of which the 'left' emerged 
as dominant on the issue. This leads on to an analysis of this policy shift 
both in terms of interpretations and of the mechanics of winning Conference 
for the shift. Thirdly, some of the questions raised in the debate - 
Are wage increases the cause of inflation? Are there 'special cases'?
Should the TÜ movement react more sympathetically to a Labour Government 
than to a Tory Government? - are questions of central importance which recur 
in almost all subsequent debates on the issue in the union, (and for that 
matter in the broad Labour Movement), so that detailed treatment of the 
debate throws some light on these general issues as well as on trends 
within the union.
The leadership's arguments as put forward by the Assistant General 
Secretary, were that the Government's proposals, including the wage freeze, 
were the only options open to the TU movement if living standards were to 
be maintained and eventually improved. Firms must remain profitable, real 
incomes remain static and productivity must improve. In essence, continued 
full employment had created a set of circumstances in which wage control 
had become essential. This having been said, the Assistant General 
Secretary went on to justify the leadership's position by appealing to the 
fact that a large majority of affiliated unions had also come to accept 
the wage freeze and the 'bargain'. As he put it:
"From the contributions to the debate (at the special 
conference, it was evident) that many of the trade 
union representatives were coming to the position 
when they felt that the trade unions would seriously 
have to consider the implementations of some common
(5) Reference back was a frequently used 'left' tactic - see p. 54-55.
(6) R.C. Conference Report, 1948, p. I3O-I3I. -
wages policy. He would put it no higher than that, 
but it was evident that there was a change, or at least
a changing attitude towards that particular matter (that
is, wage control)" (?)
The EC report, to which this quotation was a partial defence from 'left' 
attack, spelled out the leadership's view of the link between wage increases 
and price inflation thus;
"Any further increase in the general level of incomes 
without any corresponding increase in the general level of 
output would only lead to an increase in the inflationary 
pressure upon prices".(S)
In thus accepting the philosophy of the 'bargain' the EC understood that
TASS could not consider itself a special case and
in the light of certain (wages) motions ... on the 
(RC) Conference agenda, delegates should note that 
delegates at the (special) Conference ... were asked 
not to take the view that they could accept the report 
on the basis that its provisions affected every other 
union but their own. (The Assistant General Secretary) 
asked delegates, when considering the report, not to 
take the view that it affected every other union but 
the Draughtsmen's Association".(9)
Further, delegates should not be swayed by the argument that this was a 
capitulation to a Labour Government which a Tory Government would not have 
obtained;
"(it) was a very different matter for the organised TU 
movement, which had helped to put a certain government 
in power and supplied it with some of its ablest people, 
to discipline itself".(lO)
While the 'left' challenged almost all of these statements during 
the debate, a reading of the verbatim record indicates that no concerted 
attack was made and no coherent alternative was offered. Two things were 
noticeable by their omission - the 'loyalty' question did not become 
an issue and no EC member spoke in favour of the 'left' opposition.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid,, p.137.
(9) Ibid., p.133.
(10) Ibid.
On the immediate causes of the crisis, 'left' spokesmen argued that 
while it was certainly true that there had been a deterioration in the 
trade balance, this itself was only a reflection of Government foreign 
policy, particularly overseas expenditure on military matters and other 
capital outflow both leading to a drain on capital investment in British 
industry and thus low productivity o u t p u t . F u r t h e r ,  wage increases 
were not the cause of inflation. The
"spiral of profits and any inflationary tendency in the 
economy could be laid at the door of the profit-making 
capitalists ... Since 1945 wage increases in general 
industry had risen by l6 per cent, whereas net profits, 
after taxation, had risen by 39 per cent. This ('lO') 
inflationary pressure came from the profit motive."
In rejecting wage increases as the cause of inflation and in arguing 
different reasons for the Balance of Payments crises, the 'left' rejected 
the wage freeze and thus also rejected any recourse to a 'special case' 
argument. The EC nevertheless carried the Conference and the reference 
back was defeated.
Although the EC continued to support wage restraint up until the
Special TUC Conference in January 1950, disaffection deepened as time
went on. In June, 1948, the EC asked the General Council to press the
Government to carry out its side of the 'bargain'. At the 1949 Congress
the TASS delegation voted to amend the General Council's motion, calling
on the General Council to submit detailed plans to solve the crisis. After
the September 1949 devaluation of the £ the EC moved into opposition and
{13)voted against the General Council in January 1950.
It is perhaps important to note that as TASS progressed from 
'collaboration' to 'opposition', the 'left* became the accredited spokesmen.
(11) Ibid., p.135-137.
(12) Ibid., p.139.
(13) Mortimer, op.cit., p.282-283, p.301 and p.303. Dorfman, op.cit., 
p.68, argues that in devaluing, the Government admitted the failure 
of its policy as a solution to the crisis.
Mortimer spoke on TASS's behalf at both the 1949 TUC and the January 1950 
Special Conference and led for the EC at the 1950 RC Conference at which
an EC-supported motion effectively rejecting wage restraint was unanimously
, , (14) accepted.^ ^
This EC-supported motion represents a transitional policy position 
in the shift from 'right' to 'left' on incomes policy and is quoted here 
in full in order to compare it with the 1948 position and the 'left's' 
successful policy position of 1952.
"This RC Conference reaffirms its strong dissatisfaction 
at the very high level of industrial and commercial 
profits which tend unnecessarily to inflate prices; and 
is concerned that the major share of the rewards of 
increased production during the last two years should 
have gone to the owners of industry.
Conference recognises that in conditions of full 
employment trade union wage policy must be formulated 
with close regard to wider economic objectives, but 
cannot accept that this implies that there is any 
justification at the present time, when productivity 
is rising and when profits are at exorbitant levels, 
for a reduction in the living standards of wage earners.
Conference reaffirms its belief that wage increases are 
justifiable ;
(a) as a reward for increased production;
(b) to adjust the incomes of workers below a 
reasonable standard of subsistence;
(c) to attract workers to essential undermanned 
industries, and
(d) to safeguard those ‘wage-differentials within 
an industry which are essential as incentives 
for skill, craftsmanship and special training.
Conference accepts the necessity for cuts in Government 
expenditure to curb inflationary pressure, but regrets 
that economies have been made (a) in the capital investment 
industry, and (b) in the housing programme ; whilst at the 
same time defence expenditure continues to rise to a figure 
substantially higher than the 1949 Budget estimate.
Conference realises that greater efficiency and productivity 
in British industry, with a consequent raising of the 
purchasing power of wages, will help towards the achievement 
, of a higher standard of life, and therefore affirms its 
support for the policy of the CSEU for the more effective
(l4) Mortimer, op,cit., p.302, p.304 and RC Conference Report, 1950, 
p.198.
planning of the Engineering industry, and endorses 
the efforts made by (TASS) during the past year 
to stimulate the interest of draughtsmen in industrial 
production.
This HC Conference, therefore, instructs the EC to 
place a resolution on the agenda for the Trade Union 
Congress, and to remind Congress of that part of their 
own 1949 TUC resolution which stated 'that Congress 
unhesitatingly rejects proposals which suggest that 
a permanent solution of the nation's difficulties 
could only be achieved by the lowering of wages, the 
lengthening of hours or a contraction of the social 
servicesl" (l5)
On the basis of this motion the TASS delegation voted against the 
General Council's position at the September 1950 TUC and thus helped to 
defeat the wage restraint policy. The delegation also voted in favour 
of the ETU's successful resolution calling on the General Council to 
oppose restraint and abandon any further policy of restraint.
To all intents and purposes this rejection of wage restraint at the 
1950 TUC sounded the demise of trade union majority support for incomes 
policy until the TUC of September 1965, although the General Council
( 17)continued to support 'moderation' throughout the 1950s.
However, to complete the union's policy response to the issues 
raised by the 1948-51 wage freeze, attention must be given to the 1952 
RC Conference which was held immediately after the Tory Government's 
budget of that year. The necessary two-thirds majority of Conference 
votes was obtained to discuss a branch-sponsored emergency resolution 
on the budget. The motion read:
"That this RC Conference condemns the Tory Budget's 
savage attack on working people's living standards 
in the interests of higher profits and war prepara­
tions. We, therefore, call upon the General Council 
of the TUC to take immediate action to defend the 
conditions of the working class, and to work towards 
the end of the Tory Government".(18)
(15) RC Conf. Report, 1950, p.197-202.
(16) Mortimer, op.cit., p.304-305.
(17) See Dorfman, op.cit., p.81-85. 
(is) RC Conf. Report, 1952, p.366.
This was unanimously accepted hy Conference (the EC while it did not 
openly support the motion, did not openly oppose it) and was the basis 
upon which Doughty, the General Secretary, seconded an unsuccessful ETU 
motion at the 1952 TUC rejecting the Government's "policy of so-called 
restraint or moderation designed to secure the withholding of ... wage 
c l a i m s " . T h i s  1952 emergency motion and the actions based on it, 
brought policy on wage control into line with the militant 'left wing' 
policies on minimum rates, strike pay, etc., as outlined in Chapter II.
In comparing the shift in policy from 1948 to 1952 in terms of 
interpretation of the problem and of the solutions to it, the early 
position falls within Dorfman's concept of "collaboration", i.e. allegiance 
was given by the 'right wing' leadership of the union to a 'right wing' 
General Council and a 'right wing' social democratic Government. The 
1950 motion quoted in full above, represents a shift from such 'collabora­
tion' only to the extent that since the Government had not complied with 
the terms of the 'bargain', the union could no longer support it. The 
motion accepts on the one hand Keynesian demand management, e.g. "cuts 
in government expenditure to curb inflationary pressures" and the need 
to 'formulate (union wage policy) with close regard to wider economic 
objectives". On the other hand, it accepts orthodox micro-economic market 
allocation incentives to justify wage increases and thus comes close to 
justifying a 'special case' approach, and only on this latter point does 
the policy content of the motion differ greatly from that of the Government. 
If the Government had kept its side of the 'bargain' a reading of this 
motion would imply acceptance of the 'bargain'. It is possible, of 
course, taken in the context of the power struggle in the union at that 
time, that given the Government's failure, the formulation of the motion 
suited the 'left' since it meant in practice a vote against the wage 
freeze and that a more extreme motion, ruled as falling at thé Conference,
(19) RC Conf. Report, 1953» p.32.
was run to point up the actual moderation of the successful motion.
The 1952 position while not explicitly 'leftwing', rejects hy 
implication the managed-capitalism approach of eârî±er':i^esulut4en's.1. .
It talks specifically about the working class, defending its conditions 
etc. and in fact laid down a policy foundation which, while it was made 
more explicit in later years, never fundamentally changed, i.e. a class- 
based analysis,
1.2 Responses to Productivity Bargaining
This shift in interpretation can also be seen in a related area of 
policy which developed in parallel with the 1948-51 wage freeze. This 
was the question of productivity. After the December 1948 TUC affiliated 
EC's conference on productivity came out in favour of increasing pro­
ductivity through joint management-worker committees, the union set up a 
national Productivity Sub-Committee and held delegate conferences on the 
issue in a number of divisions. The Sub-Committee was wound up in 1951 
after a national delegate conference, under pressure from
"a succession of branch delegates ... (who) expressed 
the view that it was impossible to discuss the question 
of productivity to the exclusion of many other aspects 
of economic policy. They referred particularly to the 
burden of rearmament, the operation of the monopolies 
and restrictive arrangements in industry ... (and) ... 
that since the series of productivity conferences had 
been started there had been a substantial increase in 
productivity in engineering but that the major share 
of the benefit had gone to the employers and not to 
the workers." (20)
The conclusion that questions of improving productivity and of sharing 
out the rewards cannot be separated from wider issues of economic and 
political policy is perhaps a more explicit indication of the 'left's' 
thinking on incomes policy and related matters than the "defence of the 
working class" concept in the successful 1952 motion quoted above. It
(20) Mortimer, op.cit., p.290.
is still nevertheless only the embryonic form of the later policy 
position of the 1960s which see questions of incomes policy and pro­
ductivity bargaining as being against the interests of the working class 
under capitalism and only in the class’s interests under socialism. 
Essentially the 'left' viewed economic and political issues as interpene­
trated and in all subsequent debates this interpenetration overshadows 
any analysis in terms of what is called 'positive economics',
2. WAGE PAUSES, 1956 and I96I/2
Two things stand out sharply with respect to the economic crises 
and wage restraint initiatives of 1956 and I961/2 as compared with the 
situation in 1948. Firstly for whatever reasons there was not the same 
sense of urgency in the negotiations which took place as there was in 
1948 and secondly, the trade union movement or at least some very powerful 
unions with leaders on the General Council of the TUC had moved away from 
the 'collaborationist' position typical of the General Council in the post­
war years up until 1956. Thus while the General Council's overall position 
through the 1950s and early 1960s can be viewed as favouring 'moderation' 
in wage claims, the Council was not prepared to enter into wage 'bargains' 
either in 1956 or in I96I.
The Tory Government failed completely to obtain any co-operation 
from the TUC for its wage restraint proposals of 1956 and in order to 
salvage something of the economic policy package it introduced in I96I, 
it had to trade off its public sector "pay pause" for TUC co-operation
(21)in the National Economic Development Council.^ '
(21) Dorfman, op.cit., p.113-114.
2.1 TASS Responses
As reflected in TASS Conference policy and debates, the 1956 
initiative in particular raised little anger and response. The 1956 
Conference explicitly laid down the general policy line of the period;
"This Representative Council reaffirms its support 
for a vigorous wages policy and its opposition 
to wage restraint ..." (22)
The main policy debates at Conferences from 1953 to 1958 were on the 
issue of a vigorous wages policy and its degree of implementation by the
EC, leading to the 'left' majority EC of 1958. Debates of the post-1958
period concentrated on raising the level of membership militancy and on 
the mechanics of operating a many strikes/high strike pay policy.
The TASS delegation's stand against the 'pay pause' at the I96I 
TUC was confirmed at the I962 RC Conference thus:
"This RC Conference emphatically endorses the rejection 
by the Executive Committee of the Government's wage 
freeze policy, condemns interference with negotiating 
procedures, and calls on the Labour movement to
resist attempts to solve the economic crisis at the
expense of the working population' (23)
The February 1962 White Paper 'Incomes Policy, The Next Step' which 
established the NEDC and the National Income Commission, received a 
hostile reception from the TASS leadership. In the debate which took 
place at the I962 Conference, the policy position taken up was that the 
TUC General Council's decision to participate in the NEDC was "against 
the best interests of the trade union movement" and the TASS delegation 
was instructed to "demand the immediate withdrawal of the TUC from the 
body".(^^) When voting took place at the 1962 TUC,TASS was in the minority 
and the TUC did participate in the work of the NEDC. It did not participate 
in the NIC, a position with which TASS concurred.
(22) RC Conf. Report, 1956, p.281.
(23) RC Conf. Report, 1962, p.272-2?6.
(24) Ibid., p.276-282.
2,2 The 'Policy Formation/Policy Implementation' Progression
The general direction of TASS policy on governmental initiatives 
on incomes policy is quite clear. With the exception of the 'collaborat- 
ionism/managed-capitalism' of the 1948-50 period, the general foundation 
was that wage restraint under capitalism represented an attempt "to solve 
the economic crisis at the expense of the working population in the
interests of higher profits (and was thus) ... against the best
interests of the trade union movement". The alternative for the union 
and others in immediate economic terms was a "vigorous wages policy" and 
the longer-term solution was the establishment of a socialist economy and 
society, although this was never quite made explicit.
Before moving on to membership responses to these policies, reference 
should be made to the qualification to the policy formation/policy 
implementation progression outlined in the introduction to Chapter II,
The work of the present sub-section has elucidated the nature of the 
qualification. The 'left' was able to implement 'external' policy, on 
incomes policy for example, prior to 1959 even given its minority position 
on the EC, because it controlled to a greater or lesser extent the composi­
tion of the delegation to 'external' bodies such as the TUC. For example,
(25)Mortimer served on the delegation from 1949 onwards.' ' This ability 
to implement 'external' policies in the face of 'rightwing' control of 
the EC coupled with the 'left's' claims that the 'right' majority on the 
EC did not implement certain 'internal' policies seems to have had the 
effect of strengthening the 'left'. The use of 'reference back' by the 
'left' in Conference and the reactions of some of the delegates have already 
been outlined on p. 54 of Chapter III. It is difficult to find further 
evidence to substantiate this strengthening other than that the 'left' did 
in fact reach majority control on both EC and among the Divisional
(25) There is no evidence to suggest that the 'right' in such delegations 
attempted to operate the equivalent of "Carron's Law" as happened 
in the AEU in similar 'right/left' policy splits.
Organisers by 1958. What evidence there is indicates, firstly, that the 
'left' could and did show that there were areas of policy which the 'right' 
did not implement enthusiastically or at all, so that the 'left's' part in 
implementing policy at the TUC etc. may have given it a fair degree of leverage 
through the promotion of the agreed policy to the promotion of individuals 
who eventually replaced the 'right' at various levels of the union. For 
example, H. Smith, the present Assistant General Secretary (Editor), was 
a reserve delegate to the TUC delegation in 1955 and 1956, a full delegate 
in 1957, 1958 and 1959 and was elected Vice-President at the I96O RC 
Conference, an election seen by Wootton as a major consolidation of the 
'left' in the l e a d e r s h i p , S e c o n d l y ,  the 'left's' opposition to wage 
restraint for example, preceded by some years the TUC^s rejection of it 
and hence the 'left' could and did claim that TASS policy was progressive 
and yet in the mainstream of trade union thinking.
3. THE MEMBERSHIP'S RESPONSES, 1950-1963
There was no occasion during the 1950-63 period to actually test 
the membership's acceptance or rejection of the union's opposition to 
incomes policy, since at no time was the membership called upon to support 
the policy in practice. There were no strike calls on the issue for 
example. No active response was ever required from the mass of the 
membership. Since there was no question of legal constraints on wage 
bargaining or institutions built into the incomes policies, there was little 
need for the 'left' to ask members to register token protests of any kind, 
e.g. boycotting institutions, or to ask them to break the law. To the 
extent that the 'right' maintained a majority among the Divisional Organisers 
up to 1958 and did not actively implement the "vigorous wages policy", 
there would be little organised activity in most Divisions which would be
(26) RC Conf. Reports, 1955 to I96O. See the quote from Wootton, 
on p. 34 above.
seen by the mass of the membership as 'breaking' or challenging the incomes 
policy whether they agreed as individuals with incomes policy or not.
In early I962 two national one-day stoppages took place in support 
of a national wage claim, the first such stoppages in the union's history.
The Tory Government's 'pay pause' was operational and the NEDC/NIC White 
Paper came out in between the stoppages. It seems reasonable to suppose 
that the 'left' leadership's views would be well known to the mass of the 
membership not only through the monthly journal, but also through the 
divisions and branches which, by that time, were mainly controlled by the 
'left'. The response of the membership to these stoppages can perhaps 
be taken as partial tests of policy in action.
The EC urged all members whose wages benefitted directly from 
agreements between the union and both the Engineering Employers' Federation 
and the Shipbuilding Employers, to stop work on 5th February and 5th March 
1962. It agreed to pay £1 strike pay on each of the two days to those 
who stopped work. Sixteen thousand members claimed strike pay for the 
first stoppage and 21,000 for the second, that is, 25^ and 33^ of 'paying
( 27)membership' or 20^ and 30^ of 'book membership',' ' Assuming that most 
of the membership were covered by the strike c a l l s t h e  percentages 
responding to the calls are not particularly high. Looked at from 
its most negative aspect, the response to the two stoppages suggests 
that the bulk of the membership were either not prepared to undertake 
militant action in support of wage claims in general or that the Govern­
ment's call for a voluntary pay pause did meet with a sympathetic response 
among the TASS membership. Furthermore, while there is little evidence 
to support the idea that reaction to the "Communist take-over" of 1958-60^^^^
(27) RC Conf. Report, 1962, p.106-107.
(28) i.e. that most of the members were in firms represented by the EEP 
and SSREF.
(29) See quote from Wootton on p.33 above.
led to many, if not mass, resignations, there is some evidence particularly 
in the correspondence columns of the journal that some groups of members 
were dissatisfied with the leadership and the policy,
From a more positive viewpoint, the response of between 20^ and 
33^ of the membership to the strike calls could be taken as a victory for 
the 'left', particularly since these calls were the first in the union's 
history and that the 'left' had only been in active majority control since 
1958. While there may not have been mass acceptance of the anti-incomes 
policy position or of the militant wages policy alternative, neither 
was there mass rejection of it in terms of a noticeable reaction against 
the leadership by the membership or by delegates to the RC Conference which
(31)followed the stoppages.
*****
To summarise, the 'left' in parallel with victories in other areas 
of policy, won the battle against incomes policy and after 1958 proceeded 
to implement their anti-incomes policy position among the membership when 
the need arose. The foundation was thereby laid both in policy and practice 
for what amounted to an assault by TASS on the wages policies and industrial 
relations initiatives of the 1964-1970 Labour Government.
(30) See correspondence columns of the Journals of Jun, Jul, Aug, 1958, 
May, 1959» Jun, I96O and Feb. I96I for examples.
(31) i.e. the I962 Conference, see above p. 83, which endorsed the 
'left's' position.
CHAPTER V
TASS - INCOMES POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGISLATION. 1963-1970
In view of the changed context and content of Government policies in 
the 1960s as against the 1950s, it perhaps does not oversimplify history 
to separate the two decades in what might he called a one dimensional way.
If Prime Minister MacMillan's 'winds of change' speech is symbolic of 
the separation at the international level indicating a withdrawal from 
classical imperialist positions across the world, leading to political 
commitment by all major political parties to entry to the European 
Economic Community, then commitment in the 1960s to economic planning 
(somehow defined) by the major parties represents the separation from the 
decade of the 1950s at the domestic economic level.
Andrew Shonfield, when comparing the UK and USA with their West 
European rivals, notes:
"(By the early 1960s) both countries embarked on policies 
which were intended to mark a deliberate break with the 
past, while copying some features, real or imaginary, 
of European experience. In Britain the effort was 
concentrated on avoiding 'stop-go' measures which had 
interfered with an even rate of growth; the formula 
adopted was economic planning on the French model."(l)
The Conservatives' contribution in institutional terms is represented 
by the NEDC, NIC and the training schemes set up under the Industrial 
Training Act. The return of the Labour Government in 1964 and its re- 
election in 1966, gave the economic planning trend its major impetus 
and a whole range of planning commitments and re-structuring instruments 
were introduced after 1964.
Labour's initial and perhaps most grandiose commitment was the 
National Plan of I965 which was the responsibility of one of the Government's
(1) Shonfield, 'Modern Capitalism', I965, p.65.
new super-ministries, the Department of Economic Affairs. Other
initiatives were the National Board for Prices and Incomes, the Industrial
Expansion Act, the Redundancy Payments Act, the Industrial Reorganisation
Corporation, Selective Employment Tax, Regional Employment Premiums, and
(2)
the National Research and Development Corporation,'  ^ and these were 
paralleled by continued use of the NEDC.
While some of the foregoing were directed at the labour market/ 
industrial relations aspect of the economy, the two major developments 
in this area were the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations appointed in I965 which reported in I968, leading to the 
White Paper 'In Place of Strife', and the NBPI operating under a series 
of Acts from 1965 through to 1970, supplemented by the Commission on 
Industrial Relations appointed in I969.
Even if it were possible to separate those planning commitments and 
restructuring instruments which were a response to what was seen as a 
need for a long term strategic change in the direction of economic activity 
from those which were in essence a response to short term problems, it 
would nevertheless be difficult to argue that the former, given their 
scope, would have been more acceptable to the trade union movement than 
the latter. In the event, while there was an understanding between the 
General Council of the TUC and the Labour Shadow Cabinet prior to the 
1964 election on long term aims which was finally embodied in the 'Statement
(3)of Intent',' and while some discussion did take place between the 
General Council and the DEA in the early months of the Government's term 
of office over long term versus short term possibilities, the Balance of 
Payments crises in each year from 1964 to I967 led the Government to place major 
emphasis on support for the £ and on achieving a substantial expansion
(2) See, e.g.,'The U.K. Economy',Prest and Coppock,3rd ed. for further details,
(3) Dorfman, 'Wage Politics in Britain', 1973, p.148.
(4) Ibid., p.120-121 and 124.
yu
of export earnings. This entailed a short-run import surcharge, 
deflationary measures and wage control, the latter becoming severe between 
July 1966 and July 1967, all of which killed the 'National Plan'.
As in the negotiations prior to and during the 1948-51 wage freeze
the General Council or at least a majority of it, was prepared to colla­
borate with the Goverment on the basis of 'traditional loyalities'. The 
minority within the General Council became more vocal however, as on the one 
hand the Government demanded increasingly tighter controls culminating 
in the 'complete standstill' on wages of July to December I966 and the
'severe restraint' with a 'zero norm' of January to July I967, and on the
other the majority surrendered to these demands with increasing haste 
from 1964 through to 1967.^^^
Such was the reaction from rank and file trade unionists and within 
union leaderships themselves, that the General Council could only hold the 
line for 24 months from September 1965 to September I967. Voting figures 
on the relevant Congress motions show the trend. In I965 the vote on the 
General Council's collaborationist position was 5.5 MIL. for and 3.3 MIL. 
against; in 1966, 4.56 MIL. for and 4.2 MIL. against; in 1967 the General 
Council's position was defeated by a majority of 1 MIL.^^^ After I967 
the Government was unable to obtain TUC support for its incomes policy.
The devaluation of the £ in November I967 and the massive deflationary 
package which accompanied it, effectively alienated majority trade union 
support, though Woodcock and other TUC leaders continued to exhort unions
(7)to wage moderation.' ' By mid-1969 the Government abandoned any attempt 
to enforce its incomes policy and the last six months of I969 and the first 
six of 1970 saw such a marked degree of successful trade union activity on 
wage increases that it is often referred to as a period of "wage explosion".
(5) Ibid., p.142 and p.136, 140 and 141.
(6) Ibid., p.137, 140 and 141.
(7) Ibid., p.141 and 142.
(8) Clegg, 'How to run an Incomes Policy', 1971, p.59, and f.n. 2, Chapter I,
If the Government could claim a measure of success for its incomes 
policy strategy in that the TUC supported it, at least formally, from I965 
through to 1967, the same claim could not be made for its proposals on 
trade union reform. After the Royal Commission had presented its report, 
the Government drew up a set of proposals in the form of the White Paper 
'In Place of Strife' without allowing the TUC time to respond. Trade 
union reaction was almost uniformly hostile. The 19^9 TU Congress 
explicitly rejected the proposed legislation, after which the Government 
effectively withdrew its proposals. After some extremely tough and complex 
bargaining the Government was able to establish the CIR in I969 with Woodcock 
as chief executive and in 1970 the TUC established Dispute Committees which 
purported to tackle some of the problems raised by the Royal Commission 
and White Paper. These measures, in the face of massive hostility, were 
at most second best and indeed were effectively boycotted by a large 
section of the trade union movement.
When the Government went to the country in June 1970, it did so 
with a small Balance of Payments surplus, a central aim set almost 
immediately after it had come to power in I964. The cost of achieving this 
surplus - 500,000 registered unemployed, zero economic growth in 1969/70 
and a major rupture with the trade union movement - may not have lost it 
the election, but it must have had a major impact on the result.
1. THE UNION'S INTERPRETATIONS AND RESPONSES
In order to facilitate a detailed analysis of the union's responses 
during this period, this section is structured as follows; firstly, two 
broad areas of governmental initiative are looked at from the point of 
view of union interpretation and policy - economic planning and incomes 
policy, and the Donovan Commission and 'In Place of Strife'; secondly,
(9) TASS "actively opposed" the Disputes Committees, R.C. Conf.1970, p.148,
(10) The TASS leadership adopted this stance - see editorial in the 
Journal of July, 1970.
the union'a, activity based on its policy is laid out in some detail; and 
thirdly, membership response, particularly minority response, is considered.
1,1 Economic Planning and Incomes Policies
The 1965 RC Conference, in accepting the EC report, rejected the 
'Declaration of Intent' which was signed five months earlier in December
1964 by representatives of the Government, employers’ organisations and the 
TUC. It went on to reject incomes policy in favour of free collective 
b a r g a i n i n g . T h e  I966 Conference explicitly rejected the annual 
wage increase norm which the Government had been advocating since April
1965 and which continued to be the norm up until the 'complete standstill’ 
was introduced in July I966. It also implicitly rejected the 'National 
Plan' .
These rejections of the Government's overall economic strategy rested 
upon an analysis by the leadership of the economic crisis which differed 
from that of the Government. The 'left' argued that the Balance of Payments 
crisis was not caused by low productivity output and lack of price com­
petitiveness due to excessive wage increases, but was the result of military 
expenditure overseas, high capital outflow and interest on loans received 
from foreign countries. They argued that the slow growth of national 
income was caused by the "stop-go" economic policies of the 1950s and 
early 1960s, which were themselves a reflection of the weakening role 
of the £ in world money markets, and that these had hindered capital
( 13)investment decisions due to the uncertainty they had caused. ^ The
'left's' alternative strategy was, as might be expected, political as well 
as economic. They were for a move towards "socialism", seen in the 
immediate post-1964 period as the Labour Government with its "tremendous
(11) RC Conf. report I965, p.8-64 and 585.
(12) RC Conf. report, I966, p.621-622.
(13) RC Conf. report, I965, p.263-264.
ally ... the trade union movement" challenging capitalism by the extensive 
nationalisation of the "monopolies", facing "up to the city and the foreign 
bankers", instituting in the nationalised industries "a planned programme 
of investment" and taking immediate steps "for a redistribution of income 
and wealth in favour of working p e o p l e " . E s s e n t i a l l y  the Balance of 
Payments crises were seen as of secondary importance to the political 
challenge to capitalism.
The National Plan, seen by the Government as "a guide to action"
(15)in achieving a 25^ growth in output between 1964 and 1970,'  ^was discussed 
in the union^s journal but no real debates took place on it in the union 
Conference. The 'Plan' was never discussed even in the journal in terms
 ^-I ^  \
of its feasibility or lack of clarity^ although these might be 
mentioned. Instead it was attacked as not being an answer to the needs 
of the working people of Britain because it did not make inroads into the 
power of private property. Thus no debate took place on the overall goals 
of the 'Plan'or on the targets laid down within it for those industries 
in which the union had greatest involvement. Such 'indicative planning' 
was seen at best as almost useless and at worst as favouring a continuation 
of capitalism by maintaining and increasing profits. The leadership would 
have preferred the planned restriction of capitalism leading to a diminution 
of the capitalist sector of the economy and its subservience to a greatly 
enlarged public sector. The President in his address to the I965 
Conference admitted that "if it were possible to plan wages, prices and 
profits in a reasonable manner, a programme of planned expansion could be 
assured" but warned Conference that a study of the wage freeze of 1948-51 
would show that while "wages remained relatively stable, prices varied 
considerably ... profits, although held in check for a period, were
(14) RC Conf. Report, I965, p.119, 263, 264 and I966, p.373.
(15) 'National Plan', published September I965.
(16) Dorfman, op.cit., p.119, argues that this was true of most unions.
y-t,
( 17)eventually paid out in full."'
These themes - that the Government's economic planning was not 
planning at all, that its economic strategy favoured profits at the expense 
of wages and that it did not open up a way to socialism - run through 
conference debates for 19^5 and I966 and through the journals for that 
period. Mortimer, speaking in a 19^5 debate on a composite motion 
entitled 'wage freeze', puts the union's position on economic planning 
thus :
"What do we mean by planning? We mean an economy in which 
those who are responsible for society can control the 
disposition of resources. That is what (we) mean by a 
planned economy, so that not only do we establish targets 
as the National Economic Council has done but that we 
command the basic resources to ensure that these targets 
are fulfilled. This is something which the NEDC cannot 
do in this country; we have not a planned economy." (I8)
Another Mortimer speech on behalf of the EC (moving an EC sponsored 
motion against income policy at the I966 Conference) is probably the 
most comprehensive statement of the leadership's position on planning.
He argued that the union had to recognise that it lived in a society 
in which 80^ of industry was privately owned and that the dominant motive 
was the pursuit of private profit. He indicated that neither the 
exhortations of Messrs Wilson and Brown nor those of the Government 
would mean anything if they were in conflict with the private profit of 
firms and that the National Plan, and by implication indicative planning, 
had failed and would continue to fail. The leadership was in favour of 
much more effective economic planning but believed this meant the extension 
of social ownership and that this was of immediate relevance to the solution 
of Britain's economic problems. The union was for 'physical' as 
against 'indicative' planning within a transition to socialism.
(17) RC Conf. Report, 1965, p.119*
(18) RC Conf. Report, I965, p.271-272.
(19) RC Conf. Report, 1966, p.374.
In rejecting the Government's overall economic strategy as embodied 
in the 'National Plan', the union also rejected the incomes policy proposals 
that went with it. The leadership condemned the concept of the 'planned 
growth of incomes' as in effect a euphemism for a wage freeze; indeed, as 
noted above, this latter is the title given to the incomes policy resolution 
at the 1965 Conference, i.e. over a year before the 'complete standstill' 
of July 1966, Basically the leadership's position as represented in a 
successful motion at the 19^5 Conference, was "that only in a socialist 
society where the workers control the wealth they produce can any fair 
system of distribution be organised", so that under capitalism with a 
Labour Government or not, the union must insist "upon the trade unions' right 
to free collective bargaining in order to secure for the members their 
rightful share of the prosperity within the fields of their various 
e n d e a v o u r s . T h e  leadership rejected the argument that restraint 
of wages benefitted other sections of workers. In answer to the question 
"How can workers in certain industries ensure that if they forego their 
wage claims the benefit will be passed to other workers?", Mortimer replied; 
"The fact is that within capitalism there can be no such assurance. If 
we voluntarily restrained our claims the main beneficiaries would be the
(21)
employers."'
The union leadership thus made no distinction between the "planned 
growth of incomes and of income distribution" which characterised Government 
policy in the period June 1964 to July I966 and the policy of straight 
repression of wages which characterised the post-July I966 period. Any 
attempt to interfere with free collective bargaining was seen as against 
the best of interests of the membership under capitalism, and the union's 
policy on this issue remained the same for the full period 1964 to 1970.
(20) RC Conf. Report, I965, p.585.
(21) RC Conf. Report, I966, p.373.
Before turning to the question of productivity bargaining which was 
central to the Government's wages policy from I968 onwards, it is perhaps 
necessary to say something about the apparent lack of consideration given 
by the union to the Labour Government elected in 1964 with a very small 
Parliamentary majority. Essentially the leadership viewed the Wilson 
opposition and then Government as being in the Atlee rightwing 'managed- 
capitalism' tradition. Thus in both I965 and I966, EC Conference went on 
record as opposing the policies of the Government in order to save it.
The mover of the successful anti-incomes policy motion at the I965 
Conference argued that the motion was not "gunning" for the Government, 
nor was it intended as obstructive or destructive, rather it was aimed 
at preventing disaster for the Labour Party because this was precisely 
what would happen if those people who were its supporters were asked to 
stand by and accept wage restraint while the demands of Britain's monopolists 
and world bankers were satisfied. Mortimer made much the same point in the
(22)ensuing debate. ^
The emphasis placed by the Government on productivity bargaining 
stemmed from a number of factors. The chairman of the NBPI indicated 
that at one level it was introduced to overcome the difficulties experienced 
in earlier phases of incomes policy in enforcing policy. Specifically, 
and seen as separate from the problem of enforcement, the purpose of 
productivity incomes policy was to slow down the rate of increase in
( 23)labour costs per unit of output.
The union Conference came out against productivity bargaining for 
two reasons. Firstly, it questioned the objective basis of the assess­
ment or measurement technique implicit in the concept of productivity.
It argued that engineering design and drafting functions were not amenable
(22) EC Conf. Report, 1965, p.264 and p.269.
(23) 'The New Inflation', Jones A, p.83, 1973.
(24)
to objective measurement, thus it opposed ’^quantitative analysis"' 
of drawing office practices. To quote the union's position as put in a 
document circulated to the membership entitled "Data's Attitude to Work 
Assessment Schemes";
"(Design) work is creative and highly qualitative and 
these aspects extend to varying degrees right through 
the process of design work to the (detail drafting) 
stage at which the concern for the sequence of 
manufacturing operation, tolerancing and reduction 
of manufacturing times must be exercised in the 
execution of drawing work" (25)
This objection comes close to an argument for special case treatment 
under productivity bargaining since it concentrates entirely on the main 
area of employment of union membership. No generalisation is made about 
problems of productivity measurement for other types of labour or labour 
in general.
Secondly, and related to the foregoing, the leadership argued that 
"by offsetting wage claims against increased productivity, labour power 
no longer increased in value. Profits were continually increasing; prices 
were continually rising; but wages were not rising proportionately 
Irrespective of the logic of this statement, the union Conference adopted 
the position that productivity bargaining benefitted profits more than 
wages.
1.2 Donovan and 'In Place of Strife*
The 'Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations'
set up in I965 and reporting in I968 was the basis on which the Government
issued its January I969 White Paper 'In Place of Strife; a policy for
(27)
industrial relations'.' ' That the union appreciated that the Royal
(24) RC Conf, Report, I969, p.260.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) White Paper 'In Place of Strife',CMND. 3888
Commission Report contained proposals that might he beneficial to trade 
unions may be judged from the title of a TASS pamphlet circulated widely 
in 1968, 'Donovan Exposed - The Sugar Coated Pill with the Bitter Centre'. 
The pamphlet begins by arguing that the pressure to set up the Royal 
Commission came from those who wanted to make a scapegoat of the trade 
unions for Britain's economic ills, thus focussing attention on the activity 
of trade unions, particularly shop stewards, to their detriment. The 
arguments put against the Commission's proposals concentrated mainly on 
what the leadership saw as restrictions being placed on trade union 
bargaining strength. Thus registration of trade unions was seen as giving 
"the State a channel of direct control and intervention in the formation 
of trade union rules ... this could easily become a means of pressurising 
a trade union into 'disciplining' its more militant members by direct or 
indirect threats to have it removed from the register". The proposal 
to introduce a Commission on Industrial Relations was seen as a way of 
inducing "in a variety of ways the trade unions to change their policy 
and structure and to adopt a radically new form of collective bargaining 
based apparently on the promotion of productivity bargaining on a factory 
basis". The union argued that from the Government's point of view the most 
important thing was to give the NBPI control over wage drift and that the 
proposal for the registration of agreements was meant to do just that; 
to quote the Commission "the registration of company and factory agreement 
would expose the whole process of pay settlement to the influence of 
(incomes) policy". Finally, the union admitted that it could support a 
move towards factory bargaining within a two tier system but only in order 
to obtain agreements which would "recognise the circumstances in (each) 
particular plant", because only with the continued link between factory 
and national agreements would it "be possible to retain a sense of overall
(28) TASS pamphlet, I968. See also Mortimer's penultimate editorial
in Journal of July I968 and Journals of Dec, I968 and Mar.and May
1969.
(29)
working class solidarity which tends to be lacking in other countries".
The White Paper 'In Place of Strife' contained a number of proposals 
for the reform of industrial relations practices in Britain which the 
Government intended to put into legislation. From the point of view 
of the TASS leadership the main proposals to which they took exception 
were :
(a) the direct legal enforcement, where the parties wished, of agreements 
between trade unions and employers' associations;
(b) the establishment of an Industrial Board to hear certain types of 
cases against employers, trade unions and individual employees;
(n) the twenty-eight day cooling-off period;
(d) an Order in Council requiring strike ballots;
(e) the registration of trade unions and employers'associations ; and
(f) that a union may be sued in tort except in circumstances'of a trade
dispute. (30)
On these proposals, the leadership argued an essentially similar case 
to that given above on the Royal Commission Report. They argued that 
"the right of trade unions to take action is an essential balance in the 
unequal relationship which exists between an employer and his worlcpeople", 
that interference by legislation had tremendous dangers for trade unions - 
"it took ten years for Rookes v. Barnard to reach final judgement in the 
House of Lords" - and that overall "the intention of the White Paper is
(31)very harmful".'  ^ On this basis the union opposed the introduction of
'In Place of Strife'.
2. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The leadership's activity in attempting to implement Conference 
policies during this period is so broad as to require some division and
(29) TASS Pamphlet I968, p.10.
(30) TASS Pamphlet, 'In Place of Strife', I969.
(31) Ibid., p.4-5. -
structuring and the following areas have been selected for detailed 
examination.
Policy implementation;
1. In the labour movement.
2. Under 'vetting' and 'early warning'.
3. Under 'complete standstill' and 'severe restraint'.
4. Under 'productivity bargaining' and 'delaying powers'.
5. On 'In Place of Strife'.
2.1 In the Labour Movement
From 1964 through to 1970 TASS utilised every opportunity to argue 
its policies in the broader labour movement. At every annual TUC and 
Special Conference held from I963 to 1970 inclusive, the union was vocal 
in its opposition to incomes policy and industrial relations legislation.
At the 1965 TUC and again in 1967, TASS seconded the main anti-incomes 
policy motion, in the latter year winning a majority against incomes policy, 
and at the I969 Congress TASS moved the successful motion against trade 
union legislation. A similar position can be documented for Labour Party
(32)Conferences for the period.' ^
Outwith conferences, the union was instrumental in forming a 
collaborative venture with the A.Sc.V, ASSET, STCS, and ACTT to produce 
material opposing incomes policy. This resulted in the publication of 
a booklet entitled 'Declaration of Dissent* which was widely distributed 
in 1965, and a broadsheet entitled 'Five Unions Speak' circulated prior
(33)to the Labour Party Conference of that year.' ' A further publication 
entitled 'A Bad Package' was distributed immediately after the introduction 
of the wages 'standstill' of July, 1966.^^^^ The five unions also ran
(32) Relevant RC Conf. Reports.
(33) PC Conf. Report, I966, p.41.
(34) RC Conf. Report, I967, p.83.
a series of teach-ins against Government policies for delegates to the 
TUC and Labour Party Conferences of 19^5 and I966, and TASS organised a 
series of public meetings in the major cities in I966 and I967 achieving
( 35)
attendances of between 200 and 6OO.
The union published on its own behalf two pamphlets against proposals 
for legislation on trade union reform, one entitled 'Donovan Exposed' and 
the other on 'In Place of Strife', both of which were widely circulated 
in 1969 and which have been commented upon previously.
2.2 Under "Vetting" and "Early Warning"
With reference to Government legislation on incomes or TUC 
initiatives Over the full period 1964 to mid-1970, the TASS Executive 
Committee attempted at all times to implement RC Conference policy, working 
to breach restraint whenever this was necessary regardless of whether 
the restraint took the form of standstills, statutory limits or delays, 
or TUC voluntary vetting etc. Thus under the TUC vetting scheme which 
operated only nominally from September 1965 to July 1966^^^^ but became 
more rigorous from July 1967, the leadership in effect refused to co-operate
In the early period the EC took up the position that any domestic 
claims arising from its July 1965 national agreements with the Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Employers' Federations, which would almost certainly be 
above the norm, should not be notified individually but should be
covered by submitting a single letter to the effect that the union con­
sidered them outwith the scope of the voluntary scheme. That is, the 
norm applied only to national settlements and since TASS's national 
settlements were always backed up by domestic claims on the question 
of differentials via 'pattern bargaining', the union claimed that they
(37)lay outside the scope of the vetting machinery.'  ^ The EC, in conjunction
(35) Ibid.
(36) Dorfman, op.cit., p.l38.
(37) RC Conf. Report, I966 - EC Report, p.42
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with the other unions making up the TUC's Joint Consultative Committee 
of Staff Unions, followed the same procedure with respect to claims for 
four weeks holidays which would also have been above the norm,'
The General Council's reply to both letters vindicates Dorfman's 
judgement that the TUC's vetting committee was ineffective at least in the 
early period. The reply was received by TASS early in I966, and rather 
lamely "note(s) the views expressed and ask(s) that wherever possible
( 39 )assistance be given to implement ... Congress's decisions".'
Under the more rigorous vetting instituted in July I967 (after a 
year of 'standstill/severe restraint'), the union initially submitted 
details of all new domestic claims but made no attempt to hold claims 
within the guidelines. Eventually in the autumn of 19^7 the EC was asked 
to send representatives to have discussions with the TUC vetting committee. 
During the discussions the vetting committee made it clear that almost all 
the claims submitted were not in line with the criteria of Congress.
The TASS representatives stated that they were bound only by the decisions 
of their RC Conferences and would thus continue to press claims in line 
with Conference policy, i.e. outwith the TUC criteria.
The vetting committee also raised the question of the union's 
unilateral termination of its I963 National Minimum Wage Agreement with the 
Engineering Employers' Federation. This termination had taken place during 
discussions initiated by the Federation in July I967 at which the Federation 
made an offer pending the outcome of the NBPI report on the engineering 
i n d u s t r y , a n  offer the union rejected. The vetting committee asked 
why details of the national claim had not been submitted to it. The 
union said no national claim had been lodged, thus there were no details.
The outcome was that the union, having discussed its rejection of the
(38) Ibid.
(39) Ibid. Quoted in the EC's Report.
(40) RC Conf. Report, I968, p.44-45.
(41) Such an agreement had been TASS policy for 25 years*- the I965 
agreement was the first.
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Federations' offer and having indicated the sort of offer it would need 
in order to press acceptance on the membership, did not send any further 
details of domestic claims arising out of the national negotiations to the 
vetting committee, Given the relationship between TASS national., yages
policy and domestic claims and activity, (the use of 'pattern setting' 
domestic claims and 'pattern following' claims based on national awards or 
claims), this boycotting of the vetting committee on national and domestic 
claims effectively excluded the majority of domestic claims.
Immediately following these autumn 19^7 discussions with the TUC 
vetting committee, the EC was invited to meet the Minister of Labour for 
discussions on the 'early warning' of claims and specifically on the 
rejection of the EEF's wage offer. The Minister endeavoured unsuccessfully 
to persuade the EC to accept the Federation’s offer and await the NBPI 
report. He then stated that he would not be prepared to approve subsequent 
settlements for general wage increases outwith his guidelines except where 
productivity gains were included as part of the agreements. The Minister 
did threaten o r d e r s u n d e r  Part II of the I967 Act as a back-up to his 
exhortations and in at least four separate settlements considerable corres­
pondence and discussion took place. In two cases productivity clauses 
were eventually included and the settlements were then accepted by the 
Minister. In the other two cases implementation was carried out by the 
firms concerned before approval was granted but the Minister did not 
interfere,
The union continued to press claims above the norm, engaging in illegal 
settlements where possible and encouraging the membership to break the
(42) See below, p.l06.
(43) EC Conf. Report, I968, p.44-45.
(44) See p. 97 above.
(45) RC Conf. Report, 1968, p.45.
(46) Ibid.
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legislated norm, as outlined below, p.108,
2.3 Under 'Complete Standstill' and 'Severe Restraint'
Of the twelve months of 'standstill' and 'severe restraint with a 
zero norm' (July 1966 to July 196?) the EC admitted that legislation created 
situations within which it was "almost impossibly difficult ... to honestly 
apply the decisions of (RC) C o n f e r e n c e " . I n d e e d  the EC report covering 
the period April 1966 to April 196? and thus covering the period of 
'standstill' and most of the period of 'severe restraint', is the only 
EC report for the period 1964 to 1970 in which such difficulties are reported 
and of which it might be said that a touch of frustration or perhaps mild 
hysteria appears. The difficulties were of the following character.
Firstly, in October I966 the Government argued an interpretation of 
the 1966 legislation which meant that employers were not able to continue 
to pay merit differential awards to TASS members whose birthdays (21 to 
30 years) fell during the period of the 'complete s t a n d s t i l l ^ T h i s
(49)would affect in excess of 20^ of the membership
Secondly, the Minister of Economic Affairs made it clear in late 
1966 that employers should not give general merit awards to salaried staff 
during the period of 'severe restraint' and that such awards would be treated 
as a violation of the l e g i s l a t i o n . T h i s  would adversely affect those 
members of the union on salaried staff for whom such merit awards were 
a customary annual or semi-annual feature.
Thirdly, the more general problem of processing wage claims during 
the 'complete standstill' and 'severe restraint', cut across the whole
(47) RC Conf. Report, I967, p.l6. The word "honestly" seems to apply
to 'endeavour' rather than to 'illegal operations'. See below p. 108.
(48) Ibid. The Government extended the 'standstill' on merit differentials 
up to July 1967.
(49) Calculated from 'virtual' membership figures for I966 which under­
estimate the percentage. See RC Conf, Report, I966, p.292.
(50) RC Conf. Report, 1967, p.17.
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machinery the union had built up around the 'pattern bargaining' concept
described in Chapter II.
While its formal protests on the questions of differentials and
merit awards fell on deaf Ministerial ears, the EC did record a number
of successes. During the period of 'standstill' it was able to reach
agreement with a number of employers to pay back-dated awards as soon as
this became possible. By means of regrading, promotion and "other means"
a number of agreements were made acceptable within the requirements of the
legislation, and in "two major cases involving large numbers of members
in the West of England and in the Midlands" settlements were arrived at which
"because of the unusual circumstances then applying could not be given
( 51 )general publicity" - in plain English, the two settlements were known
by the union and the employers concerned to be patently illegal. This is 
the first indication that the leadership was prepared to enter into illegal 
agreements with willing employers.
During the period of 'severe restraint' covered by the 196? EC report, 
the EC noted that a number of strikes on wage issues were entered into 
(six disputes are mentioned by name of company) and one in particular led 
the Ministry of Labour to reverse its earlier position on merit differentials 
on change of age, thus "liberat(ing) a great many members salaries and 
prevent(ing) a position that could have meant that, by July I967, merit 
differentials could have vanished from salaries of draughtsmen twenty-one
(52)to thirty years of age and tracers eighteen to twenty-five years of age" * 
a not inconsequential success.
2.4 Under 'Productivity Bargaining' and 'Delaying Powers'
The previous two sub-sections cover the time period April 19^5 to 
December I967, The main factor which separates this period from the
(51) Ibid., p.16.
(52) Ibid., p.18.
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post-196? period is the emphasis put by the Government in this latter 
period on productivity bargaining. The union took the view that the 
Government, through the NBPI, intended to use its powers under Part II 
of the 1967 Act to delay settlements thus pressuring unions into
( 53)negotiating productivity deals.'
In early I968, soon after Part II orders were made on local authority 
bus crew settlements, the Minister of Labour issued orders to delay the 
payment of agreed settlements between two companies and TASS.^^^^ The 
point at issue was that the companies had agreed to pay wage increases, indeed 
had implemented the increases, which were above those the NBPI argued 
were within the 3-3&^ norm as detailed in its First Report on Pay and
( 55)Conditions in the Engineering Industry,'  ^ The whole question of pay 
and conditions of manual workers in the engineering industry had been 
referred to the NBPI by the Minister of Labour in June 196? in view of the 
fact that the three-year 'package deal' between the CSEU and the relevant 
employers' Federations was coming to an end, and when negotiations between 
the staff unions, including TASS, and the EEF over staff working conditions 
broke down, the Minister included this item and staff pay in the referral 
to the NBPI and the report was published on the 29th December 196?.^^^^
At the February I968, EC meeting the TASS leadership
"decided to support the members at Beckman Instruments 
including strike action if necessary, to compel the 
employer concerned to agree to pay the whole award 
retrospectively when the order expired,"(5?)
A similar position was taken on the other settlement covered by a 
Part II Order and both firms who had cut the increase back to the NBPI
(53) RC Conf, Report, I968, p.62.
(54) Ibid. The companies were Beckman Instruments Ltd., Glenrothes and 
Steel Group of Cos. in N.E. England.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid., p.44-45 and 62.
(57) RC Conf. Report, I968, p.62.
figures, agreed to pay the negotiated increases when the Orders expired 
with retrospective adjustment covering the period of the Orders.
Only one wage settlement was delayed by the NBPI during I969, the balance 
being paid by the Company (l.C.I.) when the delaying period expired.
During I969 it was found necessary to ask some groups of members to 
try to negotiate certain aspects of productivity agreements which ran 
counter to TASS policy - the union was opposed "to any effort to measure 
individual effort or to evaluate quantitative work effort in TASS members' 
employment a r e a s . T h e  EC asked that all agreements containing productivity 
elements be sent to the Industrial Sub-Committee of the EC for vetting, and 
felt it necessary to specifically reiterate its opposition to productivity 
bargaining in a successful resolution before the 19^9 RC Conference,
Towards the end of I969 the Department of Employment and Productivity 
brought pressure to bear on the union leadership to agree to productivity 
deals, meeting with as little success as did the Ministry of Labour over 
the NBPI's report in 196?.^^^^
Leadership pressure continued throughout I969 and into 1970 for 
wage increases above the legislated norms as witnessed by the number of 
strikes^^^) though in terms of leadership pronouncements and energies, 
as with publications etc, 'In Place of Strife' and other proposals on trade 
union reform came to assume an equal place.
Two points are worth noting here with respect to the overall attitude 
of the leadership to incomes policy. Firstly, and in line with the NBPI's 
general conclusion that many productivity agreements were essentially
(58) Ibid., p .62 and 69.
(59) RC Conf. Report, 1970, p.l6.
(60) RC Conf. Report, I968, p.l33.
(61) RC Conf. Report, 19^9, p.34, 286 and 260-262. See also RC Report,
1970, p.146 for a similar resolution.
(62) Ibid.
(63) See Table III, p.30.
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bogus, the EC report to the I968 RC Conference stated:
"Later in the year (i.e. 196?) the Ministry (of 
Labour) hesitated in approving many ... domestic 
settlements, including those at the main car firms, 
but eventually these (on the basis of some assurances 
being worked out to produce some savings because of 
more effective working arrangements) were also 
allowed to be implemented.
It then appeared likely that if the wages settlement 
contained a promise to co-operate in revised working 
arrangements to bring about some savings, that this 
would be acceptable to the Minister. The significant 
settlements at Plessey and Vauxhall Motors were cleared 
on these grounds."(64)
Implicitly if not explicitly this statement admits that the national 
leadership was prepared to connive at settlements on the promise of co­
operation to achieve productivity gains which they (and probably the 
managements involved) did not intend to honour and which were therefore 
illegal. That the leadership intended that this route to illegality should 
be used as widely as possible by the membership is shown by the paragraph 
of the EC report which follows that quoted immediately above, thus:
"So as to assist members in understanding what matters 
were possible and what were not in deciding upon such 
domestic productivity agreements the Executive Committee 
published a special statement about work assessment 
schemes". (65)
Secondly, and from the same EC report, the EC noted that after it 
rejected the Employers' Federation's wages offer in July I967, which became 
NBPIs maximum in its report of December 1967,^^^^
"the number of domestic agreements on wages ... which 
were better than the 'national offer' and without its 
limitations, are too numerous to fully detail in this 
report. It covers a very large number of firms, including 
all in the automobile industry, many in the electronics, 
telecommunications, aero engines, electrical engineering 
and in most other sections of industry ... It was not 
possible for obvious reasons to give full details and 
names of firms at that time/' (67^
(64) RC Conf. Report, 1968, p.62.
(65) Ibid.
(66) See p.102 above.
(67) RC Conf. Report, I968, p.62.
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Not only was the leadership prepared to enter into illegal settle­
ments and provide the membership with information on the relevant matters 
with respect to achieving such settlements, it did actually publicise 
them via the weekly TASS News and the monthly Journal, restricting the 
publicity to broad statements rather than details and names of firms and 
specific locations. For example, a typical 'advert' would read - "A large 
engineering firm in the North East has granted a claim for between £3-£4 
per week on a v e r a g e " w h e n  the Employers' Federation's offer in July 
1967 was a maximum of £1.50p at age 21 falling to £1.00 at age 30 and 
over.(^^) Thus illegal settlements were used to exhort the membership 
to further acts of illegality. For the five months from September 19^7 
to January 19^8, over 150 of these broad 'adverts' appeared in the Journal, 
while for the six months to July I968, 52 'adverts' appeared. The threat 
of Part II orders may have contributed to this falling off in adverts, if, 
that is, the figures just quoted accurately represent the totality of 
such settlements, though there is nothing to suggest that they are in fact 
anything but accurate.
This type of activity raises questions of an ethical and political 
nature ; in particular it raises questions of political obligation to obey
(71)the elected government and its laws and as noted below, '  ^ this generated
a discussion in the correspondence columns of the monthly Journal. The 
leadership's attitude however was quite clear - laws which they considered 
to be anti-working class and thus against the best interests of the members, 
should not be obeyed, a position reiterated more forcefully against the 
IR Act, 1971.(72)
The issue was in fact, never the subject of an open debate at RC
(68) See for example the Journal of Oct, I967, p.5.
(69) Journal of Sept., 1967, p.5.
(70) See relevant Journals.
(71) See below p. 113.
(72) See below, p.111.
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Conferences. The majority of delegates seem to have accepted without
question that the policies they decided necessitated illegal action on the
part of the membership. The opposition to the leadership at Conferences 
did not make it an issue either, tending to concentrate on the issue of 
loyalty to the Labour Government.
2.5 On "In Place of Strife"
The union's policy response to legislation on trade union reform 
has already been outlined,' ^  as has its implementation activity in the 
labour m o v e m e n t . There are, however, three areas of activity which 
are worthy of note if only because they are carried over into the campaigns
against the IR Act 1971.
Firstly, the leadership mounted a propaganda campaign which, coupled 
to the issue of incomes policy, was probably the largest in the union's 
history prior to 1970, and was definitely the largest led by the 'left'.
To some extent the membership had previously been introduced to such 
propaganda during the union's campaign to overturn the judge-made law 
arising out of Rookes v. Barnard in 1964, a case involving a TASS member
(75)and costing the union considerable legal fees. ^
The numerous week-end schools, special branch meetings and the use 
of the weekly TASS News as well as the monthly Journal as a propaganda 
medium, raised the issue to a new and higher level especially in I968,
1969 and 1970. The 'left' leadership were, in effect for the first time, 
able to use the whole machinery of the union to mount a massive education 
campaign within the membership on a political rather than an economic issue. 
The effects of this campaign are evaluated in a later section,
Secondly, the TASS EC was among those union executives which were 
officially represented at the various conferences called by the unofficial
(73) See above, p, 97-99.
(74) See above, p. 100-101.
(75) RC Conf. Report, I963, p.35 and 323*
(76) See below, p. 112-118.
and Conimxinist-led(7^) 'Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions' 
which was a fairly powerful instrument of trade union opposition from 
around I967 until the repeal of the IR Act, 1971» in 1974. This 
affiliation at the level of the EC is the first recorded instance of 
the 'left' leadership committing itself formally and openly to unofficial 
rank and file action and indicates perhaps the 'left's' political strength 
not only within TASS hut within the movement in general, in that EC 
affiliation to the Liaison Committee could have caused problems with other 
trade union leaderships.
Lastly, at the EC meeting of June 19^9» the leadership took a decision 
to press the TUC to call a one day stoppage in an attempt to force the 
Government to abandon its proposed legislation. In the event such action 
was unnecessary, but the TASS leadership were to use this policy precedent 
successfully within the AUEW against the IR Act.
3. THE MEMBERSHIP'S RESPONSES
As for the period 1945-63, it is difficult with respect to the period 
1964 to mid-1970 to evaluate in a rigorous way the degree of acceptance 
by the mass of the membership of the leadership's interpretations of and 
responses to incomes policy and trade union reform. A principal difficulty 
lies in trying to separate membership reaction to the leadership's position 
on incomes policy from reaction to other influences, for example, to 
increases in subscriptions or to 'leftwing' material in the monthly Journal, 
since the available statistics are so compiled as to make the necessary 
distinctions impossible and the other main source of information - letters 
and articles in the union journal - tends to deal with broader or multi­
topic issues.
(77) The Chairman and Secretary are members of the Communist Party.
(78) Journal of July, I969, p.4 and of January 1971, p.4.
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While these and other difficulties exist with respect to reactions 
from those who were members of the union, an even greater difficulty exists 
with respect to the reactions of those who might possibly have joined the 
union during the period. There is no way of assessing how policy on incomes 
policy and on trade union reform affected recruitment. Admitting these 
difficulties does not however preclude saying something on the issues and 
some material is available on the following areas;
1. Comments in union journal.
2. Statistics on resignations, membership etc.
3. Response to financial appeals.
4. Strikes.
5. Other policy tendencies.
The general conclusion on membership response is that, allowing for the 
inadequacy of the evidence, there was overall support from the mass of the 
membership for the leadership's policies. Some of this support was 
certainly passive but given the publicity the 'left' gave to its policies, 
it cannot be assumed this passive support was based mainly on ignorance,
3.1 Comments in the Union's Journal
As noted in Chapter II, the union's monthly journal, posted directly 
to each CM (shop steward) in quantities representing one copy per every two 
members on the CM's membership list, is probably the longest running 'left- 
wing' union journal in modern British trade unionism and given the method of 
distribution perhaps also one of the most widely circulated. While RC 
Conferences periodically considered the relationship between the journal's 
editorial policy and union policy a fair measure of editorial freedom 
was allowed, but with reference to the correspondence pages of the journal, 
Conference did exercise some control particularly prior to 1958, for example, 
banning the use of pseudonyms.
Editorially the journal was committed over the post-1948 period to 
publish all items of correspondence received providing they were correctly
signed and with union membership number attached. Thus the correspondence 
pages of the journals, which were widely used, provide a useful reflection 
of debates taking place inside the union. During the period under con­
sideration, 1964-1970, most of the correspondence which was directly 
related to union policy supported the policy line of RC Conferences, But 
for the two years I967 to I968 a noticeable increase took place in letters 
and short articles in which criticism was expressed of the union's industrial 
policy and political analysis. There were two such short articles in I967 
and one in I968 while there were none in either I965/66 or 1969. There were 
14 letters of criticism in I966, 18 in I967, 17 in I968 and 11 in 1969, all 
relating specifically to wages policy and/or 'leftwing' influence.
Further, these figures do not include a substantial amount of corres­
pondence in 1967 and I968 which was essentially discursive rather than 
critical around two other related themes. Firstly, for the first time in 
a number of years there was correspondence from members of the Liberal 
Party discussing questions of incomes policy, conditions under which laws should 
be obeyed and Liberal policies. Secondly and perhaps of more significance 
was correspondence from, among others, Christian writers on the issue of 
disobedience to the law,(7^)
Some of the critical correspondence was associated with the rump of 
the old 'rightwing' leadership^^^) and the following quotation indicates 
the general criticisms:
"For all our militancy since the 1939 var the status of 
draughtsmen and their earnings relative to other workers 
has fallen. This failure to maintain and improve our 
status rests squarely on those members who have constantly 
used the union to further their political views ... This 
political motivation of many of our members has disastrously 
weakened our case ,..
By all means use the strike weapon when industrial con­
siderations merit it. But no longer should we allow
(79) TASS Journals, I965, 1966, 1967, 1968 and I969.
(so) See for example correspondence in July I967 journal, particularly letter 
from Mr. H. Smith "of London S.E." (to distinguish him from H. Smith, 
the Communist), an EC member and President in the pre-1958 period.
114,
groups of our members who just think that they 
are entitled to higher wages, shorter working 
hours or longer holidays to collectively threaten 
rather than bargain with their employer. And to 
do so without due regard to the national interest
3.2 Resignations, Membership etc.
The available data on resignations is not in fact very helpful since 
among other things it is limited to a very short time period as indicated 
in Table VI. Certainly the 244 resignations in 196? known to be due to 
opposition to general policy are higher than equivalent figures for 1968, 
1969 and 1970 but is not of the order achieved in 1971. The figures for 
1967, 1971 and the other peak year of 1973 represent only around Vfo of 
both 'book' and 'paying' membership, and are thus proportionately very 
small.
The figures for 'Lapsed' and 'Resigned Personal and Unknown' tend to 
be high when those for 'Resigned due to TASS policy’ are high and if it is 
assumed that some of the former may relate to opposition to union policy, 
then the degree of rejection in terms of members leaving the union becomes 
more significant. Taking the figures in line 10 of Table VI, 1967 and 1971 
are peak years in the series when taken as a proportion of the membership, 
10.70 of 'book' membership in I967 and 10.10 of 'book' membership in 1971 
or 11.20 and 10.90 of 'paying' membership respectively. If it is assumed
that resignations in I967 and 1971 are related to the union's opposition
I
to incomes policy in the first year and the IR Act in the second, then 
percentages half as large as the above would represent a significant degree 
of opposition to the union's policy. Essentially, however, this must 
remain a matter for conjecture.
In terms of total membership one point may be made, While it is 
obvious that many factors operate on the rate of growth of union membership, 
i.e. the net addition to membership in any period, it might be expected
(8I) TASS Journal, Aug, 1967.
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that a cost would he imposed in terms of the number of applications to 
join through the pursuance of overtly ’leftwing’ policy. As Table I, Chapter 
II shows, total membership by both measures rose fairly steadily over the 
period 1964 to 1970; ’book' membership fell in 1967 though 'paying' membership 
rose and the reverse occurred in 1968, while on the other hand total appli­
cations for membership rose steadily over the period with the exception of 
the high peak on 1965? as shown in Table VII. Thus while the figures do not 
prove that there was no detrimental effect on union growth due to the policies 
pursued, total membership did nonetheless rise over the period as did 
applications to join.
3*3 Response to Financial Anneals
The amount raised per annum under the 'first week's wage increase 
scheme' detailed in Table IV in Chapter II could for the relevant years be 
interpreted as suggesting some rejection of the union's wages/anti-incomes 
policy position since excluding the shipbuilding "lock out" year of 1967, 
the annual total fell from £17,367 in 1965 to £9,786 in 1966, to £5,239 in 
1968 rising to £9,963 in I969. On the other hand, since many members would 
only receive the legislated increases where these were allowed, they may 
not have seen these as deriving from the union's activity and hence not have 
paid them to the union,
3.4 Strike Data
Figures for strike expenditure per annum, the number of 'union 
supported' disputes per annum, the total number of strikes per annum and 
the number of members involved in 'main supported' disputes, detailed in 
Table III page 50 , all show a decline in 1968 and the number of 'main 
supported' disputes and total number of strikes continued to fall into I969 
before rising sharply with the other two series in 1970. While this may be 
wholly accounted for by the massive deflation which accompanied the November 
1967 devaluation leading to a weaker bargaining position on behalf of the
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TABLE VII TOTAL APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP PER ANNUM(1)
YEAR YEAR YEAR
1913 1935 1957 10,535
1914 1936 1958 8,923
1915 1937 1959 8,846
1916 1938 i960 13,702
1917 1939 1961 13,150
I9I8 1940 1962 11,810
1919 1941 1963 9,601
1920 1942 1964 11,963
1921 1943 1965 18,036
1922 1944 1966 13,298
1923 1943 1967 14,210
1924 1946 1968 16,089
1925 1947 1969 23,487
1926 1948 1970 34,565
1927 1949 1971 14,794
1928 1950 1972 21,087
1929 1951 9,668 1973 28,227
1930 1952 9,092 1974 33,023
1931 1953 7,701
1932 1954 7,435
1933 1955 9,871
1934 1956 11,005
SOURCES: EC REPORTS TO RC CONFERENCES
(l) Different descriptions are used in the Reports;
’accepted applications', 'accepted into membership', 
'new members joined' and in the more recent reports, 
'applications approved'.
union, this explanation would run counter to the qualitative evidence set 
out in Chapter II with regard to the union’s overall militancy which seems 
unrelated to the level of demand in the economy. Nevertheless a suspicion 
remains that the leadership were finding it increasingly difficult to con­
vince the membership to carry through strikes for claims which were essentially 
illegal. Since only annual data is available it is not possible to locate 
the decline in relation to changes in legislation. However, the possibility 
is that the introduction of the August 19^7 Act with its emphasis on pro­
ductivity bargaining which TASS rejected, coupled to the leadership's 
insistence on claims which were above the NBPI ceiling may have placed many 
groups of members in the position of not being prepared to fight claims.
Some corroboration of this may be found from the figures given earlier 
that for the six months ending 31st December 196?, 150 'adverts' of illegal 
settlements appeared in the union press while for the six months ending 
30th June 1968 only 52 such 'adverts' appeared; fewer settlements were 
arrived at because members would not fight,
3.5 Other Policy Tendencies
Two areas of policy debate are of interest under this heading; firstly, 
those contributions which were in direct opposition to the dominant line, 
and secondly, those contributions which can be considered more extreme than 
the dominant policy line.
There was a motion before the I965 Conference directly supporting an 
incomes policy. Only the mover spoke in favour of the motion and his 
argument was brief - if inflation could be controlled pension funds would 
not d e p r e c i a t e . M o r e  generally, the arguments used against the 'left's' 
platforms on incomes policy and TU legislation ranged from the position 
that a Labour Government was better at any price than a Tory one and should 
therefore be s u p p o r t e d , t h r o u g h  arguments as to whether the 'left'
(82) EC Conf, Report, I965, p,273-274.
(83) EC Conf. Report, 1966, p.376,
x-l;7 ♦
presented any alternative programme except a free-for-all market struggle, 
indeed that this free-for-all had produced legislation as a reaction^®^^ 
or whether TASS's militant policy had effected any marked improvement 
in the wage position of the m e m b e r s h i p , t o  arguments supporting the 
efficacy of incomes policy as a means of decisively shifting the distribution 
of national income in favour of wages and salaries,
In almost all of these contributions however, the main drift of the 
argument was in favour of loyalty to the Labour Government and Labour Party, 
the 'left's' position being seen as disloyal, if not openly disruptive, 
and playing into the hands of the Tories.
The other area of contributions to debate which is of interest, 
centres around the questions of disaffiliation from both Labour Party and 
TÜC and as will be seen are more extreme than the dominant position.
There were in fact, a number of amendments to the main anti-incomes 
policy motions of the period which were not accepted by the RC Conference 
and which could be considered more extreme than the main motions, but it is 
the consistent raising of the question of disaffiliation, particularly with 
respect to the Labour Party, which perhaps represents the main extremist 
tendency.
While there was no motion on the agenda for disaffiliation from the 
Labour Party in either the 1965 or I966 Conferences, there was one in 1967, 
two in 1968, one in 1969^^^^ though none in 1970.
However, there was an unsuccessful motion in I966 requiring the union 
to "freeze the contributions to ... the Labour Party until such times as the 
freedom of the trade union movement and its members is restored" and 
another one in I968 to the same effect.
(84) Ibid., p.379.
(85) Ibid., p.377.
(86) Ibid., p.379. See also the disaffiliation arguments in the I968 
report, p.146,
(87) EC Conf. Reports, 1967, p.437, 1968, p.133 and 1969, p.126.
(88) EC Conf. Reports, I966, p.600 and 1968, p.133*
It is clear from the contributions to debates on these disaffiliation 
motions (that is, when they were debated and not withdrawn), that the main 
reason for moving them was what was seen as the anti-trade union policies 
of the Government. The 196? unsuccessful motion made this explicit:
"This Representative Council instructs the Executive 
Committee to take the necessary steps to disaffiliate 
from the Labour Party and to so remain whilst it 
pursues anti-union policies",(89)
There is no evidence to suggest that any of these motions were sponsored 
by TASS members who were politically to the 'right' of the Labour Party, 
the speaker to the I967 motion openly disassociating himself from such 
a position, thus:
"My branch wishes to dissociate itself from all Tories, 
neo-Tories and so-called non-politicals. This is not 
a resolution that is being moved from the right-wing or 
in fact from a so-called non-political stand."(90)
The leaderships response to these motions was either to obtain a 
withdrawal or to move an amendment (or support a branch amendment).
Thus the I969 disaffiliation motion was totally amended to read:
"This RC reaffirms its support for a socialist party, 
and encourages full co-operation of our members by 
affiliation to the Labour Party. It further exhorts 
our members to offer themselves for positions at all 
levels within the Labour Party in order that they may 
be in a position to advance (TASS) policies, believing 
that this can only be done from within."(91)
The 1967 Conference debated the only motion submitted on disaffiliation 
from the TUC^^^^ and this was rejected by Conference.
The mover of the motion argued two points; firstly,that representation 
on the General Council of the TUC was "obsolete", the manual trades taking
(89) RC Conf. Reports, 1967, p.437.
(90) Ibid., p.437-438.
(91) RC Conf. Report, 1969, p.285-286.
(92) RC Conf. Report, 1967, p.176.
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all the seats and being disproportionately represented even among themselves, 
while the white-collar unions had no representation, and secondly, that the 
union could not "in all sincerity belong to a body who are in direct 
opposition to (TASS) on such a fundamental matter as the prices and incomes
(93)policy", an argument expanded on by the seconder of the motion.
The three speakers opposing disaffiliation, including one on behalf 
of the EC, all argued much the same case, namely that while the union deplored 
the policies being pursued by the General Council of the TUC it was too small 
a union to forego the "many links and many roots" that membership of the 
TUC had given and would give, and that TASS did and could play a useful 
part inside the TUC in changing the policies (which is exactly what happened 
at the 1967 TUC).(^^) The union's General Secretary was in fact elected 
to the General Council in 1969.^^^^
Thus the 'left' leadership maintained a consistent positive stance on 
the principle of affiliation to both Labour Party and TUC and were supported 
by the delegates, all the disaffiliation motions which were debated being 
overwhelmingly defeated.
To round off this sub-section on 'other policy tendencies', some 
points may be made on the degree of homogeneity with respect to policies 
within the EC since it was made up entirely of members most of them lay 
members. Firstly, Mortimer resigned the editorship in August I968 to take 
up an important post with the NBPI, an action that caused great bitterness 
within the leadership. While there is no available evidence that there 
had been major policy disagreements in the EC between Mortimer and perhaps 
others and the hard-core 'left', it nevertheless seems likely that such 
disagreements did occur, and given Mortimer's new post these disagreements 
would almost certainly have been about industrial policy in general and
(93) Ibid., p.176-177.
(94) RC Conf. Report, 1967, p.177-179.
(95) TUC Report, I969, p.124.
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incomes policy in particular. Secondly, in the period 1967-68 there is 
evidence that a number of EC members who had left the Communist Party in 
a move to the 'left', formed a group in opposition to the 'left' majority.
One of them, M. Cooley, served as President in 1971 and has been described 
as a"Maoist".
*****
In concluding this section on 'the membership's responses', it is 
argued that there is some evidence which is broadly consistent when taken 
across a number of points, which indicates a degree of rejection by sections 
of the membership of union Conference policies on incomes policy and the 
leadership's implementation of them. There is also some evidence that there 
may have been some fragmenting of the leadership in and around the EC level 
related to policy and implementation on incomes policy. On balance, however, 
the weight of evidence allows the conclusion that the 'left' were never 
under any serious challenge throughout its period of leadership including 
the years 1964 to 1970; indeed there is no evidence that the leadership's 
opposition to 'In Place of Strife' led to anything but overwhelming support 
by the mass of the membership and this coupled with the rise in recruitment 
in 1969 and 1970, seems to have led to a further consolidation of the 'left' 
in the union.
4. THE TASS-SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
In drawing this fourth and final chapter on the union's history to a 
close, attention is turned to the three questions posed in Chapter I with 
respect to the 'left' in the union, specifically:
(a) What conditions or circumstances allowed TASS to promote and 
sustain a 'leftwing' leadership?
(96) Indeed Cooley seemed to subscribe to this description in 
discussion with the present writer in 1970.
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(b) What aims did the 'left' pursue and what place had wage militancy 
within them?
and
(c) What was the 'left' leadership's estimate of its success in pursuing 
its aims and how far does the estimate accord with the factual record; 
in particular, how far did the 'left' generate the wage militancy 
displayed by the membership and how far did it determine its form?
4.1 The 'left's' path to power
In sub-section 1.2 of Chapter I there was set out the argument that the 
'left' have gained power in British unions where they were able to connect 
some version of socialist ideology with independently generated industrial 
militancy and that special features attach to the mode of operation of 
this connection. Four special features were identified; these were that the 
'left' connected with:
(a) historical/local militancies,
(b) rank-and-file protest, in that the 'left' provide a vehicle for 
its expression through policy platforms which when linked to low 
membership participation provide a base for 'left' control,
(c) organisational vacuums, which allow the 'left' to set up 
unofficial organisations which they then control,
and
(d) dilutee labour, in the case of TASS, with the 'left' using the 
former's lack of professional identity to build a base for 
eventual c ontr o1.
The material presented in this and in the three previous chapters 
leads to the conclusion that the connection between socialist ideology and 
industrial militancy is by no means as straightforward as any of the 
special features examples suggest. The main complicating factor, and that 
which presents the greatest difficulty in terms of analysis and evaluation 
with respect to the four examples, is that the 'left' took power in stages
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spread over almost twenty years. As was indicated in the introduction 
to Chapter II these stages can be characterised as follows. For the full 
period of the late 1940s up to 1973 the 'left' dominated official union 
policy formation on all major issues through their majority control of the 
union's annual Conference and after becoming the majority on the Executive 
and among the full-time Divisional Organisers in 1958, coupled policy 
implementation to policy formation. This progression from policy formation 
to policy formation cum implementation - the translation of militant policies 
into militant activities - is made complex by a quite distinct separation 
between 'internal' and 'external' implementation. Because of their majority 
in Conference the 'left' were able to control delegations to the TUC, Labour 
Party, etc, and were thus able to implement all those policies which were in 
the first instance external to the union, i.e. essentially those not 
requiring an immediate membership response. After 1958 external implementation 
was reinforced by internal policy implementation, i.e. essentially those 
requiring an immediate membership response (though the 'left' did force 
the 'right' leadership prior to 1958 into a partial implementation of wage 
policy). This characterisation does not seem to sit easily on any of the 
four special features examples and in order to evaluate their explanatory 
powers with respect to TASS an analysis of this characterisation is undertaken 
first after which return is made to the four examples.
i. Taking the early period, i.e. up to 1952, there is no evidence of either 
leadership or membership industrial or wage militancy for the fifteen to 
twenty years prior to the emergence of the 'left' in the union. As the 
nascent 'left' engaged in battle in the early 1940s with the established 
'rightwing' leadership over wages policy there was a rise in strike 
activity but it was slight to say the least. Only five named strikes are 
noted by Mortimer as taking place between 1943 and 1950 and only two in the 
previous nineteen years (see Table II, p. 43). Continuous expenditure by the 
union on strike pay starts in 1951, i.e. after the 'left' had won this policy
position. Neither is there evidence that particular geographic areas displayed 
a noticeably greater militancy than other areas or adopted outspokenly militant 
postures in the later 1940s, on to which the 'left’ connected socialist 
ideology. What seems to have happened, given no prior militancy and no 
noticeable upsurge as the 'left' emerged, is that in the later years of the 
Second World War a small but cohesive 'left' appeared at annual Conference.
The 'rightwing' leadership denounced them in the monthly journal but perhaps 
because of, among other things, the political nature of the wartime alliance, 
were unable to prevent their continued appearance at Conference. The 
leadership next established in Conference a 'party', the existence of which 
became public to Conference delegates at least, through the use of voting 
lists etc. The 'left' responded in kind and by the late 1940s the existence 
of these two 'parties' albeit in embryonic form became an accepted feature 
of annual Conference and spilled over into the work of the Executive 
Committee. It is this early establishment of 'parties' and their acceptance 
in the formal structure of the union - their de facto legitimation by 
both 'right' and 'left' in the sense that both understood the emerging rules— 
of-the-game, so to speak - which provides the key to the particular form 
of development in the union in terms of the transformation from 'right' 
to 'left'.
Essentially the battles over wages and incomes policy, which were 
the major areas of contention in the period up to 1952 with the former 
remaining so in terms of implementation up until 1958, were fought out 
among the activists rather than the membership. At one level this is seen 
clearly in the 'left's* use in Conference of the historical connection between 
their new wages strategy and the 'strike-in-detail', i.e. their wages strategy 
entailed national negotiations backed up by militant activity at office level, 
to provide a foundation for their challenge. In this sense the 'left' did 
connect with an independent militancy - an early militant policy rather than 
with a contemporaneous militant movement. Wootton provides some corroboration 
of this struggle among the activists when he notes that a realignment of
forces took place in Conference and in the EC as the 'parties' solidified.
The main evidence that the struggle was restricted to the activists is that 
it does not appear among the membership in general. There is no evidence 
that any movement developed among the mass of the membership in support 
of one side or the other.
That is not to say that 'left' and 'right' did not propagandise among 
the membership because presumably they did, rather it is to argue that the 
policy battles were fought out more or less openly by the 'parties' within 
the democratic structure of the union which did not require recourse to 
the mass of the membership. Neither was any immediate response required from 
the mass of the membership to all of the changes in policy consequent on 'left' 
Conference victories. The evidence on incomes policy for example, shows that 
only in 1962 was any active response required of the membership on a policy 
dating from 1952 against incomes control.
The promotion of Mortimer and then of Doughty further consolidated the 
'left' in the official structure of the union and reinforced the legitimacy 
of the 'left' trend,
ii. Of the period 1952 to 1958, two points stand out. Firstly, there was 
a fairly slow build-up of strike activity; there is no evidence of general 
militancy among the membership. Secondly, the 'left' further consolidated 
their position through inter alia the 'reference back' technique in 
Conference and their domination of union delegations to external bodies.
The slow build-up of strikes can be seen from Table III, p.50,
There is no evidence of a flood of strike-pay applications consequent 
upon the 'left' policy victory on 100^ nett wages strike-pay. The 'right- 
wing' leadership did not actively campaign among the membership for the 
'high strike-pay/many strikes' wages strategy and it would seem that a 
struggle between 'right' and 'left' took place "in the field" to use 
Wootton's phrase, over the implementation of the strategy at divisional, 
branch and office level. Nevertheless, to the extent that the evidence
does show a build-up of strike activity coupled presumably to a build-up of 
more militant postures among the membership, the weight of evidence would 
seem to allow the conclusion that both were, in the main, the result of 
'left' activity. At worst the conclusion would be that the 'left' purchased 
militancy through the paying of 100^ nett wages strike pay; at best they 
articulated grievances and provided an apparent method of solving them.
The 'left' further consolidated their position in the leadership of the 
union through their role as official spokesmen both internal and external 
to the union. As much as anything else it was the activity in the wider trade 
union and labour movement of spokesmen like Mortimer and Doughty which gave 
TASS by the late 1950s a reputation as a militant union. As Roberts et al. 
note, TASS was more readily accepted by the manual unions in the CSEU than 
were either the forerunners of APEX and ASTMS.
This combination of 'left'-led wage militancy from formal positions 
of leadership (though still a minority in the EC) coupled to the standing 
achieved in the wider movement, provided the foundation for the 1958 'left' 
majority on the EC, The struggle between the two 'parties' remained bitter 
throughout the 1950s, with the 'right', while winning the Assistant 
General Secretary's position in 1956, being unable to hold off the 'left' 
from majority control in 1958. Wootton points out that the 'right' 
threatened to leave the union after the 'left's' 1958 victory, taking 
20 to 30 thousand members with them, but they did not do so. Many factors 
were undoubtedly at work, but one which may have weighed heavily was that 
they had been beaten democratically, themselves behaving undemocratically 
in 1956 and immediately after their 1958 defeat, and being seen to do so 
by the mass of the activists. That the people who replaced them were 
activists of long standing, indeed of some reputation, and who took their 
place alongside such noted 'leftwingers' as Doughty and Mortimer and others 
previously in a minority, must also have played a part. There is also the 
possibility that the 'right' 'party' was much weaker 'in the field" than
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the 'left'; they effectively disappear in the early 1960s so the scales may
have in fact weighed, heavily against a mass walk-ont,
iii. Of the period of 'left' majority control little needs to he said.
The huild-up of wage militancy continues although the minority response to
the one-day strike calls in support of the CSEU wage claim in early 1962 is 
perhaps indicative of the actual spread of militancy among the membership.
By 1962-63 an independent wages strategy emerges based on a 'strike waiting 
list' and TASS enters its heyday as a wage militant union.
Before returning to the four examples, it must be stated that the 
small scale of the union may have been a factor firstly, in the early 
acceptance of the 'parties' in Conference, i.e. among as few as 170 dele­
gates, and secondly, in their operation "in the field", i.e. in as few as 
14 districts and 170 branches. If the concentration by firm of employment, 
which is apparent in the early 1970s, existed in the 1950s then this also 
may have aided such operation.
In terms of the four examples, it has already been noted that the 
'left' did connect with a previous militancy - a policy rather than an 
immediately preceding and then contemporaneous militancy. Secondly, the 
'left' did provide both publicity and platform although there is no 
indication of either rank-and-file protest or of a link to low membership 
participation, lack of democratic value being more a prerogative of 'right' 
than 'left' on the evidence to hand. In point of fact, the charge that the 
'left' only appeared at Conference on the basis of low membership partici­
pation at branch meetings was never publicly made by the 'right'. The main 
phenomenon which causes problems of analysis is the parallel build-up of 
wage militancy and 'left' advance over a twenty year period. It is 
accepted that theorists who hold the 'connection' examples as explanatory 
of TASS, could argue that this thesis, in concentrating on the leadership's 
development rather than that of the membership, fails to take into considera­
tion an independent rise in militancy among trade unionists in general
or among the membership in particular onto which the ’left' connected.
That is, it is accepted that without a much more detailed analysis of the
union's industrial environment over the period or a comparative study with
. other unions and their environment for the same period, it cannot be concluded
with certainty that TASS's militancy was purely a result of internal factors.
Further it is accepted that without a much more detailed analysis of the
membership's structure, attitudes and development over the period, it cannot
be concluded with certainty that TASS's wage militancy was simply a product
of 'left' articulation and structuring of membership grievances which would
otherwise have petered out. Nevertheless the material presented in this
and the three previous chapters makes these conclusions highly probable;
notwithstanding the long-term rise in wage militancy among blue-collar
unionists outlined in the first few paragraphs of this thesis, the weight
of evidence built up from the records of the case-study union allows the
conclusion that wage militancy among the membership was in general a function
of 'left' leadership and activity for the full period from the late 1940s
up until 1968-70; thereafter a more obvious leadership/membership two-way
interaction on strike activity is apparent and this in a period of sharply
rising wage militancy among white-collar unionists in general. Another
way of looking at the relationship between the TASS 'left', rising blue-
collar wage militancy post-1945 and TASS membership wage militancy, is that
the TASS 'left' attempted to duplicate the blue-collar pattern using their
affiliation to the CSEU, the need to encourage blue-collar support for
TASS wage claims at factory level etc. to engender membership wage militancy.
What can be said with certainty is that no other white-collar union
displayed TASS's official policy on militancy, its official strike record,
spent as great a proportion of income on strike-pay or achieved a reputation
(97)
for wage militancy among both unions and employers alike, as early as did 
TASS or for such a sustained period. This is not to argue that the TASS 
membership were industrially docile and induced to militancy by 'left' 
activity alone. It is to argue that there is no general body of evidence
(97) See 'The Power to Manage: a history of the Engineering Employers'
Fedenati nn * . WifTham. 1Q71L far an pmnl nvans ' Tri aw nf TASS -wan-P mi 1 i +
of rising white-collar wage militancy before the late 1960s; that while it 
is possible that the membership of TASS were subject to special industrial 
factors conducive to militant action which were not at work on the member­
ships of ASTMS and APEX for example, there is no a priori reason to expect 
this, or to expect that such change should take precedence over the evidence 
presented on 'left' activity. The TASS membership must of course have 
faced similar problems by and large, as were faced by other private-sector 
white-collar trade unionists, and membership did increase roughly in line with 
the unionisation of the private-sector white-collar labour force as a whole. 
The key difference is that the 'left', from positions of formal leadership, 
identified the wage question as capable of achieving a militant membership 
response and were able not simply to structure membership wage grievances 
into strike activity, but to raise wage militancy to a level not achieved 
by other white-collar unions and to integrate it into the central work of 
the union; indeed the wage question takes on a number of dimensions in 
TASS which are almost certainly not found as explicitly in other unions, 
particularly the explicit integration of wage militancy, class consciousness 
and socialism, all more or less openly stated in the union's Conference 
policies.
Of the example which proposes 'left' connection with unofficial 
organisations, then to the extent that this fits TASS, the equivalent would 
perhaps be the 'party' since combine committees etc, were set up officially 
by the union - TASS displayed an official willingness to change the 
organisational structure, under 'left' leadership no doubt, in a way which 
the example suggests other leaderships were not.
VTith regard to the dilutee labour connection, its proponents offer 
no material foundation for it. Even if it was the original base for 
'left' advance or from which the 'left' emerged, it is difficult to conceive 
of it remaining so through to 'left' majority control and beyond. It is 
possible that as the membership expanded, drawn according to Mortimer from
the shop-floor in the main, as hlue-collar workers were promoted to the 
technical staff, the ’left' continually utilised their "lack of professional 
identity" as a base for further advance. It has not proved possible to 
test this. What can be said is that it is difficult to reconcile 'professional 
identity' with the overall political and industrial stance taken by the union 
for some twenty years, and more particularly to the overwhelming 1970 vote 
on amalgamation.
The foregoing raises the question of whether or not the 'connection' 
concept is the best way of viewing the relationship between a 'left' in 
a union and industrial or wage militancy; does it aid the analysis of this 
relationship? A number of points emerge from the case-study. Firstly, 
the 'connection' concept postulates what would seem to be a false dichotomy 
between the membership and the 'left' which is not apparent in TASS. On 
no occasion from 1943 through to 1970 were either the activists or the 
membership prepared to accept this dichotomy by way of applying bans and 
proscriptions, mass walk-outs etc. other than the slight destabilisation, 
in the period 1966 to 1968, consequent upon 'left' activity or victories.
Secondly, the actual relationship between 'left' ideology, activity 
and membership response is more complex in the TASS case than a straight 
'connection'. It might stretch the available evidence too far to argue 
that it supports the Leninist position set out in Chapter I, that class 
consciousness is inherent in trade union consciousness, in a sense is 
the unconscious counterpart of trade union consciousness, and is made 
conscious when trade union consciousness and socialist ideology inter­
penetrate. The 'left' leadership's belief that such an interpenetration took 
place is evaluated at the end of this chapter. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that rather than being a parasitic relationship, the complex TASS 
situation is more accurately regarded as symbiotic, hence creating the 
possibility of a synergistic effect between the 'left' and the membership,
X X x-*  x -x-
In concluding this sub-section it is held that the balance of 
evidence suggests that the 'left' came to power in TASS through their 
ability to constitutionally carry their policies and personnel at annual 
Conference and then carry the majority of the membership with them, through 
a combination of policy and activity in the field, in the implementation of 
these policies. The key features were the early de facto legitimacy 
accorded to the two 'parties' which effectively constrained the actions of 
both 'parties' but particularly the 'right' in terms of responses and extra- 
Constitutional activity, and the standing accorded to the 'left' individually 
and collectively in the wider labour and trade union movement.
4.2 The 'left's' aims
The material presented in previous sections of this Chapter and in 
Chapters III and IV leaves little room for doubt that the 'left' pursued 
courses of action over the period 1945 to 1970, more particularly from 
1958 to 1970, predicated on the view:-
(a) That industrial action, (i.e. strike activity, the threat of 
strike activity and related,, action), linked together at national 
level, maintained and increased wages in a way which was significantly 
different from what they would have been otherwise,
(b) that industrial action built membership confidence in trade unionism 
via solidarity and discipline, leading to trade union consciousness, and
(c) that when combined with a marxist political perspective led to class 
consciousness.
This 'view' was not written down in one single document nor enshrined 
in union policy at any one Conference. By its nature it could not be called 
a strategy in the sense of a plan of campaign, rather it represented what 
amounts to a political philosophy applied to trade union activity internal 
and external to the union with one aim in view - to make the membership 
(and if possible, others,) class conscious. This was seen as the ultimate
protection of the membership's interests, a class consciousness aimed at 
establishing socialism.
While it is possible to consider the union's centralised wage cum 
strike policy coupled to the continued use of-the centralised data bank 
as just a straight alternative to the previous policy of piecemeal industrial 
action - that is, to view it as simply a different wages strategy - this 
was certainly not how the 'left' viewed it. They argued that the piecemeal 
approach was not simply an inferior wage strategy but was in fact sectional 
and divisive; it did not build trade union consciousness but rather per­
petuated the market system whereas the 'left' saw their policies as leading 
through rising class consciousness to an understanding of the need to 
supercede this system and replace it with socialism. Theories of union 
wage policy are considered in Chapter VII and the proposition that the 'left's' 
wage/strike policy and the use of the data bank were positive causal factors 
in the wages actually paid to the membership is tested in Appendix III, 
Theoretical and empirical aspects of trade union aims and within this, 
class consciousness, are considered in Chapters VI and VII.
In attempting to carry their policies into practice, the 'left' 
utilised the full machinery of the union and by and large openly stated their 
political philosophy, calling for and largely receiving, positive responses 
from the mass of the membership. With the exception of a brief period of 
what amounts to minor instability in the late 1960s, the 'left' maintained 
their position of leadership, indeed almost certainly consolidated it 
further, in the early 1970s.
4,3 The 'left's' successes
Taken together, policy at both TUC and Labour Party conferences, the 
strike record, the expenditure on strike pay, the illegal activity carried 
out in the late 1960s, all suggest that no matter the difficulties in 
defining militancy, TASS was not only a militant union, it was almost 
certainly the most militant of the white-collar unions during the period
±J-t.
under consideration; indeed in terms of all-round leadership attitude to 
strike militancy it may have been the most militant union in Britain.
Further, its militancy was not hidden from the membership and neither was 
the leadership's majority political outlook. The union's journal was 
overtly 'leftwing' and overtly industrially militant as were its other 
publications.
STRIKE MILITANCY AND TRADE UNION CONSCIOUSNESS
Given that the 'left' leadership was the main factor over the period, 
it is probably the case that in the first decade of the high strike pay 
policy (1951 to 1961) militancy was 'purchased' by the leadership. Even in 
the period of 'strike waiting lists' (1962-1970) the balance of evidence 
suggests that groups of members on the list controlled themselves due to 
their desire for strike pay, i.e. they would not strike without strike 
pay. On the other hand, there is evidence that potential strikers low down 
on the waiting list would attempt to get 'victimised' by their employers 
and under union rule could immediately go on strike with full pay thereby 
effectively 'jumping the queue', thus perhaps indicating not only an 
impatience to strike but also a transitional stage between striking with 
full pay and the much later position of striking with only a token monetary 
donation from the leadership. Be that as it may, the union's strike record 
remained high throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s even with the reduction 
to 80^ nett wages in I968 and later to £15 per week or 60^ nett wages 
whatever was the highest or £6 per week if on strike with engineering section 
members, such that by the early 1970s strikes were taking place without 
strike pay being paid although EC permission still had to be obtained.
By the early 1970s, other white-collar unions, e.g. those with 
bases in engineering, ASTMS and APEX, had adopted militant postures including 
strike activity. There is no evidence however that their activity came 
close to TASS's annual average for any period of years. Thus while it
cannot be held with complete certainty that the 'left' leadership built into 
the fabric of the union an attitude favourable to strike militancy - a strike- 
proneness - this conclusion does seem a reasonable one.
Whether this strike-proneness when taken in conjunction with the 
relatively successful 'first week's wage increase' scheme and the two major 
appeals on the 1967 shipbuilding lockout and 1970 Rolls Royce lockout, 
coupled to the membership's overwhelming acceptance of the two year long 
levy for union unemployment benefit, i.e. a consistent high level of 
collective activity, can be taken as evidence of a higher level of trade 
union consciousness than that achieved in other white-collar unions, as the 
leadership believed, must remain as far as this study is concerned a matter 
for conjecture. Perhaps the degree of homogeneity of the membership during 
the full period of the study, i.e. the cluster of occupations around the 
draughtsman, coupled to the very high degree of concentration of the 
membership by company of employment, led to different aspects of trade union 
consciousness being highlighted in this union as against others. Nevertheless 
a fair measure of collective activity was achieved and its relationship to 
wage militancy was clear to the membership.
There seems little point given the goal of 'class consciousness' and 
the 'left's' view of its relationship to militant activity, in considering 
any potential options which were open to the leadership as against the actual 
wages/strike policy it pursued for some 20 years. Nevertheless one point 
can be made which while not indicating an alternative to the pursued 
policy, may point to forces operating in the late 1960s such that the 
strike pay policy started to break down. That is, the shipbuilding lock­
out of 1967 which the union eventually won, was the first major single 
stoppage that the union had to finance. Over 1400 members (2^ of paying 
membership) were locked-out at a cost of £195,038. In 1970, over 1,000 
Rolls Royce workers were locked-out in Birmingham at a total cost of 
£239,428 and the threat by the company of a total lockout of all its TASS 
employees throughout Britain (7^ of paying membership) must have had a large
bearing on the final settlement which the union did not see as a victory. 
Finally, an essentially negative piece of evidence; for the years 19^9 to 
1973, the union did not have a strike in any of the GEC plants throughout 
Britain yet this company employed over 10^ of the union's membership, the 
implication being that a lockout would have led to financial disaster for 
the union. Many factors are involved in a decision by a company to lockout 
sections of its employees; but the union's high strike pay strategy may have 
made it increasingly vulnerable to mass lockouts such that even the slightest 
threat by a management was sufficient to make it back down.
Over the period 1951 to 1970 however, the union had a strike/strike 
pay record not matched by any other union in Britain and there is no 
evidence that the mass of the membership saw such activity as anything other 
than legitimate trade union activity.
TRADE UNION CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Without a detailed comparative analysis of TASS as against other 
unions, it is not possible to locate TASS's place in the ranks which formed 
up against incomes policy and industrial relations legislation in the post- 
1945 period. At one level the union's rejection of incomes policy is simply 
an extension of the logic of the 'many strikes/high strike pay' policy - 
if there is wage control then there cannot be a militant strike policy.
Indeed for the brief period July I966 to July 19^7 when the Government 
was able to achieve some domination over trade union wage activity, to the 
extent that even the TASS membership were reluctant to pursue militant 
activity, there are signs of frustration among the TASS leadership (see p. 104) 
The furthest the union would go on the Donovan report was to admit that 
factory bargaining would permit the recognition of "circumstances in (each) 
particular plant" but that only with the continued link between factory and 
national agreements would it "be possible to retain a sense of overall 
working class solidarity" (see p.9 8 ) - again making explicit the purported
link between militant wage activity and class consciousness and this leads 
on to the other level of union thinking, the political. The challenge 
or assault launched by the TASS leadership on incomes policy etc. in the 
1964 to 1970 period was seen by the leadership as as much a political as an 
economic one. Class collaboration was counterposed with class struggle, 
planning under capitalism was counterposed with socialist planning, and 
capitalist law with the economic needs of workers. This latter, on which it 
must be reiterated the leadership won a major victory as witnessed by the 
degree of illegal activity, is best summed up by the leadership's phrase - 
"the right of trade unions to take action is an essential balance in the 
unequal relationship which exists between an employer and his workpeople",
(see p. 99). Thus the leadership's position on incomes policy etc, was 
much more than simply rhetoric; they did use almost every means at their 
disposal to defeat legislation, in particular by encouraging the membership 
to break it, and in general the membership supported them,
TRADE UNION STRUCTURE AS GLASS ORGANISATION
The overwhelming vote of the membership on the amalgamation with the 
AEF was seen by the 'left' leadership as an expression of a class understanding 
born out of the union's militant record and socialist policies. The 
leadership's views on this have been set out on page 63 above. A review of 
the union's membership growth and the leadership's position on amalgamation 
coupled with a brief look at the circumstances surrounding the amalgamation, 
while in no way providing a test of class consciousness, may nevertheless 
clarify some of the issues involved.
As indicated in Chapter II, membership growth through the 1950s remained 
low and in I96O the union altered its rules to 'open' the union to a wider 
range of technicians than were previously eligible. Yet up until the 
campaign around amalgamation with the AEF no major consistent long-run 
recruitment effort was made by the leadership; indeed it is only after 1970
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that the concept that large size is of major importance in hoth wage bargaining 
and in influence in the wider labour movement, becomes of central concern 
to the leadership. Taking the 10 years I96O to 19^9 TASS membership rose 
from 67,040 to 86,789 or by 29^, while APEX membership rose from 59,545 to 
101,230 or by 70^ and ASSET/A.Sc,W. (i.e. ASTMS) rose from 36,551 to 123,800 
or by While allowance must be made for the different size of the
catchment areas available to the three unions, e.g. that there are many more 
clerical workers than technicians in British industry, nevertheless to the 
extent that the catchment areas are dependent on union policy TASS effectively 
restricted itself. Moreover in the negotiations in the mid-1960s with both 
APEX and A.Sc.W, TASS adopted a 'holier-than-thou' attitude with respect 
to militancy, essentially arguing that neither union was capable of high 
strike pay militancy and that neither union saw engineering as its main base. 
This approach to growth by amalgamation certainly helped TASS to fall from 
the largest of the three unions in I96O to the smallest in 1970 as did the 
leadership's lack of concern with growth in general, an outlook not shared 
by the leaderships of the other two unions.
Of course while it is possible that had TASS adopted a more positive 
approach to amalgamation with the aforementioned unions, amalgamation would 
still not have ensued, nevertheless when the leadership did set up an 
amalgamation procedure with the AEF it had little difficulty in convincing 
an overwhelming majority of the membership that it was in their interests.
On the assumption that one of the difficulties involved in 'opening' the 
union up prior to I96O was the craft sentiment of many of the members 
and that this sentiment was gradually eroded during the 1960s such that 
amalgamation of one sort or another became a possibility, then the choice 
of the AEF remains a strange one because perhaps it seems the most difficult 
one to carry through. It might have been expected that the easiest amalga­
mation would have been within the white-collar group of unions, particularly 
with the 'foreman's union', ASSET, rather than a blue-collar union which.
(98) Figures supplied by TASS Research Dept.
while craft-based, nevertheless had a major 'semi-skilled' component.
On the other hand perhaps the craft sentiment of the draughtsman pulled the 
union closer to the craft-based engineer. This argument cannot be settled 
within the scope of this study. If, however, it is assumed that the forces 
making for successful amalgamation with the AEF stemmed wholly from the 
leadership and its use of the union's propaganda machinery then an earlier 
amalgamation with either the A.Sc.W or APEX, say in 19^7 or 1968, would 
certainly have been acceptable to the membership on the same basis. If, on 
the other hand, as the leadership argued, the successful vote on the AEF 
amalgamation represented a high level of trade union consciousness and 
possibly a high level of class consciousness with respect to industrial 
unionism among the membership, then the amalgamation was indeed a noteable 
event in trade union history. Two points may be noted however. Firstly, 
while it seems highly improbable it is nevertheless still possible that, 
for example, the ASTMS leadership under Clive Jenkins could also have carried 
through such an amalgamation. There is no way to test this possibility. 
Secondly, the period in which the amalgamation vote took place was a very 
complex one. The disputes in the labour movement around the policies of the 
Labour Government, the "wages explosion" of I969/7O, coupled with a tremendous 
rise in strike militancy across the TU movement and in trade union recruitment 
in these years, may have created a set of circumstances conducive to such 
an araalgmation which were not present before or since.
Be that as it may, the union was not growth conscious to any marked 
degree over the period 1945 to 1965; during the 1960s it grew more slowly 
than the other two white-collar unions with major engineering bases; and the 
leadership did not display a marked enthusiasm for white-collar amalgamation. 
Whether earlier amalgamations with either APEX or A.Sc.W or both, would have 
aided the achievement of the other policy goals set by the leadership, e.g. 
higher wages or greater impact on the policies of either the TUC or 
Labour Government remains open to doubt. Indeed with respect to the latter
two bodies, the three unions did collaborate throughout the life of the 
1964-1970 Governments. Further, whether failure to grow in the 1960s will 
have any lasting effect in weakening TASS either industrially or politically 
is also open to doubt. The union's overall position does not seem weak when 
viewed from the mid-1970s,^ a n d  only history will tell whether lack of 
attention to size in the 1950s and 1960s was a positive or negative factor 
in the union's development.
(99) In 1976, TASS had l6l,607 members, APEX had 141,767 and ASTMS had 
396,000 (as affiliated to the TXJC),
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CHAPTER VI
THE 'BLUE collar/w h i t e COLLAR' DEBATE
In the preceding four chapters while a broad description of the 
case-study union's development was given, attention was directed at the 
three TASS-specific questions set out in the Introduction.
A major conclusion drawn is that while the leadership did, in fact, 
spend a major part of its time on the wage issue and in this was generally 
supported by the membership, its main aim was to use wage policy coupled 
with ideological policy to make the membership class conscious. It seems 
appropriate therefore to pursue in the first instance this question of 
union aims, leaving until Chapter VIII a more detailed analysis of trade 
union wage policy.
McCarthy has commented that trade unions are complex and diverse 
institutions, that the term "trade union" has been used to cover a wide 
variety of organisations with contrasting aims, methods, strategies, 
traditions and structures. If this is the case it could well be asked 
whether or not there can be a general theory of union aims. One approach 
to this question, which has an added significance given that TASS is a 
'white-collar' union, is found in the debate around whether or not white- 
collar or non-manual unions pursue different aims by different methods than 
those pursued and used by blue-collar or manual unions. The first section 
of this chapter reviews some of the relevant literature on this debate in 
the light of the experience of the case-study union. In doing this it is 
appreciated that a major critique has already been undertaken by Bain et al., 
but it is hoped that the detailed material provided by the case-study will 
nevertheless prove useful. The conclusion drawn is that as far as TASS
(2:
(1) 'Trade Unions' - McCarthy, p.9, 1972.
(2) 'Social Stratification and Trade Unionism' - Bain, Coates and
Ellis, 1973.
is concerned no aims or methods were employed which would set TASS apart 
from the so-called 'hlue-collar' unions, even though the ideological role 
of the TASS leadership could he interpreted as an exception in current 
trade union conditions.
Another aspect of this debate relates to the question of class 
consciousness and this is taken up in the second section. It is concluded 
that 'class consciousness' as argued for by theorists who accept the white- 
collar/blue-collar separation is theoretically inadequate in terms of 
their specifications and differs from the conception of class consciousness 
held by the TASS leadership.
Chapter VII is devoted to a critique of the wider literature on 
union aims hinted at in the previous comment from McCarthy by way of the 
'pluralist/marxist' debate on trade unions.
1. a 'SPECIFICALLY 'WHITE-COLLAR' UNIONISM?
Much of the comparative analysis of white and blue-collar unionism 
has been conducted around the sociological concept of 'union character'^  ^
and it is this part of the debate which is considered in detail here.
At the most general level the concept of character has been used to 
argue that depending on where a union's membership is drawn from in terms 
of a postulated social hierarchy or stratification in society, so will 
depend the aims it pursues and the methods it employs to achieve these 
aims. A union's character - its aims and methods - thus depends on its 
place in the hierarchy, but generally speaking a distinction is made between 
white and blue-collar unions. White-collar unions are held to have essentially 
similar characters which are significantly different from the essentially 
similar characters of blue-collar unions to allow a distinction to be made 
between them. Before developing the analysis two points need to be noted.
(3) Some writers have used different terminology to refer to 'union 
character' - see Bain et al., p.4.
1.1 Terminological Classification
The hlue-collar/vhite-collar terminology postulates a distinction
which may not he easy to apply in practice in certain areas of employment.
The environmental and other differences relating to a coalminer or hlast-
furnaceman on the one hand and a hank clerk or insurance agent on the other
are fairly ohvious, but the differences between a toolroom superintendent,
foreman, chargehand and skilled toolmaker or an industrial clerk and a working
garage proprietor are perhaps more difficult to discern. Where, for example,
would petrol pump attendants fit into such a classification? They may or
may not actually manually operate the pumps, hut they do normally handle
cash receipts and thus come close to performing clerical work. TASS now
( 4)organises garage clerical staff.^ ■ Where would traffic-light 
control engineers fit into such a classification? They are skilled 
electricians yet work in an environment amenable to white-collar dress, 
and again many are TASS members and the union has found their strike-
(5)effectiveness very useful indeed.^  ^ The shop-workers union, USDAW, which 
might have been expected to recruit petrol pump attendants, is usually 
assigned to the blue-collar category presumably because many of its members 
work in productive industry (mainly in Co-operative movement factories) 
as well as in the manual side of distribution. Some of its members (and 
many of its potential members) both literally and figuratively wear white 
collars, e.g. Co-operative store managers, Marks and Spencers cashiers, a 
whole range of shop assistants, particularly those in high street quality 
shops, etc. Are all shop workers blue-collar or more accurately manual 
workers?
(4) See ’TASS News and Journal', April 1977.
(5) They were successfully used in strike-action to break GEC's wages 
stranglehold on the union. See p.136, above, and TASS Journal of 
April 1973.
1.2 Organisational Classification
It may have been the case in some previous period in British trade 
union history that a distinct organisational classification into blue and 
white-collar unions could be made. Notwithstanding the 1970 amalgamation 
to form the AUEW, most of the large blue-collar unions have now built up 
fairly substantial non-manual or white-collar sections, as shown in 
Table VIII. This process may be given greater impetus in the future if 
other blue-collar/white-collar amalgamations take place, e.g. APEX, has
discussed the possibility of an amalgamation with the GMWU. 
TABLE VIII
(6)
UNION
TOTAL
MEMBERSHIP
WHITE-COLLAR
MEMBERSHIP
TGWU 1,800,000 140,000
AUEW 1,200,000
Eng. Section 
Supervisory Section;-
10,810
TASS;-
161,000
GMWU 960,000 62,000
NUPB 650,000 62,500*
^Includes some 50,000 nurses
(1976 figures, supplied by the unions)
While these white-collar sections may pursue different aims by methods 
other than those used by their blue-collar comrades, their organisational 
unity represents a recent shift in British trade union structure based on 
a change of attitude on the part of some white and blue-collar leaderships 
if not yet memberships.
(6) Report of APEX Conference, 1976.
2. THE CHARACTER DICHOTOMY
Difficulties of terminological and organisational classification 
aside, the debate has centred around the existence or otherwise of a white/ 
blue separation or dichotomy. It is complicated by a number of factors, 
principally that there is no agreement or consensus among sociologists 
on the conceptual framework to be used. There is little or no agreement 
on the theory underlying the independent variable, i.e. stratification. 
Similarly with the dependent variable, character, there is also some 
dispute. While some theorists have used a Weberian separation of the status/ 
class type, others explicitly or otherwise have employed an egoist/fraternalist 
separation. The concept of separation itself is variously defined with 
some theorists posing not a dichotomy, but some kind of continuous spectrum 
between blue and white-collar character. The use of an intervening
( 7)variable, social imagery, is also surrounded by theoretical dispute,
Given these differences among the experts it probably suffices for present 
purposes to set up a simple status/class dichotomy model as the subject 
of a critique based on the TASS experience. The problems of accurately 
placing TASS along with other unions on a spectrum for example if such 
exists, would require much more detailed analysis than can be undertaken 
here though intuitively it could be held that this white-collar union would 
be placed at the extremity of the blue-collar end.
White and blue-collar character can be counterposed in the following
way;
TABLE IX/
(7) Eor a comprehensive survey of the debate see Bain et al., 
op.cit.
TABLE IX
CHARACTER
ATTRIBUTE WHITE-COLLAR BLUE-COLLAR
MAIN AIM SOCIAL STATUS ECONOMIC REWARD
Who the aim is 
meant to benefit
The sectional 
interest
All-union, inter­
union or class 
interest
Methods Non-militant and 
non-political
Militant and 
political
Political Outlook 'Conservative' 'Labour'
Assuming 'social status' and 'economic reward' to refer to the 
Weberian definitions of 'status' and 'class' i.e. concern with the 
individual's position in the hierarchy of prestige in the society at 
large in the former, and with size and source of income and degree of job 
security in the latter, then the above Table represents an attempt to 
encompass the central distinctions made by various theorists between blue 
and white-collar character.
White-collar workers are seen as seeking social status generally or 
professional standing specifically in the case of professional associations, 
and they do this on behalf of the organised sectional interest using methods 
which are non-militant and non-political thus being 'conservative' in outlook, 
Blue-collar workers are seen as wage-conscious rather than status-conscious, 
homogeneous rather than heterogeneous and pursuing interests wider than 
their own immediate organised sectional interest. Using methods which are 
militant and political they are 'labourite' in outlook. Leaving aside 
problems of defining such concepts as militant and political in the 
'character' context, there are a number of ways of interpreting these two 
propositions. Bain et al. provide a schematic description of the postulated 
relationship between stratification and character thus:-
DEPENDENT VARIOLES W IO N^G EO ™  ™
INTERVENING VARIABLE ^ SOCIAL IMAGERY ^
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE SOCIAL POSITION
The full lines on the diagram indicate the sophisticated version of 
the relationship which explicitly or implicitly underlies the simple 
relationship of the dotted lines. The direct interpretation of this 
relationship is that given social position and through the mediation of 
social imagery, union character may be determined. The problem with this 
interpretation is that not only is there disagreement about the theoretical 
nature of each of the variables but also, accepting the variables, about 
the nature and direction of causality. Might not union character change 
the subjective assessment of social position or the social image of society 
that that an individual holds? If social imagery is meant to bear some 
relationship to objective reality might not union character impinge on 
the social imagery which groups in society hold? For example, could it not 
be argued that the wage militancy displayed by white-collar unions post- 
1968 was the result of a changed imagery of union character under the 
impact of, inter alia, the seemingly successful militancy previously 
displayed by blue-collar unions?^^^ Was there, in fact, a demonstration 
effect? Or is the explanation that, under the pressure of declining income 
differentials as against blue-collar workers, white-collar workers pursued 
the only options left open to them, militancy and political action?^
Given the confusion among the sociologists both of these causal sequences 
seem reasonable.
Another way of interpreting the two propositions is that they are 
circular - their authors, unable to be objective, have included their own 
class background in the causal sequence and have in effect set up the
La). Bain et al., op.cit., p.9» Since theories of union growth are not con­
sidered in this thesis, only the right-hand side of the diagram is analyse'
(9) See 'How to run an incomes policy' - Clegg, p. 59-6?, for some discussion
of relevance to this.
(10) See 'TASS Journal', Feb., 1970,,p.4.
dichotomy;
white-collar = middle class 
blue-collar = working class 
and then sought evidence which justifies the assumptions - middle class 
people have middle class values and have aims and methods "acceptable to
society", i.e. to the middle class, whereas working class people have aims
and methods not acceptable to the middle class.
Yet another way of approaching the dichotomy thesis is in effect not
to let it get off the ground. That is, to postulate that there are no
a priori grounds for maintaining
i that status is the prerogative of one group in society rather 
than another, or for that matter economic reward,
ii or that status need be separate from economic reward,
iii that white-collar workers are less homogeneous than 
blue-collar workers,
iv or that some 'methods' and 'outlooks' are the prerogatives of 
one group rather than another.
All these must be shown to hold in practice or the distinction breaks 
down.
2.1 The TASS experience
Recourse to the history of TASS should be sufficient to refute the 
contention that there is any simple formulation such as that underlying 
the direct interpretation of the dichotomy thesis upon which to base a
f 11 ^meaningful distinction between blue and white-collar unions.  ^ ' Even
allowing for gaxage clerks and traffic-light control engineers
in membership, TASS has been a white-collar, predominantly craft union since
its formation. Eor the twenty five years up until 1970 the union placed
(ll) Bain and Clegg note that "the many attempts to explain the growth 
and character of unionism in terms of 'class' and 'status' are a 
monument, to the folly of explaining trade unionism without first 
looking closely at trade unions". (Emphasis added) - 'A Strategy 
for Industrial Relations Research in Gt. Britain', BJIE, Mar., 1974.
major emphasis on economic reward although for the 'left' in the union 
this was seen as consequent upon the class consciousness aim. Status was 
not even a regular minority point of view expressed in annual conferences 
of the union, though since conferences were normally made up of activists 
perhaps the most important evidence is that status was not a regular issue 
in the correspondence columns of the journal where the less active (therefore 
less ideologically-motivated) members might have been expected to express 
their point of view. The only counter-evidence comes from the very few 
leadership pronouncements mentioning status, made in reference to highly 
skilled designers and engineers, usually of university degree or equivalent 
level, but these were to the effect that economic reward was the most 
accurate measure of status.
On the question of 'methods', TASS militancy also runs counter to the 
prognostication of the dichotomy thesis, so much so that it raises questions 
as to why this particular evidence was not given greater weight in earlier 
pieces of empirical research on union character. It is precisely in the 
post-1950 industrial militancy of TASS members and in their acceptance 
generally of 'left-wing' political policies in conjunction with the 
leadership's expectations of consciousness-raising that is found the militant 
and political action par excellence that dichotomy theorists argue only 
relate to blue-collar unions. No more evidence need be offered than this 
against the dichotomy position on militancy and politics.
While it is the case that the union was wage-conscious and thus spent 
a great amount of time on discussing and implementing its policy, it was 
also involved in wider issues again contrary to the dichotomy thesis.
For example, as recorded in Chapter III, p. 46, TASS affiliated to the TUG
(12) See 'TASS Journal' of Mar., 1970, for example. For some
interesting comments on the relationships between status and 
economic rewards, see Hyman, 'Inequality, Ideology and Industrial 
Relations', BJIR, July, 1974. By way of an aside, TASS officials 
have said to the present author that the key difference in industry 
is between staff-graded and non-staff-graded workers.
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in I9I8, the STUC in 1923, the CSEU in 1943 and the Labour Party in 1944, 
and as recorded in Chapter II, p. 3I, the union adopted policies on 
German re-armament, NATO, Suez and relationships with East European trade 
unions. Thus, far from pursuing sectional interests or not being involved 
in broad organisations, the reverse is the case. The progression of 
affiliations may indicate a long-term struggle in the union about where its 
basic interests lay - affiliation to the TUC, NFPW and the STUC being more 
easily accepted as something necessary at a national level to the member­
ship's interests, affiliation to the CSEU, a mainly blue-collar industrial 
confederation, being more difficult to get accepted, and more so political 
affiliation to the Labour Party - but the union was certainly involved in 
the broader movement throughout its history.
It might of course be argued that since the majority of TASS members
at least up until recently, were 'promoted' to staff grades from craft
(13)
areas on the shop-floor,^ they thus carry their manual traditions with 
them. A counter point of view might be that in being promoted, their wage- 
consciousness would be demoted in favour of their new-found status. Without 
much more detailed research neither position can be proved or refuted here 
although the build-up of industrial militancy during the 1950s and of 
political policy during the 1960s suggests that even if either of them 
were operational the 'left's' leadership still had a major impact. Yet it 
is not at all the case that wage-consciousness, militancy and political 
involvement were simply the result of 'left' control replacing status- 
oriented goals of an earlier period. As previously noted, under previous 
'right-wing' control, i.e. pre-1951 or pre-1958 whichever is preferred, the 
union was certainly less wage-conscious, much less militant but no less 
politically involved, although in a different direction, than under the 
'left', but these attributes were not overshadowed by status goals as 
postulated by the upholders of the dichotomy thesis. The best that can
(13) 'History of the AESD', Mortimer, p.413*
be said is that given the craft nature of the union's membership, it 
displayed a blue-collar character and when coupled to 'left' control it 
became the epitome of such character.
2.2 The Wider White-collar Experience
There is, however, a sufficient body of evidence from the behaviour
of other white-collar unions, e.g. teachers, clerical workers, foremen, airline
pilots, civil servants, etc. to conclude that TASS is not in fact an exception
(14)
to the rule.^ ' In all the union areas mentioned, militant action over 
wages has been a feature of the past few years. For some of them affiliation 
to TUC or Labour Party is of long standing, e.g. APEX and ASTMS, while for 
others it is fairly recent, e.g. NALGO's affiliation to the TUC and the 
teachers' unions in both England and Scotland affiliating to their respective 
trade union centres. While such affiliation need not indicate a lack of 
sectional interest or sectional protection, the act of affiliation to a 
predominantly blue-collar trade union centre would seem to go beyond the 
bounds of status as used by dichotomy theorists unless the TUC and STUC 
have now become status symbols. The affiliation of the Educational Institute 
of Scotland, the largest Scottish teachers' union, to the STUC, could be 
interpreted as an act of sectional protection rather than a positive 
commitment to the wider trade union movement. The degree of competition 
between teachers' unions in Scotland coupled with the method of representation 
on the committee which discusses teacher salaries with the relevant govern­
ment department, compelled the EIS to protect its position by joining 
the STUC after two of the other unions had previously done so. In 1970-1 
both the Scottish Further Education Association and the Scottish School­
masters' Association affiliated to the STUC, registering 1,050 and 5,000 
members respectively; the EIS affiliated in 1971-2, registering 32,000
(l'4) See, for example, the evidence amassed by Bain at al, op.cit.
m e m b e r s . T h e  EIS would now however seem to have accepted its place 
in the wider movement with its General Secretary sitting on the General
(16)
Council of the STUC.
Some white-collar unions have had a long association with, for 
example, the CSEU and in 1970 TASS, APEX, ASTMS and ACTSS (the white-collar 
section of the TGWU) were affiliated.
While none of the white-collar unions mentioned in this sub-section 
would seem to come close to TASS in duplicating the postulated blue-collar 
character, they do show sufficient difference from the dichotomy’s white- 
collar paradigm to indicate how far it fails to cover the wider white-collar 
experience.
2.3 The Blue-collar Experience
From the blue-collar union point of view there is some evidence to 
suggest that some of them do not conform to the blue-collar character 
postulated by dichotomy theory. While they are all by and large wage­
conscious, some of them are not very militant, for example the Tobacco 
Workers' Union, Iron and Steel Trades Confederation and the Amalgamated 
Union of Sailmakers, among others are not noted for their militancy. Some 
of them are fairly sectarian, for example the 'black squad' in the shipyards, 
the Boilermakers.
On the questions of status and homogeneity some blue-collar unions 
would seem to have been as status-conscious (though not with respect to 
a "hierarchy of prestige in society at large" but rather with respect to 
a hierarchy of prestige within the .job-cluster) and as internally segmented 
as any white-collar group. The Boilermakers maintain the craftsman/mate
(15) Reports of the 74th and 75th Scottish Trade Union Congress.
(16) Report of the 78th STUC.
(17) Report of proceedings of 35th Annual Meeting of the CSEU.
distinction in their rule-book; the AEÜ, the EETU/PTTJ, UCATT and. the 
Sheetmetal Workers’ maintain the skilled worker/unskilled worker position 
in theirs, and there is little doubt that these differences are among
( is)other things an expression of status. Furthermore, trade union
officials do admit that dilutee or government-trained labour tend to be 
"looked down upon by properly time-served men".^^^^
The existence of wage differentials or more accurately the importance 
placed on them by different groups of unionists and non-unionists alike, 
points to an appreciation of status - albeit again not of the kind defined 
by Weber - even where claims to it are wholly subjective. It is not clear 
therefore that the suggested homogeneity of blue-collar workers is of the 
kind actually met with in practice. Wage solidarity and secondary boycotts 
there may be, blue-collar workers are differentials-conscious as well as 
wage-conscious. Why this is so need not be of concern here.
***%x
Leaving aside a more detailed consideration of ’aims' to the next 
Chapter it is here concluded that the blue/white-collar separation based 
on social stratification, while interesting, bears little relationship to 
the complex TASS experience specifically or to the wider trade union 
experience generally. The TASS experience allows a conclusion to be 
drawn similar to Lockwood's, i.e.
'generally speaking the overall tendency has been 
for blackcoated workers to form associations 
fashioned after those of working class unions'.(20)
6.2 UNION CHARACTER AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
Following on from Lockwood's characterisation of non—blackcoated unions
( 21)as working class unions, he and Blackburn^  ^have been the main exponents
(la) See the respective rule-books.
(19) In personal discussions with the present writer.
(20) 'The Black Coated Worker' - Lockwood, p.194-195, 1958.
(21) 'Union Character and Social Class' - Blackburn, I967.
of the view that union character can he used to measure the working class 
consciousness of a union. Neither writer precisely defines class
i 22 )consciousness'  ^ and this will he referred to later. Since both writers 
hold essentially similar positions on the relationship of character to 
consciousness, attention is focused on Blackburn's exposition which is 
the most clearly set out and detailed.
Blackburn introduces the idea of 'unionisation* - made up of two parts, 
'completeness* (more usually 'density') and 'unionateness' (an index of 
character) - and argues that unionisation 'may be taken as an index of
(23)
class consciousness'.
Completeness
It is difficult to see how completeness relates to working class 
consciousness (however defined unless circularly) in anything but a rough 
and ready way. Leaving aside the difficulties associated with the practical 
measurement of completeness for open unions such as TASS, people may join 
unions for many reasons, e.g. to gain access to insurance cover in the case 
of school teachers, or legal cover as provided by TASS and many other unions, 
to obtain employment where union shops are the rule or simply to obtain 
fringe benefits of one kind or another. There is no reason to suppose that 
such recruits to trade unions are what might be called 'trade union 
conscious', i.e. view themselves as having interests common to all trade 
unionists such that they are prepared to act collectively to protect these 
interests, far less to suppose that they are class conscious. Even the 
concept 'trade union consciousness' raises difficulties in the sense that 
union leaderships may compete with each other in the recruitment field 
and in others without taking into consideration a broad view of total trade 
union structure, e.g. vested interests in growth and structure may lead
(22) See Bain et al., p.96.
(23) Blackburn, op.cit., p.9.
to sectionalism and is apparent in the periodic debates on structure 
at the TUC. A union which vigorously pursues an expansionist membership 
policy along with union shop agreements, may achieve a high degree of 
completeness without in any way being class conscious, indeed the reverse 
may be the case - it could be militantly sectionalist.
Unionateness
Blackburn does, however, concentrate on unionateness as the key to 
class consciousness and argues that an organisation can be described "as 
more or less unionate according to the extent to which it is a whole­
hearted trade union, identifying with the labour movement and willing to 
use all the powers of the movement ... The level of unionateness depends 
on the commitment of an organisation to the general principles and ideology 
of trade unionism".
It is not at all clear that this quotation is meaningful. For example, 
what is the ’labour movement’; is it a fairly static group of organisations 
or simply the collective at a point in time of organisations of workers 
for industrial and/or political ends? Does it include the Communist Party 
or for that matter the Tory Party’s trade union organisation, and therefore 
does it mean identification with them? Some unions operate bans and 
proscriptions of one form or another against Communists holding union office 
but not against Tories holding union office - how does this paradox affect 
identification with the 'labour movement'? One union allows only Labour 
Party members to hold its top offices - is it more or less identified with
(23)
the 'labour movement' than those with no bans or some bans? What
are "all the powers of the movement"? Are they the powers of strike action 
and secondary boycott or the powers to impose an incomes policy? Is there
(24) Blackburn, op cit., p.18.
(25) For example, APEX and the NUR.
general agreement on the meaning of "general principles and ideology of 
trade unionism"? Was the support of some London dockers and Smithfield meat 
porters, mainly trade unionists, for Enoch Powell's position on immigration, 
part of the ideology of trade unionism or the support now being given by 
some London trade unionists to the National Eront?^^  ^ Is there an 
acceptable definition of 'working class consciousness' with which to underpin 
the concept of unionateness? Marxists like those in Tass would define 
working class consciousness as the recognition by those who sell their labour 
power, workers, of the historically transient nature of capitalism, of the 
need to work actively to transform capitalism into socialism using violence 
if necessary and the need to do this as a class as against the sectional 
plurality of capitalism. Would Blackburn agree with this definition?
Blackburn admits the ambiguities in his formulation but argues that 
a useful measure of an organisation's unionateness and hence class 
consciousness can be obtained by considering with respect to the organisation 
the following seven elements
i. regards collective bargaining and the protection of the 
interests of members, as employees, as its main function, 
rather than, say, professional activities or welfare schemes,
ii. is independent of employers for purposes of negotiation,
iii. is prepared to be militant, using all forms of industrial
action which may be effective,
iv. declares itself to be a trade union,
V .  r e g i s t e r s  a s  a  t r a d e  u n i o n  ( w h e r e  t h i s  i s  a p p l i c a b l e ) ,
vi. is affiliated to the TUC,
vii. is affiliated to the Labour Party.
It would take the present discussion too far afield to consider 
each point in detail. Taking (i) as Blackburn does, as somehow primus 
inter pares, why should collective bargaining be considered so important?
(26) See, for example, 'The National Front', Walker, p.110-111, 1977, for 
a brief discussion of docker and meat porter support for Powell,
(27) Blackburn, op. cot., p.18-19.
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TASS wages policy - financially supported strikes, unilaterally set minimum 
rates, pattern bargaining, etc, - can be interpreted as an attempt at 
unilateral regulation. (This interpretation is considered more fully on 
p .176 below). Would TASS thus 'score' zero under this element? Blackburn 
thinks so; he argues that collective bargaining is 'basic to the concept 
of unionateness'. Even worse as far as TASS is concerned, he further 
argues - 'If an organisation has no score under this item, it has no score 
under the other items, i.e. its level of unionateness is zero'.^^^^
More generally, it is not at all clear that these seven elements 
if accepted by a union would not still allow it to be as sectional as it 
wanted to be, rather than, as Blackburn implies, much more broadly motivated. 
Further, even if it is accepted that the elements, interpreted sympathetically, 
go some way towards defining a broad trade union and political outlook if 
not class consciousness, it would seem that their spirit applies more easily 
to trade union leaders than to rank and file. TASS, for example, had at 
no time prior to 1970 more than 47^ of its membership paying the political 
levy and a referendum on Labour Party affiliation may have resulted in 
disaffiliation had one taken place. This need not, indeed the former did 
not seem to impair TASS industrial militancy, so again how would TASS have 
then 'scored' on the unionateness scale? Such a reduction in outlook, 
i.e. disaffiliation from the Labour Party, would have been against the wishes 
of the leadership as indicated in the debate on disaffiliation in I967 
dealt with on p.120 above. Blackburn, other than the comments on collective 
bargaining, offers no system of weighting for the seven elements.
X X X  X X'
The TASS experience since 1945, effectively demolishes the 'blue- 
collar/white-collar' character dichotomy. If TASS represented the only 
evidence against the dichotomy thesis then perhaps the existence of the
(28) Blackburn, op cit., p.28.
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'left' leadership could he used to explain this exception to the rule.
The broader white-collar and blue-collar evidence indicates that far from 
being an exception, TASS's experience is the rule.
However, it would be incorrect to leave matters there. There would 
seem to be sufficient evidence from the TASS case to at least give credence 
to the hypothesis that both the form and the content of the political stance 
adopted by the union, including that over amalgamation, and supported by 
the mass of the membership, represented a higher level of consciousness 
than has yet been found among white-collar unions in Britain and that this 
was the result of 'left' leadership.
CHAPTER VII
THE 'PLURALIST/MARXIST* DEBATE
Returning to the comment from McCarthy mentioned at the beginning 
of Chapter VI to the effect that a wide variety of aims have been attributed
to trade unions, there is a marked tendency in the literature on the
subject for theorists to highlight one specific aspect of union behaviour 
'and then to argue that this is the defining aim or characteristic of
trade unions. In relation to this tendency two points can be made.
Firstly, there seems to have been little discussion among theorists on 
a theory of the specification of aims, a subject which has generated 
some debate among economists in their field of study. Thus the concepts 
of maximising, satisficing, sequential consideration of alternatives 
and optimum mix, for example, have little place in the literature.
Secondly, there is little acknowledgement that there may exist different 
aims for different groups within one union, e.g. for the leadership, for 
the full-time officials, for the clerical staff employed by the union 
(who may be union members), for the membership in whole or in part.^^^
Some attempt has been made to come to grips with this question in the 
descriptive historical chapters of this thesis by outlining the various 
aims held by different groups within TASS where there was evidence for 
such variation. The development of a theory of the specification of 
union aims is beyond the scope of this thesis, and the approach relies 
on the more usual position of the majority of writers. The second point 
relating to differentiation of aims, is returned to on a number of occasions 
and in a number of ways in this and later chapters.
(l) But see for example, Hyman, 'The Workers Union', p.206-221, 1971, 
for some discussion on this point.
This chapter concentrates on two of the main contending theories 
in modern academic industrial relations, the pluralist and the marxist, 
or more correctly, on how trade unions fit into both theories. However, 
given the dissimilarity of aims that have been attributed to trade unions 
a brief resume of the broader literature on aims may prove helpful.
The first two sections of this chapter review two broad areas under the 
headings of economic and political. Sections 3 and 4 consider the pluralist 
and marxist approaches to rules, law and trade unions, while the remaining 
section deals with these views on trade unions and the experience of the 
case-study union,
1, Economic analysis
Many early writers were concerned to underline what they saw as 
an essential similarity rather than diversity when dealing with trade 
unions and usually did so with respect to a broad economic aim in which 
what might be called the 'wage objective' features prominently. They 
would have agreed with what Flanders has called the conventional answer 
to the purposes question, that:
"(unions) defend and, if possible, improve their members' 
terms and conditions of employment. They are out 
to raise wages, to shorten hours and to make working 
conditions safer, healthier and better in many other 
respects," (2)
Implicit in this approach is that trade unions impose a cost on an 
employer individually and on capitalism in general which is greater than 
the wage bill. Accepting that this is so, and without getting involved 
in a theory of the specification of aims, then a number of questions 
arise. How should economic reward be defined? How far do unions or
(2) See for example 'Six Centuries of Work and Wages' - Rogers, p,439,
1912 edition; 'The History of Trade Unionism' - the Webbs, p,l, 1920 
edition; a book by a former general secretary of the General Federation 
of TUs - 'Trade Unions, their past, present and future' - Appleton, 
p.121, 1923; and 'Management and Unions' - Flanders, p, 41, 1970,
individual workers take into consideration aspects of this imposed cost 
other than wages when they formulate claims for increases in the latter?
Do unions trade-off one aspect for another, e.g. forego a wage increase 
or accept less than they otherwise would in order to obtain some gain in 
holiday entitlement? To put the question another way, how do unions and/
( 3)or individual workers define economic reward? Allen has argued that 
the monetary wage is an ever-present concern to workers hence unions, 
since it is through this, given exogenously set price and tax structures, 
that they buy the necessities of life; that since few if any of them could 
maintain consumption standards if they withdrew from the labour market, 
they are continually forced to present themselves for employment and are 
thus continually faced with the monetary wage whether weekly or monthly.
He stresses the dynamic aspects of the employment relationship, i.e. wages 
are a cost to the employer to be minimised though income to the worker 
to be maximised, and this contradiction is subject to forces arising from 
changes in the cyclical pattern of employment as well as structural changes 
in e m p l o y m e n t . T h e r e  is surely a major element of truth in this 
position, though whether it is as rigid as is implied, in the face of 
the argument that given the provision of a social security system, workers 
will remain unemployed until work turns up at what they consider the 
"right" wage, is another matter. Nevertheless, it is true that many of 
the non-wage costs imposed on employers involve long-term benefits, e.g. 
clinic facilities, locker and washing-up facilities, safety equipment 
including clothing etc. and thus will not require to be of concern to 
specific groups of workers on a week-to-week basis though it is probable 
that a union may at any one time have claims for non-wage benefits in 
progress somewhere.
(3) 'The Sociology of Industrial Relations' - Allen, 1974,
(4) Ibid., p,39-40,
Similar comments -would seem to apply to holiday entitlements, 
redundancy payment provisions and pensions though perhaps not so much 
to hours of work, hut all of these must have some bearing on the wage 
per unit of time spent at work. It is doubtful however if in the general 
case they are considered part of the money wage or more accurately, are 
seen on a week-to-week basis as influencing the monetary return to employ­
ment, Thus Allen's argument, while it does not answer the questions posed 
at the beginning of the previous paragraph, at least has the merit of 
emphasising that while the weekly or monthly wage is part of a greater 
cost imposed on the employer and in this sense is internal to the employ­
ment relationship, it is precisely because it is the most immediate part 
of that cost which is realised externally to the employment relationship 
that it is of ever-present concern and importance to both workers and 
union. Workers may, indeed probably do, view most non-wage benefits as 
"icing on the cake" - if they are made redundant the icing stays with the 
employer.
The economic aim is best summed up as that view which highlights 
the external as well as the internal dimension of the employment relation­
ship under capitalism and barring external fringe benefits (which can be 
reduced to income), this means highlighting the monetary wage.
2, Political analysis
By and large political theories of union purpose emphasise some
aspect of industrial government as the central aim of trade unions.
One writer, Ross, has argued the importance of internal political processes
of unions, directed at their organisational survival, in understanding
their aims, but since he applies this specifically to wage policy his
theory is held over to Chapter VIII where it is contrasted with Dunlop's
( 5)
'income maximisation' theory. '
(5) 'Trade Union Wage Policy', Ross, 1948, and 'Wage Determination under 
Trade Unions', Dunlop, 1944.
An early statement of a governmental theory is found in the work 
of C o m m o n s w h o  regarded unions not as bearers of tyranny and monopoly, 
but as liberating forces which helped establish constitutional government
(7)in industry and delineated the power of one party over the other.
Clegg, writing in 1 9 5 1 , has offered what is essentially a similar view.
The main problem associated with these views is that while it could be 
accepted that unions have introduced order out of chaos in industry or, 
with greater emphasis, have by their organisation of workers reduced the
arbitrary powers of the employer, it is not clear what is meant by
government. What sort of governmental structure is it, in which the unions 
are, to paraphrase Clegg, a permanent opposition, never to become the ruling 
party? Why should unions remain a loyal opposition and not democratically 
or otherwise bid for power? It can be held of course that this situation 
is the best of all possible worlds, therefore eternal and unchanging, but 
that does not follow from a theory of government unless it is defined as 
the acceptance by unions of some sort of perpetual benevolent dictatorship. 
The concept of constitutional government seems more applicable to what 
is currently called workers self-management, and seems close to the
(9)guild socialist position of Cole and the syndicalists,
Perlman, writing in 1 9 2 8 , postulates the concept of "job-conscious 
unionism", that "all unions sooner or later stress 'shop rights', which 
to the working man at the bench, are identical with 'liberty' itself - 
since, thanks to them, he has no need to kowtow to foreman or boss, as 
the price of holding his job".^^^^ F l a n d e r s , w r i t i n g  in 1970, argues 
a similar but much broader thesis and given its central importance to
(6) 'The Economics of Collective Action' - Commons, 1925.
(7) See 'Industrial Relations Theory - A Critical Review' - Blain & 
Gennard, BJIR, Nov. 1970.
(8) 'Industrial Democracy and Nationalisation' - Clegg, 1951
(9) 'The World of Labour' - Cole, 1913.
(10) 'A Theory of the Labour Movement' - Perlman, 1928.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Flanders, op.cit.
the debate on union aims is here extensively quoted;
"... in defining union purpose ... the best
way of finding the right answer is to look
at the behaviour of trade unions, to infer what they 
are from what they do ... Here one thing is certain,
and it applies to all trade unions and has .applied
throughout the greater part of their history. The 
activity to which they devote most of their resources 
and appear to rate most highly is collective bargaining 
... Collective bargaining may be what the words imply - 
that depends on how we define bargaining - but-it is 
also a rule-making process ... In other words, one 
of the principal purposes of trade unions ... is 
regulation and control. They are interested in 
regulating wages as well as raising them; and of 
course, in regulating a wide range of other issues 
appertaining to their members' jobs and working life ...
The effect of rules is to establish rights, with their 
corresponding obligations. The rules ... secure for 
employees the right to a certain rate of wages; the 
right not to have to work longer than a certain number 
of hours; the right not to be dismissed without con­
sultation or compensation and so on ... (The) basic 
social purpose of trade unions is job regulation and 
control." (13)
It may aid the later analysis of the behaviour of the case-study
union if at this point a digression is undertaken into wider social and
political theory for, as Fox notes, the pluralist foundation which underlies
Flanders' postulate of job regulation and control is itself part of a
pluralist theory of society, a view made explicit by one of Flanders'
( 14)major collaborators, Clegg. A very wide literature exists on rules,
rights, obligations etc. embracing social, political, moral and philosophical 
texts and a critical survey is well outside the scope of this enquiry.
It is not argued therefore, that the two approaches which will be outlined, 
the pluralist and the marxist, are in any way exhaustive of the possi­
bilities, only that they represent central and competing perspectives in 
modern British industrial relations theory. Nor is it argued that all 
the authors mentioned with respect to one or other perspective would admit 
to every aspect given here.
(13) Ibid.
(14) 'Pluralism in Industrial Relations', Clegg, B.J.I.R., Vol, XII, no. 3,
1975.
3, Pluralism and Society
3.1 Continuous Compromise
Pluralism constitutes a political perspective which is applicable 
both to society in general and to industrial relations in particular.
This perspective advocates viewing society
"as fractured into a congeries of hundreds of 
small special interest groups, with incompletely 
overlapping memberships, widely differing power 
bases, and a multitude of techniques for exercising
influence on decisions salient to them ..." (l5)
This interest group structure is integrated into a society in two 
principal ways. Firstly, the central authority, usually the government, 
since it relies on the support of, or is elected by, the interest groups, 
ensures that in its dealings with them it arbitrates the competing claims 
or imposes a solution so as not to isolate the offended group or groups
from the political process. Clegg puts this position thus:
"There are no definitive decisions by final authority 
only.continuous compromises with landowners, farmers, 
financiers, industrialists, workers, the church, the 
army and many other pressure groups or with coalitions 
of two or more".(16)
Secondly, the interaction of interest group conflict or competition 
and resolution - continuous compromise - is itself a mechanism, perhaps 
the main mechanism, through which society is maintained as are its 
political freedom and adaptability. No one interest group or coalition 
has priority in claims or for that matter continuous dominance over other 
groups. The interaction of conflict and resolution among groups of more 
or less equal power, or at least where there is a power imbalance, it is 
short-lived or not so great as to rupture the interest group structure.
(15) 'Community Power and Political Theory', Polsby, I963, quoted by 
Fox in 'Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist 
Ideology' in 'Man and Organisation', Child, 1973*
(16) Clegg, op.cit., p.309» See also the discussion of pluralism 
in Fox, ibid.
is self-reinforcing since all groups receive rewards from the process 
of compromise and thus they develop a
"commitment to the process by which (the rewards)
were secured, and by which more may be had in the
future". (17)
The concept of commitment is taken by some writers to mean more than
simply an interest group's desire for survival driving it to acquiesce
to the process of compromise in a society in which life is "poor, nasty
and brutish". Commitment is taken to mean that all interest groups see
the process of compromise as legitimate, that they compete in the spirit
of goodwill, and honour their obligations consequent upon the compromises
they reach; in effect all interest groups have what Fox calls "a consensual 
( 18 )code of ethics".^  ^ Flanders would seem to come close to this latter 
view when, in the field of industrial relations, he argues that collective 
bargaining - the process of compromise in industry - protects not only 
the material living standards of workers
"but equally their security, status and self-respect - 
in short, their dignity as human beings 
(Collective bargaining) establish(es) rights, with 
their corresponding obligations". (l9)
It is but a short step from concepts such as security, status, self- 
respect, dignity and rights and obligations to those of goodwill and honour.
Group conflict or competition is not always seen by pluralist theorists 
as a negative feature to be overcome by compromise. Many, if not all, 
would agree with Coser that:
"Conflict, rather than being disruptive and 
dissociating, may indeed be a means of balancing 
and hence maintaining a society as a going concern ..
A flexible society benefits from conflict because 
such behaviour, by helping to create and modify 
norms, assures its continuance under changed 
conditions". (20)
(17) Ibid.
(is) Fox, op.cit.
(19) Flanders, op.cit.
(20) ’The Functions of Social Conflict', Coser, 1954, quoted in Hyman, 
'Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism', p.23-24, 1971.
Pluralism thus constitutes a political analysis of society in which 
interest group conflict is continually resolvable with the central authority 
playing a mediating rather than coercive role. Conflict arises from 
disputes over the sharing of rewards both material and cultural, and is 
resolved on the basis of a propensity to compromise, a self-legitimating 
propensity derived from the integrative pull of reward-sharing inherent in 
the process of compromise.
3.2 Pluralism and Trade Unions
Of pluralism as applied to industrial relations, Clegg concludes
that
"the rules of collective bargaining can be seen as 
the industrial equivalent of the political rules 
governing the operation of pressure groups." (2l)
It is within this framework of pluralist rule-making that Flanders'
emphasis on collective bargaining must be set. For Flanders and the others
( 22)of the "Oxford school"' the "basic social purpose of trade unions is 
job regulation and control", and this unions attempt to achieve, indeed 
by and large do achieve, through collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining as the previous quote from Clegg hints at, is the industrial 
equivalent of the process of compromise in society at large. Flanders 
makes this clear when he discusses bargaining between political parties, 
between governments, between unions and employers etc., thus:
"Any of these forms of 'bargaining', whether in 
industry or politics, are in the modern idiom 
'pressure group' activities, and the resulting 
deals, though they may be called 'bargains', are 
in reality compromise settlements of power con­
flicts ... The process of negotiation is best 
described as a diplomatic use of power." (23)
(21) Clegg, op.cit.
(22) Blain and Gennard, op.cit.
(23) 'The Nature of Collective Bargaining', Flanders in 'Collective 
Bargaining', Flanders (Ed.) p.17, 1969.
This collective or negotiated compromise is at the root of 
industrial stability in that the process of reward-sharing integrates 
the bargaining parties sufficiently to enable them to so deploy their 
relative strengths at any point in time such that they do not force the 
other party to revolt, i.e. they use their power diplomatically. This 
seems implicit in Clegg's criticism of Fox for asserting that the balance 
of power between employers and workers is typically unequal and in favour 
of the former. Clegg argues that:
"In most instances the only means of discovering 
where the balance lies is to wait for a conflict 
in which both sides deploy all their resources and 
to note which side wins, or whether the outcome 
is a stalemate ... In most industrial situations 
there is room for endless argument over where the 
balance of power lies. " ( 2 4 ) (emphasis added)
Trade unions, themselves coalitions of interest groups, are, along 
with employers' organisations and government, the main organisations in 
the process of compromise in industry and as such their role is crucial 
as one of the authors of the output of compromise, the rules of collective 
bargaining. Unions and their memberships are thus integrated into the 
industrial process in particular and into society in general, on the 
basis of achievements in the field of job regulation and control. Indeed 
for Flanders the process of integration has reached the stage where British 
trade unions are
"an essential part of the mechanism of social 
control." (25)
Finally, while pluralism need not rest on an end of ideology postu­
late or on some such purported historical break or change, there is a 
sense in which it implies a maturity of the social order. For example, 
Clegg argues that pluralism works best in the advanced industrial societies 
where interest groups possess sufficient resources
(24) Clegg, op.cit., p.303.
(25) 'The Reform of Collective Bargaining: From Donovan to Durkheim', 
Fox and Flanders, B.J.I.R., Vol. VII, No.2, I969.
"to make concessions to new groups without 
driving established groups to revolt." (26)
This sort of historical change is often asserted with respect to
the history of industrial relations and could be used to suggest that
pluralism in industrial relations works best under late rather than
early capitalism. The following quote puts the case neatly:
"Contrary to Marx, industrial conflict peaks early, 
not late, in the process of industrialisation.
Rather than facing greater and greater conflict 
ending in revolution, industrialising societies 
face more and more peace once the early period 
of industrial unrest has been passed. Problems 
get solved, attitudes get changes, mechanisms get 
developed." (2?)
4. Marxist Political Economy
4.1 Rules and Class Power
For Marx and Engels the state
"is by no means a power forced on society from 
without ... It is simply a product of society 
at a certain stage of development. It is the 
confession that this society has become hope­
lessly divided against itself, has entangled 
itself in irreconcilable contradictions which 
it is powerless to banish. In order that these 
contradictions, these classes with conflicting 
economic interests, may not annihilate themselves 
and society in a useless struggle, a power 
becomes necessary that stands apparently above 
society and has the function of keeping down 
the conflicts and maintaining order".(2B)
(emphasis added)
But this power, this state, is not impartial. It rules in the 
interests of the dominant economic class. Thus, on the rule of law and 
the labour contract, Engels says:
(26) Clegg, op.cit. , p.309.
(27) 'Labor and Management in Industrial Society', Kerr, p.xx, I964.
(28) 'The Origin of the Family', Engels, p.206, Kerr Edition,
1902.
"The labour contract is said to be voluntarily made 
by both parties. But it is considered as voluntary 
when the law places both parties on equal terms on 
paper. The power conferred on one party by the 
division of classes, the pressure thereby exerted 
on the other party, the actual economic relation 
of the two - all this does not concern the law.
Again, during the term of the contract both parties 
are held to have equal rights, unless one has 
expressly renounced his right. That the economic 
situation forces the labourer to give up even the 
last semblance of equality, that is not the fault 
of the law." (29)
Further and more generally;
"In such a state, wealth exerts its power indirectly, 
but all the more safely. This is done partly in the 
form of direct corruption of officials ... (and) 
through universal suffrage. For as long as the 
oppressed class, in this case the proletariat, is 
not ripe for its economic emancipation, just so 
long will its majority regard the existing order 
of society as the only possible one, and form the 
tail, the extreme left wing of the capitalist class.
It is perhaps worth noting at this point that a number of modern
industrial relations scholars working from what is called a "radical
perspective" would seem to accept almost all of the above, only stopping
short of the implicit prediction of revolution contained in the phrase
"not ripe for its economic emancipation". Fox, for example, explicitly
(31)adopts this position.^ '
Thus the classical marxist perspective sees the rule of law and the 
democratic machinery of capitalist society as structured by class division. 
Society remains more or less stable and adaptable, to the extent that
(32)a majority of the oppressed class are ideologically captured^  ^ through 
corrupted officials, i.e. opinion-formers including trade union officials, 
and the apparent freedoms of capitalist society such as universal suffrage.
(29) Ibid., p.87-88.
(30) Ibid., p. 210-211.
(31) Fox, op.cit.
(32) That is, are induced to have a 'false consciousness'.
See 'Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution', Foster, p.3-7, 
1974, for a modern marxist view on false consciousness.
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Industrial strife is nevertheless endemic due to conflicting economic 
interests, and the coercive organs of the state are used to put down 
revolts when necessary.
If marxists see the aim of ruling class ideological penetration 
of the working class as being to bind the latter, or a majority of it, 
to capitalism, then the main creation of such penetration, through which 
the opinion-formers operate and workers perceive their own relevance 
within society, is a multitude of "sectional interests" with their own 
"identities". Trade unions are seen as representing some of these
( 33)sectional interests or groupings of them.'
Marx and Engels predict, however, that circumstances will occur
within which sectional identities will be submerged in a class identity,
and the working class forced to overcome capitalist democracy - "win the
(34)
battle of democracy"'  ^ - to take state power, usually by armed struggle
against the coercive organs of the capitalist state, and reverse the
unequal power relationship in favour of themselves. Political society 
may indeed by a system of rules and a rule-making process but under the 
workers’ state these will favour the workers. Lenin puts this position 
thus :
"(in) capitalist society we have a democracy that 
is curtailed, wretched, false, a democracy only for 
the rich, for a minority. The dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the period of the transition to
communism, will for the first time create democracy
for the people, for the majority, along with the
necessary suppression of the exploiters, of the 
minority." (35l (emphasis added)
4.2 Marxism and Trade Unions
None of the classical marxists produced a text wholly on trade 
unions. The most complete summary of the views of Marx and Engels is to
(33) Lenin, ’Collected Works’, Vol. V, p.404, I96I. See also Foster ibid,
(34) ’Communist Manifesto’, Marx and Engels, p.74, Moscow, 1977.
(35) ’The State and Revolution’, Lenin, p.82, Moscow 7th Printing,
1972.
be found in L o z o v s k y ^ a n d  that of Lenin in his text "What is to be 
Done?"(^^) Engels writing in 1844-45 says;
"(The) object (of trade unions) were to deal, 
en masse, as a power, with the employers; 
to regulate the rate of wages, according to 
the profit of the latter, to raise it when 
opportunity offered ... " (38)
Marx writing in 184? argues:
"Large scale industry assembles in one place a 
crowd of people who are unknown to each other.
Competition divides their interests. But the 
maintenance of their wages, this common interest 
which they have against their employer, brings 
them together again in the same idea of resistance - 
combination".(39)
In another text:
"Trade unions work well as centres of resistance 
against the encroachments of capital. They fail 
partially from an injudicious use of their power.
They fail generally from limiting themselves to 
a guerilla war against the effects of the existing 
system, instead of simultaneously trying to change 
it, instead of using their organised forces as a 
lever for the final emancipation of the working 
class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of 
the wages system-"(40)
It is interesting to note that Engels talks of both regulation and
raising wages, indeed Marx talks of unions obtaining "contractual con-
(4l)ditions" from employers,'  ^hence they did have a positive conception 
of workers and unions obtaining rights in industry and thus imposing 
duties on employers. Their enthusiastic support and campaigning for the 
10 hour day indicates not only that they had a positive conception of
(36) ’Marx and the Trade Unions’, Lozovsky, 1935.
(37) Moscow, 9th printing, 1973*
(38) 'The conditions of the working-class in England in 1844’ - Engels, 
p.215, 1966 Reprint.
(39) 'The Poverty of Philosophy’ - Marx written in 1846-7. See p.145 
of the Martin Lawrence Edition.
(40) "Wages, Price and Profit’, Marx, written in 1865, first published 
in 1898.
(41) Quoted in Lozovsky, op.cit., p.l6.
rules but also that some rules were seen by them as a major inroad both
(42)to the economic power of the capitalists and to their political control. ' 
It is clear, however, from the foregoing quotations and from much 
else in their writings that Marx and Engels saw the competitive struggle 
between capitalists both domestically and internationally for markets, 
and within this the struggle around wage costs, as the key to understanding 
the development of capitalism and hence trade unionism. The dynamic 
process of capitalist development - "the unceasing improvement of 
machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes (the workers’) livelihood 
more and more precarious" and "the growing competition among the bourgeois, 
and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever 
more fluctuating" - is seen on the one hand, as continually undermining 
the contractual conditions unions have obtained from employers and through 
this on the other, continually regenerating militancy and trade union 
consciousness around defence and improvement of the wage. This regeneration 
of trade union consciousness, precisely because it can never do more than 
provide a resistance against the encroachment of capital, is seen as 
preparing conditions for the acceptance by workers of the need for political 
action; "in the struggle ... the mass becomes united, and constitutes 
itself as a class for itself", "what the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, 
above all, is its own grave-diggers
Workers and trade unions are thus seen by the classical marxists 
as subject to two sets of opposing forces, one which stems from the 
ruling class and the other from the struggle over wages. The former 
includes all those techniques and organisations, among them the corruption 
of officials, the ’freedom’ of the ballot box and the ’impartial’ state, 
which can be grouped under the heading of ideological controllers or
(42) See ’Inaugural address of the International Working Men’s Association’, 
Marx, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p.382-3.
(43) All quotations in this paragraph are from the ’Communist Manifesto* 
op.cit.
mechanisms of social control, and which bind workers to capitalist society. 
The latter arises from the irreconcilable struggle over wages and forces 
sections of the workforce to combine in unions and periodically undertake 
militant activity which may bring the coercive organs of the state into 
action; the continual regeneration of trade union consciousness is eventually 
transformed into a political challenge to capitalism, a class consciousness 
emerges among workers and across unions which leads them to challenge for 
state power.
Hyman, in a pamphlet^^^^ which subjects both the classical marxists 
and later marxist theorists to a lucid critique, designates the views 
of Marx and Engels as the "optimistic tradition" and goes on to review 
those other marxists who, for Hyman, to some degree or other relegate 
trade unions from the potentially revolutionary forces, e.g. writers such 
as Lenin, Trotsky, Gramsci and more recently A n d e r s o n , ^ a n d  whom he 
sees as representing the "pessimistic tradition".
Without dealing with Hyman's arguments in detail, his major 
assertion is that Marx and Engels hold that the forces arising from the 
economic struggles of workers and unions, i.e. those tending to make 
unions revolutionary, would outweigh those tending to bind unions to 
capitalism, i.e. the ideological controllers, whereas the other writers 
hold the reverse. These writers all argue that capitalism controls 
unions through penetrating them, and they use such concepts as "embourgeoise­
ment", the "labour aristocracy", the "iron law of oligarchy" and 
"incorporation" in their explanations of the processes involved in 
ideologically binding unions to c a p i t a l i s m . I t  is not clear that 
Lenin actually falls with the pessimistic tradition in that while he argued
(44) Hyman, op.cit.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
for an explicit difference between the revolutionary political party 
of the working class and the class itself and hence also the unions, 
he does strike an optimistic note:
"Trade union organisation not only can be of 
tremendous value in developing and consolidating 
the economic struggle, but can also become a very 
important auxiliary to political agitation and 
revolutionary organisation." (4?)
The point of all this is - what is it that trade unions do under
capitalism when viewed from the perspective of marxist political economy?
The answer must be that two opposing views are held by marxists; the first, 
the optimistic tradition of Marx, Engels and Lenin, views trade unions 
as potentially revolutionary bodies continually undergoing regeneration 
in the class struggle in industry, primarily around wages, which parallels 
the competitive development of capitalism, and when led by revolutionaries 
and imbued with socialist consciousness^^^^ will actually become revolutionary
The second, the pessimistic tradition, sees the incorporation of unions,
particularly union leaderships, as leading to unions becoming "lieutenants 
of capitalism" and their leaders as "political police", thus collaborationist, 
non-revolutionary or overtly counter-revolutionary.^^^^
This latter view brings the argument close to Flanders’ thesis that 
unions are an essential part of the mechanism of social control. If union 
leaderships and memberships are, for whatever reason, class collaborationist, 
then they may in fact be interested in joint rule-making, in perpetuating 
capitalism by compromising with it.
5. Pluralism, Marxism and the TASS Experience
5.1 Aims and objections
In terms of day-to-day trade union activity there can be little 
doubt that TASS members, including the leadership were involved in
(47) Lenin, op.cit., p.113-114,
(48) See Chapter I, p. 11 and 12.
(49) Hyman, op.cit.
something akin to the process of compromise in industry, in obtaining 
contractual conditions from employers. But there can also be little doubt 
from the mass of evidence that the main field of concentration both in 
terms of policy and practice was wages. While leadership, union negotiators 
and those members who participated in negotiations must have been concerned 
to reach agreement on a whole range of issues affecting working conditions, 
the wage issue was pre-eminent. The overwhelming emphasis placed on wages 
in RC Conference, both in terms of debate and policy, in the union's 
journal and Vacancy List, the consistent opposition to any form of incomes 
policy post-1950, the annual wage campaigns built around the many strikes/ 
high strike pay policy used to pattern bargain or where possible pattern- 
impose settlements across companies, the sophisticated wages data-bank 
and the unilaterally-set minimum wage rates, the sheer amount of time 
and effort devoted by leadership, organisers and activists, apparent from 
RC Conference reports and monthly journals, all lead to this conclusion.
It would not stretch the evidence at all to conclude that this union's 
experience under 'left' leadership, offers concrete support to the 
conventional answer to the trade union purposes question rather than to 
the job regulation and control postulate. That is, the union was out to 
raise, not to regulate, wages. That it had in most cases to compromise 
with employers or their representatives, to enter into accommodations with 
them, is not proof of regulation as an aim, a point returned to below.
The conclusions reached in section 4 of Chapter V with respect to 
the leadership's aims go beyond this emphasis on wages, however. The 
leadership held that emphasis on wages, a militant wages strategy and 
militant activity were conducive to building trade union consciousness 
and when coupled with socialist ideology, would produce class consciousness. 
The leadership's central aim was a class consciousness among the membership, 
and others outside the union, directed at establishing socialism. This 
question of socialism was not as some writers would have it, rule number
one in the rule book or inscribed on the H.Q. banner to be seen but 
not argued or worked for, but was held particularly during the period 
1964 to 1970, to be a real alternative strategy open to the membership 
and working class in general. While the union did not have a "blueprint" 
of the new socialist order ready to hand^^^\ the debates at RC Conference 
and the resolutions passed, some of them fairly detailed, make it clear 
that socialism or policies which were seen as opening up the prospect 
of socialism, were held as immediately applicable and were not visions 
of some sort of "promised land" to be held up as a moral exhortation never
(51)to become a reality.' '
It could be argued that since the leadership was professedly marxist 
in outlook it is no real conclusion that the union adopted a militant 
wage strategy and socialism as aims. The point would seem to be, however, 
that from the early 1940s onwards, wages lay at the centre of the union’s 
official policy as regularly accepted by RC Conference, that while the 
’left’ purchased a militant response to the wages aim in the 1950s it felt 
confident enough to move to an independent wages strategy in the early 
1960s after having defeated the 'rightwing’s' ambivalence to wage militancy 
in the late 1950s, that the ’left* carried the day over incomes policy 
under the difficult conditions imposed by legislation in the late 1960s, 
in a phrase, that the mass of the membership accepted that raising wages 
was central to their trade unionism. That the ’left’ initially induced 
wage militancy is not proof that the mass of the membership did not hold 
that raising wages was a prime aim or that they did not come to see 
militancy as a legitimate method of achieving it.
Further, as already noted with respect to the industrial militancy/ 
socialist ideology connection, there is no evidence that the ’left’ was 
seen as anything other than legitimate by the mass of the membership.
(50) See ’Management and Unions’, Flanders, op.cit.
(51) Ibid,
that the latter were coerced or subverted by the former or that the 
'left' was somehow separated from the membership so that it had to connect 
with it. Rather the relationship of 'left' to membership was much more 
complex than a straightforward connection. While bearing this complexity 
in mind, it is nevertheless more difficult to sustain an argument for the 
proposition that the mass of the membership accepted socialism as an 
alternative to the policies pursued by the 1964-70 Labour Governments 
for example, than it is to sustain one on the wages aim. Yet it would 
be incorrect to maintain that the union's policy on this issue was wholly 
artificial and detached from the membership. While it may be true that 
had a referendum been held a majority would have rejected it, the facts 
are that socialism or policies which were held would open up the road 
to it, were regularly accepted by EC Conference and propounded in the union's 
journal and at TUC and Labour Party conferences. That is, socialism 
was a democratically decided policy of the union, it was not hidden from 
the membership indeed most if not all must have appreciated that their 
union was 'leftwing', yet did not provoke a mass revolt from them.
That many, if not most of the membership may have been much more interested 
in wages and much less so, if at all, in socialism, is not to deny the 
consistently 'leftwing' stand taken by TASS for over twenty years and 
which was seen by many outside the union and doubtless by many inside it, 
as relating to the union as an organisation rather than simply to the 
leadership. To argue that this union's experience under this particular 
leadership is somehow outwith the range of "pure and simple" trade unionism' 
is to deny its obvious place in the recent history of the wider British 
trade union and labour movement.
(52) Ibid.
5.2 Compromise and Legitimacy
There can he little argument that for the leadership and activists 
the process of compromise was not seen as legitimate,rather it was something 
to be acquiesced to because there was little or no alternative. The whole 
machinery of the union’s wages strategy suggests that, as Bain et al. note,
(53)some unions may prefer unilateral regulation' and that this union did, 
but was constrained to compromise not because it saw it as legitimate, but 
because it was not always powerful enough to do otherwise. The pattern 
bargaining which Roberts et al. argue was directed at collective bargaining 
and thus in line with p l u r a l i s m , c a n  be interpreted as an attempt 
at unilateral regulation.
Moreover, the discussion in the union’s journal in the late 1960s 
over the conditions under which the law ought to be obeyed, suggests 
that if the leadership was not able to convince the mass of the membership 
that an anti-capitalist ideology rather than a consensual one, was a 
necessary prerequisite for solving their problems, it was able through, 
among other things, its advocacy of and limited success in obtaining, 
illegal activity on wages under statutory incomes policy to at least raise 
the issue among sections of the membership and generate discussion on it . 
This question of the degree of legitimacy given to the process of com­
promise by the membership as distinct from the leadership and activists 
can be put another way. Fox has argued that some union leaderships adopt
( 55)a "continuous challenge frame of reference"'  ^ and while this concept 
could be applied to the ’left’ leadership in TASS, the leadership’s 
commitment to the overthrow of the capitalist system would seem to go 
beyond what is implied by continuous challenge. The concept could, however, 
be applied to the mass of the membership, as deriving from on the one hand, 
the propaganda and agitational work carried out by the leadership in the
(53) ’Social Stratification and Trade Unionism', Bain, Coates and Ellis, 
p.88-89, 1973.
(54) See the quote from Roberts et al. on p. 47.
(55) 'Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations' Fox, 1974.
union over a long period of time and to some extent built into the fabric 
of the union, and on the other, the membership's own experience of practising 
militancy over the same time period.
The amalgamation- of TASS with the AEU and others in 1970, does not 
fit easily into the pluralist framework of coalitions of interest groups.
Much more easily acceptable would have been amalgamation with one of the 
other white-collar unions with which negotiations were held but rejected 
by TASS. The 1970 amalgamation though probably facilitated by the specific 
conditions of the late 1960s as already argued on p.139, remains unique 
in British trade union history, and was seen by the TASS leadership, and 
openly reported as such in the union journal, to be the welding together 
of a higher form of class organisation, the industrial union. The argument 
that one of the reasons put forward by the leadership was the need for 
TASS members to be assured of blue-collar support in the workplace, i.e. 
to strengthen TASS members' bargaining positions, and that it was this ' 
rather than the political motive which swayed the membership, may indeed 
be true but it would only support the continuous challenge position 
already argued as encompassing the mass of the membership.
A final point can be made which while not directly related to the 
pluralist perspective on trade unions, indeed is held by some scholars 
in opposition to the pluralist position, is that the leadership 
and for that matter the membership, constitute what in political -
theory is called an elite or a highly articulate minority within the
industrial labour force in Britain. Based on this special attribute the 
union would then be seen as capable of adopting extreme policies and 
practices and carrying them successfully in a labour and trade union 
movement which did not have either the general industrial conditions 
or the expertise to pursue such a course. A careful reading of Mortimer's 
history of the union suggests that this sort of outlook may have 
unconsciously been held by him. Similarly, the leadership's view of the 
result of the ballot on the 1970 amalgamation, given on p. 63, could be 
interpreted in this way.
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5• 3 Optimism y. Pessimism
The experience of the case-stndy union offers concrete support 
to the optimistic tradition within marxist political economy with respect 
to trade unions. The long, bitter battle for policy and executive control 
conducted by two 'parties', the revolutionaries and the collaborationists, 
the democratic victory of the former as against the undemocratic practices 
of the latter, the success of the militant wages strategy and the 
discussion among the membership over the rule of law, etc., are precisely 
the kinds of developments predicted by the optimistic tradition. There 
is no evidence from the period under consideration that the 'left' were 
subject to capitulation, to incorporationist tendencies, although the 
'right' did collaborate over the 1947-50 incomes policy. The 'left' 
in fact continually fought against such tendencies, for example, in 
their rejection of the N.E.D.C. in 19^2, incomes policy and institutions 
in 1963, and 'In Place of Strife' and the Commission on Industrial 
Relations in the late 1960s. Further, the 'left' leadership was prepared 
to initiate what in pluralist terms would be a coalition of interest 
groups, the campaign run by the five white-collar unions against incomes 
policy in I965-66 detailed on p.100, and the union officially supported 
the Liaison Committee for the Defense of Trade Unions in the late 1960s; 
both of these campaigning bodies would be seen by marxists as rooted in 
the development of working class, the modern equivalents of the Minority 
Movement in the 1920s and 19308 for example, the dialectic opposites of 
the forces internal to the working class leading to class collaboration.
This having been said, the final and most difficult question must 
be posed: did all this do more than generate a fairly high level of trade 
union consciousness? Does the TASS experience help in providing an 
answer to the question:
"Under which conditions and for which reasons do 
workers, whether manual or white-collar, come to 
see themselves as socially connected with interests
in common, and under which conditions are those 
interests perceived to involve a confrontation with 
the existing social order?" (56)
It has already been argued in section 4 of Chapter V, and some 
of the material used there has been reiterated earlier in this section, 
that the union adopted policies over a long period which were in effect 
class policies opposed to the continuation of the capitalist system.
It has also been indicated that, given the concentration in this thesis 
on the 'left' leadership and its role in forming the policies and 
practices of the union, insufficient information exists on the membership 
to draw firm conclusions regarding class consciousness. But what can 
be stated with some degree of certainty is that if the membership did 
go beyond trade union consciousness, and the activity in support of union 
policy under the 1964 to 1970 Labour Governments, the result of the 
amalgamation ballot in 1970 and the actions against the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971 suggest that for brief periods they did, then a key 
factor in the equation was the existence of a legitimate, articulate 
'left’ leadership in the union.
(56) Bain et al., op.cit., p.157*
CHAPTER VIII
THE 'ROSS/DUNLOP* TRADE U N I O N WAGE POLICY DEBATE
While there exists a very extensive literature on the economics of 
labour there is however a relative dearth on the economics of organised 
labour, trade unions, particularly on union wage policy. At the most general 
level the majority of commentators would probably agree with Rees that the 
classic statement of union wage objectives is that unions always want more - 
more than employers want to pay and more than non-union workers are getting. 
The questions arising from this statement are worthy of attention. For 
example, how much more do unions want, does the 'want* vary in intensity 
between unions or at different points in time for the same union, or how is 
the 'want* made 'effective'? Perhaps more importantly, given that trade 
unions tend not to be monolithic and that bargaining takes place at various 
levels, it is possible to isolate a 'trade union wage policy' separate from 
the rhetoric of the official leadership? Does the monetary 'wage' anyway 
correctly identify the 'want* as against the underlying but often unspecified 
concept of 'net advantage'? Indeed is this latter concept identifiable by 
a union?
Some of these questions will be taken up in this chapter through a 
critique of two long-standing orthodox - as opposed to Marxist - theories, 
Dunlop's 'maximising' approach and Ross's 'political' approach.
1. THE ECONOMICS OF THE WAGE OBJECTIVE
Dunlop's approach was originally formulated in his book 'Wage 
Determination Under Trade Unions' and is essentially a 'maximising' model 
of a trade union. He attempted to integrate the collectivist nature of 
trade union wage policy into a framework similar to that of the neo-classical
(l) 'The Economics of Trade Unions', Rees, p.49, 1968 reprint.
analysis of price and output in the firm. It was argued in conclusion that 
"the most suitable generalised model of a trade union for analytical purposes 
is probably that which depicts the maximisation of the wage bill for the 
total membership", more generally, "this model viewed the union as an •• • 
economic decision-making unit having as its primary objective the maximisation 
of some wage or employment dimension of its members, or some optimum combination
(2)of wage rates and employment".
Dunlop's basic contention was that the union would be faced with a 'normal' 
demand curve for labour such that any change in the wage rate would entail 
inverse changes in employment. He outlined a 'membership function'-"showing 
the total amount of labour that will be attached to the labour organisation 
at each wage rate", - and indicated six possible union objectives:-
a. The achievement of "the largest possible wage bill from the particular 
segment of the economy, quite regardless of whether all wage earners - 
as specified by the membership function - are employed."
b. Assuming union concern for workers unemployed, "the trade-union 
objective may be the largest possible wage bill from the segment of 
the economy including funds from the public support of the unemployed",
c. Again assuming concern for workers unemployed, the "objective may 
be the largest private payroll to employed members, deducting from 
their wage income an amount to pay out-of-work benefits to unemployed 
members".
d. "To secure the largest possible amount of employment, given its 
membership function",
e. "The attainment of the highest average wage income for each unit of 
labour affiliated with the union", and
(3)f. To maximise the collective wage 'rents' of those employed".' '
(2) 'Wage Determination under Trade Unions', Dunlop, p.44, I966 reprint,
and 'Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining", Levinson, p.3, 1966
(3) Dunlop, op,cit., p.33 and 36 to 41.
It was admitted by Dunlop that in general terms the wage which resulted 
depended on the exact specification of the 'demand' and 'membership functions' 
and it is on the specification of these that the challenges to Dunlop's 
position have hinged.
One point can be made before developing a critique of this model: 
Dunlop's neo-classical approach to this area of work, i.e. trade unions, 
leaves him open to the usual criticisms made of the neo-classical theory 
of the firm and the criticisms which follow are very much in this vein.
His defence of course could be that the maximising principle is in effect 
a paradigm - not testable but highly illuminating.
2. CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL
2.1 Economic Criticisms
a. Perhaps the best-known criticism is that of Ross and is fundamentally 
a criticism of the 'demand function'.
Ross rejected the 'maximisation hypothesis' on the grounds that
"the volume of employment associated with a given wage 
rate is unpredictable before the fact and the effect 
of a given rate upon employment is undecipherable after 
the fact. The employment effect cannot normally be 
the subject of rational calculation and prediction at 
the time the bargain is made, and union officials are 
normally in no position to assume responsibility for it",
and concluded
"the typical wage bargain (with certain significant 
exceptions) is necessarily made without consideration 
of its employment effect."(4)
Although Ross rejects the "maximisation approach" he does not argue 
that there will be no employment effect ex post, but only that union 
negotiators will not, except in extreme cases, take it into consideration 
ex ante. Thus Ross points out the difficulties facing a union in assessing
(4) 'Trade Union Wage Policy', Ross, p.80, 1948.
the elasticity of demand for labour in anything other than very simple
cases.
b. The logical point that no analysis is possible under conditions of 
uncertainty is well formulated by Reder; that is, even assuming a specified 
’membership function’, "the maximand (income) itself is by no means 
unambiguous in any but the most simple situations. In real situations, 
income is a stream of payments expected to accrue at various moments in 
the future, and such payment is of uncertain size. A maximiser must decide 
whether he prefers a steady income stream of minimum size, but with a 
comparatively small mathematical expectation, or the reverse ... Behaviour 
will be different, depending upon the maximiser's preference for risk with 
the possibility of high reward versus safety and low rewards ... The 
consequences of this ambiguity in the maximand can be readily indicated: 
either the theory will have to be so emptied of content as to preclude 
virtually no behaviour, or it will be wrong ... What the union will do in 
a given situation cannot be deduced from the premise that it is trying to 
maximise member income: for this postulate is compatible with virtually
( 5)any type of union wage policy".'
c. Criticism has also been made of the postulated 'membership function*; 
namely, that by suitably specifying the "function" ex post, "almost any 
pattern of behaviour can be reconciled with the postulate of income 
maximisation". Thus, unless the 'membership function' is specified by the 
union ex ante, so that deviations from it can be seen (in principle at 
least) then virtually no kind of union wage-membership behaviour is 
excluded even in the "static case".^^^
(5) 'Theory of Union Wage Policy', Reder, Review of Econ, and Stats., 
p.35, Feb. 1952.
(6) Ibid.
2.2 Political Criticism
Dunlop appreciated the difficulties raised in (c) above. When 
dealing with the 'membership function' he asks: "What range of wage 
earners are taken into specific account by trade unions when formulating 
wage decisions?" And answers "This problem cannot even be approached until 
the decision-making unit has been specified. The wage earners from one 
department in a firm ..., a local union, an international union, or some 
joint unit with other unions are all possibilities ... Several variants 
must be kept in mind as the position of the membership function appropriate 
to decision formulation may be altered depending upon (a) the formal 
bargaining unit, (b) the degree of unionisation of the wage earners, (c) 
membership restrictions, and (d) locus of political power within a trade
(7)union concerning the wage rates".
If it is accepted that Dunlop's 'demand function' is valid, i.e. 
there is no elasticity assessment problem, the above statement surely 
indicates that a fundamental role must be given to political processes within 
a union in setting wage policy to the extent that a specified 'membership 
function' appears in wage policy at all.
2.3 Maximising as a Historical Explanation?
Dunlop's partial static approach would nevertheless seem to provide 
certain illuminations on empirical phenomena in the field of trade union 
wage policy. For example:-
à. The wage-cut/employment expansion case. It is possible to argue
from Dunlop's model that a union may instigate a wage cut in order to
expand employment and thus membership, or at least take a wage cut in order
to protect the employment of existing employed members, either in a plant,
firm or industry. The widespread use of sliding-scale wage agreements
in 19th century Britain might be cited as evidence of this, though it is likely
(7) Dunlop, op.cit., p.43 and 44,
that it was viewed hy both managements and unions as less costly than
lockouts or strikes and provided an ongoing bargaining relationship. The
following quotation gives a point of view from the union side: "(The
organiser) was advising them to maintain the sliding scale method of
regulating wages according to trade conditions, as against the old method
of 'haggling' when prices varied which method too often led to disputes".
From the employers: "The continual haggling over prices of steel and wages
was disturbing and unsatisfactory, and that with the (sliding) scale wages
( 8 )would regulate themselves".' '
Evidence from Britain's coal industry might also be cited. Over the 
period 1955 to 1970 approximately, certain grades of miners in certain coal 
fields accepted money wage reductions in order that certain grades in other 
coalfields could receive wage increases; there was a general 'levelling' 
of wage rates to produce "national rates of pay for each job in the
(9)industry",' ' It is not clear however whether this was directly conditioned 
by the declining employment prospects in the industry during the period, i.e. 
to protect employment in the high-cost coal fields, or was an expression of 
growing wage solidarity among miners as a social group. In periods of rising 
demand for labour, however, unions may put emphasis on expanding membership 
rather than wages so that the 'wage-cut/employment expansion' effect may 
take place in this relative sense.
b. The maximum income per member employed case. Although this example 
is not specifically developed by Dunlop it follows the same lines. That 
is, a union may seek to maximise the income per member employed without 
concern for the unemployed (i.e. the 'membership function' is specified).
The extreme case would be where the maximum income was achieved for the
last member employed. If the objective is reformulated in terms of the average
income of original members, the decline in numbers would be controlled at
(8) 'Men of Steel', 1951, p.3^5 and IO6, See also Reder, op.cit., p.42-45 
and Ross, op.cit., p.15.
(9) 'A Special Case?', Hughes and Moore, p.13-23, 1972.
the rate at which retirais, resignations and deaths took place. The 
result would still be the same. Some unions do of course limit the intake 
to the trade.
Coincidentally the example quoted by Eees^^^^ which seems to lend 
support to this case, i.e. the United Mine Workers in the US, can also be 
offered from British experience. Some members of the NUM do seem to have 
argued during the 1972 wage negotiations that if employment declined due to 
the higher wages then at least those left in employment will be better off 
than before. It is not necessarily the case however that they accepted 
the ubiquitous nature of the employment effect, rather that they were expres­
sing a point of view on the political control over their industry which 
they saw as responsible for the long-run decline in coal-mining,
c. Shifts in the demand curve case. Some support has been adduced for 
Dunlop's contention that unions appreciate the wage-employment trade­
off from evidence that some unions do undertake campaigns of one kind or 
another to shift the product demand curve to a more favourable position.
3. THE TASS CASE
These 'illuminations' have been quoted in order to give some idea of 
the sort of evidence which is usually held to weigh favourably for the
(ll)'maximising thesis'. None of them seem to apply to the case study union.'  ^
How far then does the history of wages policy in TASS 'fit' the maximising 
model?
3.1 Rhetoric and the Wage-Employment Trade-Off
Firstly to return to one of the questions asked in the introduction 
to this chapter; given that trade unions tend not to be monolithic and that 
bargaining takes place at various levels, is- it possible to isolate a 'trade
(10) Rees, op.cit., p.52.
(11) Though TASS demands that the Government support and maintain Leyland 
Cars for example could be interpreted as a variation on (c).
union wage policy' separate from the rhetoric of the official leadership?
The material presented in the four historical chapters of this thesis 
effectively restricts this question to one of rhetoric; that is, no 
evidence is available on the specifics of negotiations by union members 
at industry, firm or plant level, all the evidence relates to policy formation 
and its organisational implementation and thus no answer can be given as to 
whether or not in specific negotiations, negotiators took into consideration 
the employment effect of wage movements. All that can be said is that wage 
policy as formulated by EC Conference, the EC and the union journal over many 
years, contains no mention of Dunlop's postulated employment effect. Even 
in the early post-1945 years when the leadership is on record as supporting 
the 'wage freeze', no direct connection was made explicit between wage 
increases and unemployment. To the extent that there was acceptance of such 
a connection it expressed itself via the macro-economic linkage of wages/ 
inflation/economic deflation/unemployment, rather than the micro-economic 
concept of a 'normal' inverse relationship between wages and employment.
More importantly, in terms of the extent to which the official union attitudes 
set a framework within which members actually conduct negotiations, the micro- 
economic employment 'effect' was not something which the leadership felt 
compelled to take into consideration. There was no challenge in the union's 
policy literature in the most recent period (1972-1976) when the micro- 
economic 'effect' was being stressed alongside the macro-economic 'effect' 
by many commentators. Nevertheless no conclusion can be drawn on the 
question as to whether or not the leadership or.members considered the 
employment effect in actual negotiations, particularly those at firm level 
where the Dunlop model applies primarily. On the other hand while much 
of the leadership's pronouncements could be termed rhetorical, there is 
little doubt from the evidence to hand that the stated policy on wages - 
'controlled' militancy even to the extent of breaking the law - was sincerely 
held by the leadership who went to great efforts to carry through the policy.
It -was not simply rhetoric.
Secondly, the leadership's objective in its all-round work was to 
make the membership class conscious and wage militancy was seen as playing 
a key role in achieving this. Wage policy, maximising or not, was thus 
subordinated to a political and ideological end.
y.2 A MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION?
Membership growth prior to the late 1960s was never of major concern 
to the leadership. Although the union changed its title in I96O in order 
to facilitate membership expansion, membership was not treated with the 
same degree of urgency as wage militancy. It is doubtful therefore whether 
the leadership had a conception of a 'membership function' in Dunlop's 
sense ; that is, given that membership was not seen as a serious problem, 
i.e. in decline, the leadership's aim was to make those in membership 
class conscious. Far from viewing wage cuts as an appropriate method of 
increasing employment and hence potential membership, or in times of rising 
demand for labour, concentrating on recruitment rather than wage increases, 
the leadership at no time up until the late 1960s pushed recruitment with 
consistent vigour. Instead they believed that recruitment was aided by 
the militant wages policy as witnessed by the union’s recruitment literature. 
Returning to a point made earlier in this chapter on the question of membership 
functions, the TASS leadership argued that new members would be "attached"
(to use Dunlop's terminology) due to wage increases won by militancy but they 
never argued or admitted that members would be so lost. Nevertheless it is 
possible that different membership functions were used at different levels 
within the union, by the leadership at a policy level and by negotiators 
at bargaining levels.
(12) Such literature often indicates the need for collective strength 
and places emphasis on the union's dispute payment record.
3.3 DUNLOP'S WAGES OBJECTIVES
To be more specific with regard to Dunlop's postulated six possible 
union wage objectives, nowhere do the concepts 'the largest possible wage 
bill' or 'the largest private payroll' or 'the collective wage "rents'" 
appear in the union's literature or in policy debates. The leadership did 
however believe that the distribution of income could be shifted in favour of 
wages and thus they had some underlying concept of a total wage bill. Whether 
this related to some aggregate national wage bill ("labour's share") or 
only to the membership was never made explicit.
With respect to Dunlop's view on unemployment benefit, both from the 
union and Government, being taken into account by leaderships when determining 
wage policy, TASS does pay benefit and as Mortimer notes this was an attraction 
to recruits in the early 1930s as well as an inducement to those members 
made unemployed to remain in the union. In the early 1970s the union, as 
well as providing unemployment benefit from normal income, levied employed 
members specifically to pay for unemployment benefit which was rising 
rapidly. While there is no direct evidence to suggest that the leadership 
took such payments into account when deciding wage policy or took Government 
unemployment benefit into account, when it did become possible for strikers 
to claim social security benefits the leadership used this as one of the
( 13)arguments for reducing strike pay.'  ^ So they may also have taken both
sorts of unemployment benefit into account when considering wage policy.
Of Dunlop's six objectives, the one which comes closest to fitting 
TASS policy is 'the attainment of the highest average wage income for each 
unit of labour affiliated with the union' and to this would need to be added 
' and still in employment', since the employment effect does not seem to 
have been taken into direct consideration. The leadership's emphasis on 
average-wage-for-age returns from CMs census forms and the unilaterally
(13) The debate which took place around the 'state subsidy theory of
strikes' would seem to have proved inconclusive. See for example 
Durcan and McCarthy, 'The State Subsidy Theory of Strikes', BJIE, 
Mar, 1974 and Hunter, 'The State Subsidy Theory of Strikes: A 
Reconsideration', BJIR, Nov. 1974.
set minimum-wage-for-age-scales testifies to this concern for averages. If 
the perverse *Vage increase/membership attachment" membership function is 
added to this, then perhaps all that can be said is that the union tried 
to obtain an annual wage increase for all current employed members. They 
did this through the centralised strike policy (pattern-setting and pattern- 
following) and argued that this was the only way to achieve maximum wage 
increases and at the same time recruit as a consequence. With a time 
horizon of only one year the leadership did not seem to take longer-term 
considerations into account. In effect the argument arrives back at Rees' 
formulation - unions always want more than employers are prepared to pay.
How much more? - the only trend that seems to stand out from TASS's history 
is that having considered those firms suitable for pattern-setting with or 
without strike action, the leadership opted for "a little more than last 
year".(^^)
The maximising critique can be rounded out by two final considerations. 
Firstly, the use of the centralised data bank at union headquarters by the 
membership and the weekly 'vacancy list' could be fitted into the Dunlop 
model. That is, the union's concern was with the wages of its current 
employed membership while trying to get its unemployed members to accept only 
those jobs meeting the union's unilaterally-set minimum wages or above.
Thus members made unemployed for whatever reason had their chances of new 
employment considerably enhanced through access to the data bank coupled to 
the free national advertising of vacancies provided in the weekly "TASS 
NEWS", even to the extent of having an advantage thereby over unemployed non­
members. Furthermore, stress was continually placed by the leadership on 
the membership to use the data bank in a regular way to change their jobs 
for better paid ones. These two uses of the data bank, added to the 
dynamic factors implicit in Ross's criticism of Dunlop's 'demand function',
(14) See p. 57 above,
may, it could be argued, have 'blinded' the leadership to the question of 
the wage/employment trade-off.
Secondly, as Ross points out, Dunlop seems preoccupied with wage-cut
(15)situations^ and these have been few and far between in TASS's post- 
Second World War history. In 25 years of relatively high demand for union- 
organised labour it could be argued that the leadership had no need to 
concentrate on the maximisation of the wage bill' or 'some optimum com­
bination of wage rates and employment', rather that it could concentrate 
on maximising 'the average wage income' of the employed membership and it 
approximated this by pursuing its militant wage strategy and obtaining an 
annual wage increase for all employed members. It would take into con­
sideration the unemployed membership by providing unemployment benefit 
even to the extent of levying the employed and perhaps also weighing in 
the balance the provision of, for example, earnings related supplementary 
benefit by the Government.
In concluding this section it has to be restated however that the 
actual wages policy pursued, no matter how it is interpreted within the 
maximising paradigm, was predicated on a political ideology opposed to the 
capitalist market system and directed at producing a class consciousness 
which would lead to the system's overthrow. Of course it might be claimed 
that the leadership's stated goal of socialism also falls within the 
paradigm to the extent that socialists claim that it will, inter alia, 
provide much higher standards of living than capitalism can. Finally, 
maximising or not, the union's development of its particular wage strategy 
over the whole of the post-1945 period does not have the "feel" of maximising 
about it which does obtain even in the more esoteric areas of 'modern theories 
of the firm' .
(15) Ross, op.cit., p.54-55.
4 ■  TKT-'ROITTICS . QF^TBET.WAGE-QBJEÇT1VE
Perhaps the best-known statement of a 'political model' of trade union 
wage policy - written in reaction to Dunlop's maximising model - is that 
of Arthur M* Ross. His basic contention was that trade unions are 
fundamentally political institutions in which the main objective is the 
future viability of the union, that disputes as to the best ways of ensuring 
such viability are resolved politically and that this circumscribes the choices 
open to the union leadership in terms of (wage) policy and thus makes (more) 
difficult the subsidiary objective of the leadership, that of the latter's 
perpetuation. The leadership is seen as attempting to achieve both these 
aims by resolving the various pressures thrown up by the membership and 
others - pressures generated in the main through adverse comparisons with 
other groups and called 'orbits of coercive comparison' - through the attempted 
implementation of "just" and "equitable" settlements which thus satisfy the 
pressure groups,
Ross applies this framework to the particular field of union wage policy 
and argues; "The central proposition, then, is that a trade union is a 
political agency operating in an economic environment ... The real 
significance of the economic influence ... is to be found elsewhere than in 
a continuous functional relationship between wage rate and employment in the 
bargaining unit ... The economic environment is important to the unions at 
the second remove: because it generates political pressures which have to 
be reckoned with by the union leader. The effect of any given change depends 
upon how it fits into the general constellation of pressures .., The policies 
adopted by particular unions do not represent different degrees of enlighten­
ment but different ranges of choice and cannot be understood until we 
recognise the primary importance of organisational survival as the central 
aim of l e a d e r s h i p . T h u s  a particular wage policy or set of policies
(16) Ross, op.cit., p.53.
j.y\j «
will be implemented by the leadership in order to achieve organisational 
survival.
Before developing a critique of the Ross model it may be as well to 
state that which can easily be forgotten - Ross is dealing implicitly only 
with American trade unionism (of the pre-1948 period) and hence he accepts 
the "business union" philosophy which at first glance ought to put him close 
to Dunlop. He notes the general lack of ideological divisions within US 
trades unions such as are commonly found in British trade unions as outlined 
in Chapter II. Thus his coercive comparisons stem mainly from economic 
rather than political factors. Whilst not wishing to underestimate the 
role of the labour movement in US society, the lack of a mass working 
class-based political party, the existence of laws prohibiting Communist 
Party members holding union office and the predominance of a capitalist 
free-enterprise ideology would seem in combination to make the US labour
(17)movement less prone to ideological conflict than its UK counterpart.^ ^
5. CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL MODEL
There are three main criticisms which can be levelled at Ross’s model. 
The first has to do basically with whether it can be made operational or 
not, i.e. is it testable or does it have to rely on a pardigm defence and, 
if it is testable, can its central core, coercive comparisons, always be 
considered ’strong’ enough to exert any independent effect on a union’s 
wages policy? The second and related criticism has to do with whether 
or not the implied time-scale of action ("orbits of comparison") and 
reaction (the leadership’s response) is too short to be of any real value 
in analysing leadership wage policy in the general case. Finally, Ross’s 
specification emphasises a uni-directional flow of ’coercion’ from, for 
example, the membership to the leadership but thereby underestimates the 
impact of the reverse flow.
(17) See for example, 'Consciousness and action among the western working 
class', Mann, op.cit., p. 3^“3S«
5.1 COMPARISONS - COERCIVE OR NOT?
There is a sense in which Ross defines this problem out of existence -
presumably 'coercive comparisons' do coerce. On the other hand the whole
analytical value of the theory can be challenged along the lines of attack
taken against the maximising hypothesis - how can it be tested? Ross's
statement of aims and central proposition have been so challenged, for
example, by Reder, as being of: "no greater heuristic value than ... (the)
maximisation theory. The political theory precludes only such behaviour
as is downright subversive of the union organisation, e.g. deliberate
attempts to disrupt the union or attempts by union officers to line their
own pockets at the expense of both organisation and its membership. Any
form of member income maximisation policy, for example, could easily be
encompassed by the political theory as an attempt to satisfy membership
sentiment. In short, the objectives of union behaviour, in (both Dunlop's
theory and) Ross's are so general and vague as to be of little use in
(is)understanding union wage policyl"' '
Reder's criticism seems open to at least two interpretations. Firstly, 
the logical one about the impossibility of analysis under conditions of 
uncertainty; neither the political nor the maximising theory can meet the 
necessary criteria. Yet while this criticism is valid with respect to 
uncertainty and leadership action, Ross offers more than simply a theory 
of leadership action in that he expects changes in the leadership or some 
other form of protest by the membership if they remain dissatisfied. When 
Reder says that any form of member income maximisation could be encompassed 
as an attempt to satisfy membership sentiment, Ross could retort that an 
attempt to satisfy is not what is required - satisfaction is what is 
required. Thus Reder begs the question of whether or not the membership 
feel that the leadership has satisfactorily responded to it. Certainly 
this does not lead to a theory of union wage policy in the predictive sense.
( i s )  Reder, op.cit., p.36.
but it does at least offer a subsidiary hypothesis to the political model 
which is not available to the maximising one. It therefore admits the 
possibility of the postulation of different wage strategies by groups contending 
for leadership within the membership or of some other forms of action not 
readily encompassed by the maximising model and these are surely worthy of 
attention.
Secondly, it could be interpreted as holding only where the ’orbits 
of comparison' are 'weak'. Dunlop, in the introduction to the second edition 
of his book, offers a rejoinder to Ross which is essentially the same as 
this second interpretation, namely that: "in the normal case of collective 
bargaining, the independent effect on wage rates of internal political con­
siderations is not large. There are no doubt cases, at one end of the 
spectrum, particularly in the short run in new unions where rivalry and 
factionalism are rampant, where the independent effect of political con­
siderations is even dominant. But the perspective of the full range of 
collective bargaining relations ... reduces this factor to relatively minor 
significance.
Thus the Reder/Dunlop criticism of the political model can be viewed 
as revolving around the strength of the comparison effect: where the effects 
are 'strong' a degree of prediction with respect to wage policy is accepted; 
where they are 'weak' little if anything can be predicted. Ross however 
holds that the 'orbits' so circumscribe the leadership as to preclude any 
actions other than those which are "resolving" through just and equitable 
settlements, otherwise members leave the union, potential members join 
other unions or the leadership is removed - the comparisons are generally
'strong'.(20)
Accepting the problems of testing Ross's model, there still exists the
(19) Dunlop, op.cit., p.v, in Preface.
(20) Ross, op.cit., p.63-68, on "rival unionism".
paradigm defence that this is perhaps most powerfully put hy Flanders 
who argues: "Recognition of the force of comparisons in negotiation is now 
common ground among all students of industrial relations. Whether or not 
the phrase "orbits of coercive comparison" can be given a rigorous inter­
pretation and a solid empirical foundation, no one denies that the parties 
to collective bargaining, in searching for a compromise between the con­
flicting interests they represent, are frequently looking over their shoulders 
at the result of other settlements as a further guide to their own... It is 
further accepted that both political and social factors are involved in 
accounting for their evident force... External and internal rivalries in 
the trade union world ... (and) ... equalising tendencies ... resulting 
from^ the force of ideas - concepts of equity and justice (are also considered 
important)" ( )
Thus as with the maximising model, the Ross model does provide certain 
'illuminations' in the field of trade union wage policy.
5.2 THE TIME-SCALE OF RESPONSE
Even if it is accepted that a situation exists in which the comparisons 
are 'strong', Ross's conclusion about changes in leadership necessarily 
following from an inability to resolve these pressures, i.e. to satisfy 
(sections of) the membership, does not seem justified. A much more detailed 
analysis than can be undertaken here of power and authority relations - both 
from a political and sociological perspective - would need to be undertaken 
within the framework of the constitutional set up of individual unions in 
order to conclusively prove or refute Ross's contention for any individual 
union and such an analysis would have to consider changes at all levels in 
a union. Suffice it to say that Ross's implied time-scale for "change of 
leadership", consequent upon an inability to satisfy (even sections of)
(21) 'Collective bargaining', Flanders (Ed.) p.27-28.
the membership even under great pressure, seems much too short to be a useful 
way of analysing most UK unions* national policy decisions, particularly 
wage decisions. Specifically, there is likely to be the creation of "unofficial" 
centres of leadership, a shift of power away from the constitutional leader­
ship to regional or local leaderships, or to shop stewards. These shifts may 
take place without in any way, (other than in the longer-run which is usually 
the death or retirement of the constitutional leadership),affecting the 
position of the constitutional leadership and thus without influencing national 
wage policy. (The situation may be different in the US due to election/ 
appointment procedures.) The following examples are not dealt with in a 
detailed way but are simply included to indicate the sequence of leadership 
changes which have taken place in some UK unions which could possibly be 
interpreted as providing evidence against Ross's implied time-scale of 
response. Firstly, the replacements of Tiffen (who served briefly after 
Deakin) by Cousin in the TGWÜ and of Carron by Scanlon in the old AEU, both 
of which represented major political/ideological shifts in the leaderships 
of those unions, took place upon the death or retirai of the 'rightwingers'.
No doubt there had been major internal battles over strategy and tactics 
in both unions prior to the changeovers, including perhaps unofficial power
(22)centres^ and the building up of private political 'contacts' and of
'machines', yet there is little indication that the replacements would 
have occurred when they did if elections had been held between the old 
"rightwingers" and the 'leftwingers' rather than between new 'right' and 
'leftwingers' consequent upon the death and retirai of the respective old 
'rightwingers', as did happen.
Secondly, an example which could be stretched to fit the 'decline in 
membership' and the 'change in leadership' aspects of Ross's model and 
yet would tell against his implied time-scale is the NUGMVT. This union.
(22) See for example, Roberts, p.192-193» in 'Workers Control', 1973; 
and Clegg, 'The System of Industrial Relations in G.B.' p.94-99 
for a discussion on 'parties and factions' in trade unions.
the third largest in Britain, has had a generally stagnant membership since 
around the late 1940s with a fairly high membership turnover. This could 
be attributed to the contraction of traditional areas of membership only 
being offset by recruitment, though since the union seems to have emphasised 
or has been forced by circumstances to emphasise the recruitment of female 
workers, there is a prima facie case that male workers are leaving or are 
not interested in joining. The union also pursued a more cautious policy with 
respect to amalgamations than did its major "general" rival, the TGWÜ, which 
has grown from a similar membership base to the NÜGMW of 800,000 25 years ago, 
to roughly 1,800,000 today. Within Ross’s framework it could have been 
expected that "orbits of coercive comparison" would have manifested themselves 
at an early stage and forced the NXJGMW leadership to change its policy or 
the membership to change the leadership, yet both leadership and policy did 
not change until fairly recently, though when that did happen the "decline 
in membership" aspect seems to have played a part. The following statement 
puts a national journalist's point of view on the recent change
"Britain's third largest union, the 840,000-strong General 
and Municipal Union, could move away from its entrenched 
Rightwing position with the election of Mr. David Basnett,
48, a national industrial officer of the union, as the 
next General Secretary ... Within minutes of his election 
being announced ... Mr. Basnett said: "You are not going to 
see any dramatic switches in policy like those which have 
occurred in the Transport and General Workers' Union and 
the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. We have a 
continuity policy in this union which I hope will be 
- maintained but I would look to the union being somewhat 
left of centre ..." Mr Basnett ... said he will endeavour 
to take the union membership beyond the l.M. mark".(23)
5.3 UNI-DIRECTIONAL COERCION?
A final criticism can be levelled at the Ross framework. That is, 
he tends to view the role of the constitutional leadership in a one-sided 
way, as reacting to pressures thrown upon them rather than themselves 
getting involved in structuring the sources of pressure. While he mentions
(23) 'Financial Times', 8th Nov., 1972.
the possibility that a leadership may become actively involved in
(2k)
attempting to establish ’orbits of comparison', the overall impression
derived from his work is that a union leadership, like one version of the
classical monopolist, yearns for the quiet life and thus only reacts to
events rather than initiating and structuring them. It follows that a
constitutional leadership pursuing the quiet life may only be prepared
to be active in those fields e.g. the union journal, T.V., the press etc.,
(25)
which allow them to produce comparisons which maintain the quiet lifel 
Ross summarises his position thus: "Trade union wage policy is a function 
of the leadership. It is expressed in the various operating decisions which 
officials are required to make in the course of wage bargaining. In making 
these decisions, the officials must harmonise various pressures which are 
focused upon them in the bargaining process. These pressures emanate from 
a complex of political relationships surrounding the officials; relation­
ships with the rank and file, with the employers, with other organisational 
levels of the unions, with the labour movement, and with the government ... 
(The officials) attempt to reconcile the pressures in such a manner as to 
contribute most to the survival and growth of the organisation." Hence a 
tendency for the pressures to be uni-directional, focused on the leadership 
and not really viewed as sometimes, or at most times, initiated and structured
by them.(2^)
6. THE TASS CASE
Turning once more to TASS wages policy and viewing it with respect to 
the concept of coercive comparison related to Ross's "future viability" 
aim, it may be as well to recall that in the earlier treatment of the 
maximising model it was concluded that while it was possible to interpret
(24) Ross, op.cit., p.34-38 and p.68-69 on "front runners".
(25) See Ross, op,cit., p.71 on "leadership protection" arising from
multi-union bargaining.
(26) Ross, op.cit., p.43. This criticism of the Rosa model may be misplaced,
in the sense that conditions may have changed in US unions since the
period when Ross originally wrote about them.
TASS wages policy within that framework it nevertheless remained impossible 
to explain why at any point in time a particular claim of a particular 
magnitude was lodged or a settlement reached. All that could be said 
was that the leadership seemed to carry out a survey of the likely pattern- 
setting claims available to it, bargained for those it chose including 
strike-support if necessary, and then attempted to pattern-follow these 
settlements across the membership. If anything determined the magnitude 
of the particular claims it seems to have been a rule-of-thumb - a little 
more than last year. If this is then interpreted as short-run maximisation 
of average wage per member employed it can neither be proven nor refuted.
6.1 "Harmonisation" v. Political Struggle
Ross's interpretation would however be couched in the language of 
"constellation of pressures", "orbits of coercive comparison", "reconciliation 
of pressures", "harmonisation of pressures", etc., yet for the best part 
of 12 years (1958 to 1970) the TASS leadership itself did the pressuring 
to implement its militant wages policy and far from "harmonising" the 
pressure from the government upon it during the incomes policy of the 1960s, 
the leadership went out of its way to counteract the pressure by, for example, 
resorting to open illegal tactics. Even in the 13 years 1945 to 1958 under 
a "rightwing" majority EC there was no "harmonisation" of pressures but a 
straight though protracted war between "right" and "left" over how and 
when to implement the "left’s" wage strategy which was in fact the union's 
stated policy as early as 1945. These two views of wage policy in the TASS 
leadership are more easily encompassed in the Ross model than in Dunlop's 
however. Similarly in the support of the 'rightwing' for the wage freeze 
of the late 1940s there is little evidence of the "rightwing" leadership 
"harmonising" the pressures from Government on the one hand and from the 
"left" on the other. They openly supported the Government against the "left" 
but in doing so had to suffer a "left" victory in this policy area as a
consequence.
Perhaps the most important aspect of TASS history which tells against
Ross is that at no time was the future viability of the union an issue in
any concrete sense. Certainly the pre-1958 "rightwing" leadership probably
attempted to perpetuate their rule (Ross's secondary leadership aim) but
they lost the struggle for control to the "left" in 1958. The struggle between
them could be couched in Ross-type terminology but it could also be explained
in different terminology. All that matters is that the "right" lost control
and there is little indication that anything but a very small minority of
the membership were involved in bringing about their defeat although both
sides doubtless claimed to represent the interests and desires of the majority
(27)of the membership. The claim made by Wootton^ ' that after the "left's"
1958 victory the "right" threatened to lead a breakaway is interesting 
but not significant - it did not take place. Again in the late 1960s when 
there is some evidence that members were leaving the union and/or expressing 
dissatisfaction with the "left's" policies the question of viability never 
became an issue. As Clegg notes there is little evidence from British 
trade unionism in general that people vote with their feet^^®) and the 
history of TASS seems to confirm this.
There seems little point in analysing in detail TASS experience vis-a- 
vis the time-scale-of-response criticism. The "left" emerge in the early 
1940s, have policy control by the early 1950s but not executive control and 
only achieve this in 1958, To say that the "coercive comparisons" were not 
therefore strong enough is to underestimate the complexities of the matter, 
to say the least.
But something needs to be said about the criticism of "uni-directional 
coercion", because if there is a general case that leaderships only respond
(27) See p. 33 above.
(28) Clegg, op.cit., p.93 and 94.
if pressurised then the post-1958 leadership in TASS is the exception. On 
almost every major policy issue the leadership did indeed lead the membership, 
using all the facilities at their disposal to win the membership for action 
on and support for union policies. That there was a two-way interchange 
of views between the active membership in the areas and divisions with the 
EC at and between conferences, that the union journal was open to comments 
by all membership, in a word that the democracy of the union was operational, 
is not in doubt: nevertheless the leadership did in effect set up the 
"comparisons" across a whole range of policy issues. Specifically in the 
union's use of pattern-setting and pattern-following techniques Ross's 
framework could be made to "fit" TASS behaviour, though again the pressures 
emanated from the leadership as much as if not more than from the active 
membership.
In concluding this chapter it is held that while both the maximising 
and the political models offer insights into trade union wage policy 
formation, neither of them warrant the title of 'the theory of TASS wage 
policy formation'• The former model contains a number of difficulties 
which make it unlikely even in the general case that union leaderships, 
either nationally or locally, do more than consider the employment effect 
of wages and there is no evidence that the TASS leadership considered it at 
all. This is not to say that economic factors played no part in TASS wage 
policy formation; neither is it to say that the employment effect did not 
exist; the argument is simply that the employment effect did not seem to be 
a major determinant of TASS national wage policy given all other influences, 
when viewed ex ante by the TASS leadership.
This latter position is taken up in the second model though as has been 
shown, Ross's postulated relationship between leadership aims and political 
mechanisms is not helpful. Nevertheless without developing the argument 
in detail, there is a prima facie case that political differences are 
important in British unions in a way that may not be true in the US.
One final point. Mitchell(2^) notes:
’There is a substantial literature which purports to 
resolve the apparent conflict between the Ross and 
Dunlop models ... In the main, the reconciling 
literature fails to deal directly with the key aspect 
of the controversy: the ability of unions to perceive 
a trade-off in the wage-employment relationship. Here 
the Ross and Dunlop models can be easily differentiated - 
Ross unions cannot perceive the trade-off, while Dunlop 
unions can'.(30)
On the basis of the analysis in this chapter this differentiation is 
false. Ross's model does not rest on the non-perception of the trade-off, 
though perhaps his way of stating his case suggests this, but on the 
recognition that even if the elasticity of demand for labour is known there 
is a fundamental political process to be gone through to decide what course 
of action to pursue and in whose interests. The fact that Ross fails to 
provide a realistic political process in no way invalidates the political 
component of wage policy, to the extent that a 'policy' exists.
(29) 'Union Wage Policy: The Ross-Dunlop Debate Reopened', Mitchell, 
Industrial Relations, Feb., 1972.
(30) Ibid., p.48.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis set out to explore, with reference to wage militancy,
the relationships between a national union leadership, the membership of
that union and the influence within it of radical or revolutionary politics. 
The method of study - a historical enquiry based on certain of the union’s 
records - was chosen so as to be able to answer certain questions posed with 
respect to ’left wing’ activity in the union. These questions having been 
tackled, the results obtained were used to investigate the more general 
relations between leadership, radical politics and wage militancy by setting 
the results against certain industrial relations controversies connected with 
wage militancy. To the extent that the TASS-specific questions (those 
relating to 'left wing’ activity in the case study union) were answered, 
this was done in Section 4 of Chapter V. The questions raised by the 
wage militancy-related areas of industrial relations controversy (the 
’blue collar/white collar' debate, the 'pluralist/marxist' debate and the 
’Ross/Dunlop’ wage policy debate) were evaluated in Chapters VI, VII and 
VIII respectively. All that remains to be done here is to summarise the 
conclusions drawn earlier.
The TASS-specific questions
The three questions posed with respect to the development of TASS
were :
a) What conditions or circumstances allowed the union to promote and 
sustain a ’left wing’ leadership?
b) What aims did the 'left' pursue and what place had wage militancy 
within them? and
c) What was the 'left' leadership's estimate of its success in pursuing 
its aims and how far does the estimate accord with the factual record; 
in particular, how far did the 'left' generate the militancy displayed 
by the membership and how far did it determine its form?
The first of these questions was taken in conjunction with a proposition 
found in British industrial relations literature, namely that the 'left' 
has gained power in British unions where it was able to connect some version 
of socialist ideology with independently generated industrial militancy.
The conclusion drawn was that the relationship between socialist ideology and 
industrial militancy as expressed in the development of TASS was much more 
complex than the straightforward 'connection' proposition in any of its four 
variants. In particular, the de facto legitimation of the two-party system 
within the leadership levels of the union before the rise of wage militancy, 
and the dichotomy between 'left' leadership on policy and 'right' leadership 
on policy implementation interacting with the democratic practices of both 
'right' and 'left' as militancy built up during the 1950s, are factors 
not easily encompassed by the 'connection' proposition. The 'left's' 
path to power in TASS was a complicated and often twisted one in which these 
factors among others played a part. That the 'left' did connect its 
ideology with an early militant wage policy does not detract from the 
actual complications of moving from opposition to majority control, nor 
does it necessarily account for the rise of wage militancy in the 1950s 
and 1960s which was almost certainly generated by the 'left' leadership.
On the question of aims it was noted in Chapter V that no one document 
enshrined a comprehensive statement of aims. In broad terms, the 'left' 
saw the ultimate protection of the membership's interests as a consciousness 
among them aimed at overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism.
The 'left' pursued courses of action over the period 1945 to 1970, more 
particularly from 1958 to 1970, predicated on the view:
a) that industrial action, centrally controlled, maintained and increased 
wages in a way which was significantly different from what they would 
otherwise have been,
b) that industrial action built membership confidence in trade unionism 
via solidarity and discipline, leading to trade union consciousness, and
c) when combined with a marxist political perspective led to class 
consciousness.
In attempting to carry policies based on this view into practice, the 
'left* utilised the full machinery of the union and by and large openly 
stated its political philosophy, calling for and largely receiving positive 
responses from the mass of the membership.
While there is evidence particularly in the late 1960s that the 'left’ 
leadership adopted a holier-than-thou approach to amalgamation with other 
white collar unions - a certain arrogance attaches to some leadership 
pronouncements - there is no evidence that the 'left' was generally arrogant 
with respect to its role either in the union or in the wider labour move­
ment. Neither is there evidence that it saw its aims as subversive,and 
requiring secrecy - Harold Wilson might have applied his phrase "a small 
tight-knit group of politically motivated men" to the 'left' in TASS, the 
'left' and the bulk of the membership would have rejected it - nor is there 
evidence that it adopted particular strikes on the basis of bloody-mindedness 
Rather, the 'left's' actions, as it saw them, were a necessary feature 
of trade unionism under capitalism and debates on policy while punctuated 
with rhetoric were sober and intense. There was no revelling in the 
difficulties facing Labour Governments, for example, nor little in the 
defeats which TASS and others on occasions inflicted on them.
It is more difficult to evaluate the successes the 'left' had in 
carrying through its aims. The 'left' itself while extremely critical of 
the previous 'right wing' leadership and often of its own actions.
nevertheless felt that it had achieved major advances in raising the level 
of consciousness of the membership as witnessed by its evaluation of the 
1970 vote on amalgamation with the AEU and others. There can be little 
doubt that TASS was in fact one of the most wage militant unions over the 
period 1945 to 1970 in terms of strike activity as well as one of the most 
'left wing' in broader policy terms. This latter feature was a direct 
'left' success and allowed the leadership to prosecute its policies in the 
wider movement often moving or seconding controversial 'left wing' resolutions 
at Labour Party Conferences and TUCs with some success, no mean feat for a 
small white collar union. Indeed the union's standing in the wider movement 
saw its general secretary elected to the TUC in preference to other often 
better known union leaders, and a subsequent general secretary was the 
first Communist Party member to be elected to the General Council since
1945.
However, the position is not quite so clear-cut on the question of 
the generation of wage militancy. There^ican be no dispute that the form which 
wage militancy took under the 'left' in TASS - a centrally controlled high 
strike pay/many strikes strategy adequately summed up by the pattern 
bargaining concept - was the direct result of 'left' control, but it cannot 
be held on the basis of the material presented in this thesis that without 
the 'left' there would have been little or no wage militancy. What can be 
said is that it is highly probable that the actual record of wage militancy 
displayed by the TASS membership, while not artificially manufactured by the 
'left', was induced by it. The 'left' purchased strike activity through 
paying 100^ net wages in the 1950s; it also articulated grievances which 
would otherwise not have been taken so far by the membership, indeed it 
may also have identified areas of wage bargaining not apparent to sections 
of the membership and almost certainly through the demonstration effect 
inherent in pattern bargaining raised the wage aspirations of some sections
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of the membership. Taken together, the purchase of strike activity, the 
central control of such activity often associated with a strike waiting 
list, the anti-incomes policy stand of the leadership and the illegal activity 
under incomes policy in the late 1960s, the 'leftwing' public policy of 
the union and the overwhelming vote on amalgamation represent a not 
insignificant success for the 'left' in what was in fact a fairly short 
space of time.
Industrial relations controversies
The three areas chosen allowed a fairly detailed analysis to be 
undertaken of propositions related to white collar wage militancy and 
revolutionary politics. The scope covered is sufficiently broad to argue 
that the material structured around the TASS-specific questions was set 
against not only important theoretical issues in modern industrial relations, 
but also a fairly comprehensive set of issues.
The white collar/blue collar debate, in which one side argues that 
in terms of aims and methods white collar unions have an essentially different 
character to blue collar unions, while the other side to the debate sees 
them as essentially similar, may have passed its peak in terms of academic 
interest. Yet the changing composition of the trade union movement and 
in particular of the TUC, reflecting in the main the changing composition 
of the labour force (not only between white and blue collar, but also between 
public and private sector) and also perhaps certain political features 
specific to the recent development of capitalism in Britain (the 
"concordat" approach of the 1974-79 Labour Government, the role of the 
TUC in national economic affairs), may once more focus attention on the 
postulated white collar/blue collar dichotomy or on some other such 
dichotomy, e.g. staff-graded/non-staff-graded, public sector/private 
sector. The following main conclusions can be drawn from the present 
study.
Firstly, the proponents of the dichotomy-type approach oversimplify 
the issues involved. For example, to argue that white collar unions are 
"conservative" in outlook is to overlook the fact that few of them have 
a politically homogeneous membership, TASS never had more than 47^ of its 
membership paying the political levy in the period to 1970 - a substantial 
contracting out position - yet the leadership (and TASS policy) even before 
'left' majority control, was always "labourite" in outlook (except perhaps 
in the perverse sense that the 'left' was against much Labour Government 
policy). Further, to hold that white collar unions only use methods which 
are non-militant and non-political is not simply not to do justice to the 
TASS experience, it is to positively ignore it. Secondly, and taking the 
questions of main aims and class consciousness together, then those writers 
such as Blackburn, who have, within the blue collar/white collar debate, 
attempted to construct measures of class consciousness to be used to weigh 
the working class consciousness of unions, have not had much success. 
Blackburn's attempt is not internally consistent; unions which are class 
conscious in terms of his seven measurement elements could in practice 
be sectional rather than class conscious. Moreover, in highlighting that 
element which sees collective bargaining as the key measure, Blackburn 
excludes all those unions which would favour unilateral regulation or a union 
like TASS which is on record for the establishment of socialism by the 
working class and which most definitely saw a militant, unilateral wage 
strategy as part of the struggle for socialism.
The pluralist/marxist debate is one facet of the ongoing discussion 
on the philosophy and methodology of industrial relations. While pluraliste 
such as Flanders and Clegg have long held sway in British industrial 
relations theory, this orthodoxy is not without its non-marxian critics.
Fox, in particular, has articulated a critique of pluralism which goes some 
way towards weakening its central philosophic tenet - that harmony is in
the order of things. His attack on the self-correcting thus self- 
perpetuating nature of pluralist society (and pluralist industrial relations 
systems) via its moral imperative - the self-legitimating propensity inherent 
in the process of continual compromise - is, however, much closer to the 
classical marxists than he might suppose.
Be that as it may, the marxist intellectual tradition is not a 
unified one. The classical marxists held that the economic imperative 
of capitalism, to exploit the working class, would continually break down the 
harmonious ideological picture handed down by the capitalist class and its 
various social controllers and for periods held as a reality by the majority 
of workers. Trade unions did indeed make contractual arrangements with 
employers and influence labour law, but economic pressures on workers would 
eventually undermine such contracts and overcome workers acquiescence to 
capitalism such that trade union consciousness would be regenerated and an 
anti-capitalist ideology emerge. This, the optimistic tradition, is 
challenged by others who see the ideological control of the capitalist 
class as always able to negate the factors making for the generation of an 
anti-capitalist ideology. They reject the classical marxist proposition 
that unions are schools of socialism, are revolutionary organisations of 
the working class, and indeed come close to Flanders' view of unions as 
part of the mechanism of social control with such concepts as unions 
becoming lieutenants of capitalism and their leaders political police.
The conclusions drawn from the experiences of the case-study union 
with respect to these theoretical approaches are somewhat tentative. It 
could be argued that Fox's continuous challenge frame of reference better 
represents the activity and outlook of the majority of the membership in the 
late 1960s than does the pluralist framework. For example, it is 
not clear that the amalgamation vote in 1970 is easily encompassed 
within the pluralist framework. To the extent that the vote represented
a desire for a greater sectional bargaining power rather than a class vote 
for class trade unionism, then it surely emphasises the continuous challenge 
outlook rather than the consensual outlook implied by pluralism. To the 
extent that the strike record, the illegal activity, the membership’s 
acceptance of the political stance of the leadership, the challenges to the 
social democracy of the 1964-1970 Labour Governments and the 1970 amalga­
mation vote are considered as going beyond Fox's position, then the evidence 
supports the classical marxists rather than their pessimistic successors.
The Ross/Dunlop debate remains an interesting and important one. 
Initiated in its modern form by Dunlop after a period of falling money, if 
not real, wages, the central question - how do trade unionists (both members 
and leaderships) perceive the wage bargain? - remains important in an era 
of rising money wages. Both Ross and Dunlop direct attention to real effects 
of wage bargaining, the internal cohesion of unions in the former, the 
employment considerations in the latter. That neither approach finds vindi­
cation in the experience of TASS is perhaps not surprising since both authors 
allow that the other may indeed be a special case, and thus in effect allow 
a range of behaviour to influence wage agreements. The TASS leadership's 
emphasis on a militant wage policy without seeming concern for the employ­
ment consequences would support the contention of Ross that unions do not 
perceive a wage movement/employment trade-off. On the other hand, the 
almost pluralistic self-perpetuating outlook attributed by Ross to union 
leaderships finds little support from either 'right wing' or 'left wing' 
periods of leadership in TASS. Ross's strength is surely in emphasising the 
politics of wage settlements and Dunlop's in that employers will almost 
certainly respond to wage changes irrespective of union perception.
The questions posed in this thesis while perhaps not original, have 
illuminated a number of interesting features of modern British trade 
unionism, in particular the extent to which a small union when well led,
can play an important part in the wider trade union and labour movement.
That the leadership was in this case from the socialist wing of the trade 
union movement raises interesting areas of analysis in terms of the militancy 
displayed by other unions in recent years, unions like N.U.P.E. which also 
openly subscribes to a socialist transformation of society.
APPENDIX I
DRAFT LIST OF JOB TITLES IN T.A.S.S. - compiled August, 1972(1)
Acceptance Engineer 
Accessory Technician 
Accident Investigator 
Accoustician 
Accoustics Technician 
Administration Clerk 
Administration Technician 
Administrative Assistant 
Administrative Supervisor 
Administrator
Advance Project Technician 
Advance Provisioner 
Aer0dynamicist 
Aero Engineer 
Aero Engine Planner 
Air-Conditioning Engineer 
Aircraft Engineer 
Airworthiness Engineer 
Allocating Engineer 
Analyst
Analyst Programmer 
Analytical Engineer 
Analytic Chemist 
Apparatus Engineer 
Applications Engineer 
Applicator 
Appraisal Engineer 
Apprentice Instructor 
Apprentice Training Officer 
Approvals Engineer 
Architectural Assistant 
Architectural Draughtsman 
Architectural Surveyor 
Architectural Technician 
Artist 
Assembler
Assembly Controller 
Assembly Foreman 
Assembly Inspector 
Assembly Planner 
Audio Systems Engineer 
Authorised Person 
Automatic Setter
Bearing Engineer 
Blade Engineer 
Blading Engineer
Board Inspector
Boardman
Bolt Lister
Budget Analyst
Building Engineer
Building Maintenance Surveyor
Building & Site Manager
Building Surveyor
Building Technician
Buyer
Buying Assistant 
Buying Engineer
Calculating Machine Operator 
Calculations Engineer 
Calculator
Calibration Engineer 
Calibration Technician 
Camera Operator (industrial) 
Canteen Manager 
Capital Control Officer 
Cartographer
Cartographical Draughtsman 
Catalogue Compiler 
Cataloguing Technician 
Catalogue Writer 
Certification Engineer 
Change Note Engineer 
Chargehand 
Chartered Engineer 
Chassis Engineer 
Chassis Liaison Engineer 
Checker
Chemical Analyst 
Chemical Laboratory Technician 
Chemical Technician 
Chemist (industrial)
Chemist's Assistant 
Circuit Design Draughtsman 
Circuit Delineator 
Circuit Draughtsman 
Circuit Specialist 
Civil Engineer 
Civil Engineering Surveyor 
Clay Modeller 
Clerical Assistant 
Clerical Estimator
(l) This list was provided by the T.A.S.S. Research Department.
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Clerical Stock Controller
Clerk
Clerkess
Clerk of Works
Clerk/Typist
Climatic Laboratory Technician
Code Controller
Codification Technician
Coding & Classification Supervisor
Coding Clerk
Coding Engineer
Coding Officer
Coil Engineer
Collator
Colourist
Combustion Engineer 
Commercial Assistant 
Commercial Clerk 
Commercial Engineer 
Commercial Equipment Engineer 
Commission Engineer 
Commissioning Engineer 
Commitment Acceptance Engineer 
Commitment Acceptance Supervisor 
Communications Engineer 
Company Programmer 
Compass Scheduler 
Compiler
Compositor Operator 
Comptometer Operator 
Computer Controller 
Computer Liaison Officer 
Computer Operator 
Computer Programmer 
Computer Room Supervisor 
Computer Supervisor 
Computer Technician
Concession & Modifications Controller
Construction Engineer
Contracts Despatch Clerk
Contracts Assistant
Contracts Clerk
Contracts Controller
Contracts Engineer
Contracts Estimating Engineer
Contracts Programmer
Contracts Shipping Engineer
Control Clerk
Control Engineer
Controller
Control Programmer
Control Systems Engineer
Conveyor Belt Technologist
Conveyor Engineer
Co-ordinating Engineer
Co-ordinator
Copywriter
Cost Administrator:
Cost Accountant
Cost Analyst
Cost Clerk
Cost Controller
Cost Engineer
Cost Estimator
Costing Engineer
Cost Investigator
Cost Reduction Engineer
Craftsman
Craft Technician
Cri-Dan Specialist
Critical Path Analyst
Customer Liaiser
Dark Room Technician 
Data Analyst
Data Control Computer Operator
Data Control Engineer
Data Engineer
Data Logger Technician
Data Processer
Data Reduction Technician
Defect Investigation Engineer
Defects Controller
Defects Engineer
Defects Investigator
Demonstration Engineer
Demonstrator
Depot Manager
Design Analysis Engineer
Design Assistant
Design Checker
Design Draughtsman
Design Engineer
Designer
Despatcher
Despatching Order Planner 
Despatch Superviser 
Detail Draughtsman 
Dataller
Development Engineer
Development Fitter
Development Foreman
Development Manufacturing Engineer
Development Physicist
Development Technician
Development Technologist
Diagram Assistant
Dial Analyst
Die Liaison Engineer
Direct Labour Supervisor
Draughting Assistant
Draughting Clerk
Draughtsman
Draughtsman Checker
Draughtswoman
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Drawing Controller 
Drawing Office Assistant 
Drawing Office Checker 
Drawing Office Clerk 
Drawing Office Engineer 
Dynamicist
Dynamometer Technician
Editor
Editorial Assistant 
Electrical Apparatus Engineer 
Electrical Applications Engineer 
Electrical Contracts Engineer 
Electrical Design Engineer 
Electrical Designer 
Electrical Draughtsman 
Electrical Engineer 
Electrical Estimator 
Electrical Foreman 
Electrical Methods Engineer 
Electrical Spares Engineer 
Electrical Technician 
Electrical Tester 
Electronic Calibration Engineer 
Electronic Designer 
Electronic Engineer 
Electronic Instructor 
Electronic Maintenance Engineer 
Electronics Inspector 
Electronic Technician 
Electronic Test Engineer 
Electroplating Technician 
Engine Design Draughtsman 
Engineer
Engineering Advisor 
Engineering Assistant 
Engineering Change Controller 
Engineering Chemist 
Engineering Clerk 
Engineering Co-ordinator 
Engineering Designer 
Engineering Draughtsman 
Engineering Instructor 
Engineering Liaison Officer 
Engineering Specialist 
Engineering Technician 
Engine Sales Recorder 
Environmental Engineer 
Erection Estimator 
Erection Planner 
Estimating Engineer 
Estimating Manager 
Estimator
Equipment Approval Engineer 
Equipment Engineer 
Equipment Planning Engineer 
Evaluation Engineer 
Exhibition Draughtsman
Expeditor
Experimental Assistant 
Experimental Engineer 
Experimental Fitter 
Experimental Officer 
Experimental Planner 
Export Liaison Officer 
Export Representative 
Export Sales Technician
Fabrication Engineer 
Facilities Design Engineer 
Facilities Engineer 
Facilities Supervisor 
Factory Layout Engineer 
Factory Planning Engineer 
Factory Services Engineer 
Fabrication Controller 
Factory Planner 
Field Engineer 
Field Service Co-ordinator 
Filing Clerk 
Film Reader 
Filtration Engineer 
Financial Analyst 
Fire Officer 
Fire Protection Engineer 
Fitter
Fitter/Turner
Flight Analyst
Flight Development Engineer
Flight Test Engineer
Flight Test Observer
Flow Measurement Engineer
Fluid Power Engineer
Foreman
Foreman Fitter
Foreman Setter
Foreman Technician
Forging Machine Operator
Form Designer
Foundry Loader
Foundry Technician
Fuel Engineer
Fuel Technician
Fuel Technologist
Full-Scale Draughtsman
‘Furnishing Design Engineer.
Gas Technician 
Gear Tooling Engineer 
Gear Tooling Specialist 
Gearing Specialist 
Generation Assistant 
Glass Technician 
Goods In Supervisor 
Graphic Artist
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Graphie Designer 
Gratiseule Draughtsman 
Grinder
Ground Support Equipment Engineer 
Group Engineer 
Group Inspector 
Group Production Engineer
Handling Engineer
Heating Engineer
Heating & Ventilating Engineer
Heat Treatment Engineer
Heat Treatment Superintendent
High Altitude Laboratory Technician
Hydraulic Engineer
Hydraulics Technician
Hydrometer Assistant
Illustrating Draughtsman
Illustrator
Improver
Industrial Chemist 
Industrial Enginer 
Industrial Relations Officer 
Inside Sales Engineer 
Inspection Classifier 
Inspection Engineer 
Inspection Methods Engineer 
Inspection Planner 
Inspection Planning Engineer 
Inspector
Installation Engineer 
Installation Planner 
Instructor
Instrumentation Engineer
Instrumentation Planner
Instrumentation Technician
Instrument Engineer
Instrument Maker
Instrument Mechanic
Instrument Technician
Instrument Technologist
Insurance Engineer
Interchangeability Engineer
Interchangeability Inspection Engineer
Internal Sales Engineer
Interpreter
Inventory Recorder
Investigation Engineer
Investigator
Invoice Clerk
Invoice Typist
Jig Engineer
Jig &  Tool Demonstrator
Jig &  Tool Design Engineer
Jig & Tool Designer 
Jig & Tool Draughtsman 
Job Assembler
L2000 Operator 
Laboratory Analyst 
Laboratory Assistant 
Laboratory Attendant 
Laboratory Engineer 
Laboratory Technician 
Laboratory Supervisor 
Lathe Turner 
Layout Artist 
Layout Draughtsman 
Layout Engineer 
Layout Inspector 
Layout Methods Engineer 
Layout Technician 
Lecturer
Legislation Engineer 
Liaison Draughtsman 
Liaison Engineer 
Liaison Officer 
Liaison Representative 
Librarian 
Library Manager 
Licence Technician 
Life Test Technician 
Lift Technician 
Lister
Lithographic Designer 
Lithographic Technician 
Loadcoll Technician 
Loading Controller 
Loftsman 
Log Compiler
Machinability Services Investigator
Machine Engineer
Machine Load Estimator
Machine Operator
Machine Project Engineer
Machine Shop Foreman
Machine Shop Planner
Machine Shop Superintendent
Mains Records Draughtsman
Maintenance Assessor
Maintenance Clerk
Maintenance Engineer
Maintenance Foreman
Maintenance Manager
Maintenance Specialist
Maintenance Superintendent
Maintenance Supervisor
Maintenance Technician
Management Services Officer
Manufacturing Development Engineer
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Mamifactnring Draughtsman 
Manufacturing Engineer 
Manufacturing Technician 
Manufacturing Unit Manager 
Marketing Engineer 
Market Research Engineer 
Material Controller 
Material Handler 
Material Handling Engineer 
Material Lister 
Materials Engineer 
Materials Laboratory Technician 
Materials Scheduler 
Materials Standards Engineer 
Material Stores Supervisor 
Mathemat ician
Measurement Control Engineer 
Measurement Engineer 
Measurer
Mechanical Contracts Engineer 
Mechanical Design Engineer 
Mechanical Designer 
Mechanical Detail Draughtsman 
Mechanical Development Technician 
Mechanical Draughtsman 
Mechanical Engineer 
Mechanical Handling Engineer 
Mechanical Project Engineer 
Mechanical Service Engineer 
Mechanical Technician 
Mechanical Test Engineer 
Mechanisation Engineer 
Metal Failures Engineer 
Metallurgical Technician* 
Metallurgist
Metal Planning Liaison Engineer
Meter Test Engineer
Methods Engineer
Methods N.C. Programmer
Methods Planner
Methods Study Engineer
Method Studier
Method Study Associate
Methods & Procedures Assistant
Methods Research Technician
Metrication Coder
Metric Standards Engineer
Metrologist
Microbiologist
Microfilmer
Microfilm Operator
Microscopist
Miller
Model Maker
Model Shop Technician
Modifications Clerk
Modifications Compiler
Modifications Controller
Modifications Engineer
Modifications Co-ordinator
Modifications Investigator 
Modifications Officer 
Modifications Planner 
Modifications Progress Co-ordinator 
Modifications Recorder 
Module Training Controller 
Monitor Analyst 
Motor Body Stylist 
M.T.O. Compiler
Multilith Duplicator Supervisor 
Multilith Operator 
Municipal Sales Clerk
Naval Architect 
N.C, Co-ordinator 
N.C. Methods Engineer 
N.C. Part Programmer 
N.C. Programming Engineer 
N.C. Tape Punch Operator 
N.C. Technician 
New Projects Controller 
Noise Engineer 
Nuclear Engineer 
Nuclear Power Draughtsman 
Nuclear Scientist 
Numerical Codifier 
Numerical Control Programmer 
Numerical Control Specialist 
Numerical Engineer,
Office Manager 
Operations Assistant 
Operations Superintendent 
Order Controller 
Organisations & Methods Analyst 
Organisation & Methods Engineer 
Organisation & Methods Officer 
Outside Contracts Engineer 
Outside Erection Engineer 
Outside Representative 
Overseas Engineer 
Oxygen Laboratory Technician
Packaging Engineer 
Packaging Technician 
Packer
Paint Chemist
Paint Engineer
Panel Design Draughtsman
Part Programmer
Parts List Compiler
Parts Lister
Parts Service Supervisor 
Pattern Controller 
Pattern Engineer 
Pattern Maker 
Payload Engineer
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Performance Engineer 
Performance Technician 
Permatracer (Printed Circuits) 
Photographer (industrial) 
Photographic Controller 
Photographic Printer 
Photographic Production Technician 
Photographic Technician 
Photolithographer 
Photoprinting Operator 
Physicist
Physicist Engineer
Planned Maintenance Engineer
Planner
Planning Administrator 
Planning Draughtsman 
Planning Engineer 
Planning Estimator 
Planning Methods Engineer 
Planning Programmer 
Planning Ratefixer 
Plan Printer
Plans & Records Engineer 
Plant Development Engineer 
Plant Engineer 
Plant Layout Draightsman 
Plant Layout Engineer 
Plant Load Engineer 
Plant Purchase Engineer 
Plant Project Assessor 
Plant Service Engineer 
Plant Technician 
Plastics Engineer 
Plating Technician 
Plotter
Polymer Technologist 
Polyurethaifi Technologist 
Preliminary Designer 
Preplanning Engineer 
Pre-production Methods Engineer 
Press Load Engineer 
Pressure Vessel Draughtsman 
Preventative Maintenance Engineer 
Price Control Technician 
Pricing Officer 
Printed Circuit Draughtsman 
Printer
Printing Supervisor 
Print Machine Operator 
Print Room Supervisor 
Process Auditor 
Process Clerk 
Process Controller 
Process Development Engineer 
Process Engineer 
Processing Technician 
Process Planner 
Process Planning Engineer 
Process Ratefixer
Process Writer
Procurement Engineer
Procurement Planner
Product Controller
Product Cost Engineer
Product Description Supervisor
Product Design Engineer
Product Engineer
Product Estimator
Production Adviser
Production Buyer
Production Clerk
Production Control Clerk
Production Controller
Production Co-ordinator
Production Coster
Production Engineer
Production Equipment Controller
Production Gear Specialist
Production Liaison Engineer
Production Metallurgist
Production Methods Engineer
Production Planner
Production Programmer
Production Specifications Engineer
Production Statistician
Production Superintendent
Production Termination Controller
Production Test Engineer
Product Standards Engineer
Product Support Assistant
Productivity Service Analyst
Productivity Services Engineer
Productivity Services Officer
Product Liaison Engineer
Product Provisioner
Product Systems Technician
Product Technician
Profit Budget Analyst
Programme Analyst
Programme & Budget Controller
Programme Clerk
Programme Controller
Programme Co-ordinator
Programme Engineer
Programme Planner
Programmer
Programme System Analyst 
Programme Technician 
Progress Assessor 
Progress Chaser 
Progress Clerk 
Progress Controller 
Progress Co-ordinator 
Progress Engineer 
Progresser 
Progrèssman 
Progress Planner
Progress Planning Engineering Clerk
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Progress Representative 
Progress Technician 
Project Author 
Project Controller 
Project Co-ordinator 
Project Cost Engineer 
Project Designer 
Project Development Engineer 
Project Draughtsman 
Project Engineer 
Project Estimator 
Project Leader
Project Manufacturing Controller
Project Planner
Project Secretary
Project Surveyor
Project Technician
Proposal Development Engineer
Proposal Engineer
Propulsion Engineer
Prototype Assembly Technician
Prototype Wireman
Proving Engineer
Proving Operator
Proving Technician
Provisioning Engineer
Provisioning Technician
Provisions Engineer
Publications Engineer
Publications Technician
Publicity Assistant
Pump Engineer
Punch Card Operator
Purchase Progresser
Purchaser
Purchase Research Engineer 
Purchasing Engineer 
Purchasing Manager 
Purchasing Officer
Quality Analyst 
Quality Assurance Engineer 
Quality Auditor 
Quality Control Engineer 
Quality Controller 
Quality Control Manager 
Quality Control Officer 
Quality Control Supervisor 
Quality Engineer 
Quality Observer 
Quality Planner 
Quality Planning Engineer 
Quality Technician 
Quality Surveyor 
Quotations Engineer
Radiographer
Radiographic Technician
Radiologist
Ratefixer
Rater Setter
Rationalisation Engineer
Raw Material Controller
Reader
Recorder
Recording Draughtsman 
Records Clerk 
Refrigeration Engineer 
Reliability Engineer 
Reliability Liaison Engineer 
Reliability Representative 
Repair Engineer 
Representative 
Reproductive Technician 
Requisitioner 
Research Assistant 
Research Chemist
Research & Development Design Engines
Research Engineer
Researcher
Research Investigator 
Research Metallurgist 
Research Officer 
Research Physicist 
Research Technician 
Resistor Designer 
Rheometer Operator 
Rig Shop Liaison Engineer 
Rig Shop Technician 
Rig Test Technician 
Road Test Driver 
Road Test Engineer 
Road Test Observer 
Rotary Section Supervisor 
Routiner
Routing Engineer 
Rubber Technologist
Safety Engineer 
Safety Officer 
Sale Liaison Engineer 
Sales Assistant 
Sales Clerk 
Sales Co-ordinator 
Sales Correspondent 
Sales Engineer 
Sales Office Manager 
Sales Promoter 
Salvage Engineer 
Sample Maker 
Scaler
Schedule Clerk 
Schedule Compiler 
Schedule Engineer 
Scheduler
Scheduling Controller 
Scheduling Co-ordinator 
Scheduling Engineer 
Scientist
Scrap Material Co-ordinator
Secretary
Section Buyer
Section Engineer
Security Officer
Service Controller
Service Engineer
Service Liaison Engineer
Service Manager
Service Manuals Supervisor
Services Engineer
Services Manager
Service Supervisor
Sheet Metal Worker
Shift Engineer
Shipping Clerk
Ship Repair Accounts Clerk
Shop Floor Co-ordinator
Shop Floor Production Engineer
Shop Lister
Shopload Clerk
Shop Loader
Shop Loader Engineer
Shop Planning Engineer
Shop Production Engineer
Shop Superintendent
Shop Tooling Engineer
Shorthand Typist
Sieracotes Operator
Site Engineer
Site Liaison Engineer
Site Service Officer
Software Systems Analyst
Soil Chemist
Spares Assessor
Spares Cataloguer
Spares Compiler
Spares Controller
Spares Department Manager
Spares Engineer
Spares Evaluator
Spares Manuals Supervisor
Spares Orders Supervisor
Spares Provisioner
Spares Provisioning Engineer
Special Assignments Engineer
Specialist Assistant
Specialist Engineer
Special Projects Engineer
Special Purposes Electrical Draughtsman
Special Purpose Electrical Engineer
Special Purpose Machinery Draughtsman
Special Purpose Machinery Engineer
Specification Compiler
Specifications Analyst
Specifications Engineer
Specifications Writer
Spectographer
Staff Designer
Staff Engineer
Staff Inspector
Standards Engineer
Standards Officer
Statfile Operator
Statistical Analyst
Statistical Clerk
Statistical Quality Inspector
Statistician
Steel Buyer
Steel Designer
Stock Control Clerk
Stock Controller
Stock Cost Controller
Storekeeper
Stores Controller
Stress Analyst
Stress Calculator
Stress Engineer
Stressman
Structural Analyst 
Structural Detailer 
Structural Draughtsman 
Structural Engineer 
Structural Test Engineer 
Structure Designer 
Studio Manager 
Stylist
Sub Assembly Compiler 
Sub-Contract Draughtsman 
Sub-Contracts Engineer 
Suggestions Engineer 
Superintendent 
Supervision Test Engineer 
Supervisor (Technical)
Supplier Control Engineer
Supplies Controller
Supplies Representative
Support Engineer
Surplus Utilisation Engineer
Surveyor
Survey Plotter
Switchgear Development Engineer
Switchgear Estimator
Systems Acceptance Engineer
Systems Analyst
Systems Controller
Systems Co-ordinator
Systems Design Engineer
Systems Engineer
Systems Liaison Controller
Systems Programmer
Systems Supervisor
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Systems Technician 
Systems Test Engineer
Tape Librarian
Tape Planner
Tape Programmer
Technical Administrator
Technical Adviser
Technical Applications Engineer
Technical Artist
Technical Assessor
Technical Assistant
Technical Author
Technical Buyer
Technical Clerk
Technical Compiler
Technical Co-ordinating Engineer
Technical Co-ordinator
Technical Copy Writer
Technical Correspondent
Technical Cost Analyst
Technical Cost Engineer
Technical Cost Estimator
Technical Designer
Technical Documenter
Technical Engineer
Technical Estimator
Technical Illustrator
Technical Industrial Engineer
Technical Inspector
Technical Installation Engineer
Technical Instructor
Technical Librarian
Technical Methods Engineer
Technical Office Administrator
Technical Planner
Technical Planning Clerk
Technical Programmer
Technical Proposal Engineer
Technical Provisioner
Technical Publications Co-ordinator
Technical Publicist
Technical Rating Clerk
Technical Records Compiler
Technical Records Officer
Technical Representative
Technical Sales Engineer
Technical Salesman
Technical Sales Representative
Technical Sales Technician
Technical Sales Engineer
Technical Spares Compiler
Technical Specifications Scheduler
Technical Trainer
Technical Translator
Technical Typist
Technical Writer
Technician
Technigraphics Designer
Technigraphics Photographer
Telecommunications Engineer
Template Draughtsman
Template Maker
Tendering Engineer
Test Administrator
Test Assistant
Test Control Engineer
Test Engineer
Tester
Test Equipment Design Engineer
Test Equipment Design Technician
Test Equipment Engineer
Test Facilities Engineer
Test Foreman
Test Gear Engineer
Test Methods Engineer
Test Plant Engineer
Test Repair Technician
Test Rig Draughtsman
Test Rig Planner
Test Rig Technician
Test Specifications Writer
Test Technician
Thermoplastics Engineer
Timber Treatment Technician
Time Clerk
Timekeeper
Timer
Time Setter 
Time Studier 
Time Study Engineer 
Time Standards Engineer 
Timing Engineer 
Timing Programmer 
Tool Analyst 
Tool Buyer
Tool Control Engineer 
Tool Controller 
Tool Design Checker 
Tool Design Engineer 
Tool Designer 
Tool Draughtsman 
Tool Engineer 
Tool Foreman 
Tooling Controller 
Tool Development Engineer 
Tooling Engineer 
Tooling Methods Engineer 
Tooling Supervisor 
Tool Investigator 
Tool Liaison Engineer 
Toolmaker
Tool Methods Engineer
Tool Planner
Tool Planning Engineer
Tool Procurement Engineer
Tool Programmer
Tool Research Engineer
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Toolroom Estimator 
Toolroom Foreman 
Toolroom Planner 
Toolroom Superintendent 
Tool Trials Engineer 
Tracer
Training Analyst 
Training Instructor 
Training Methods Officer 
Training Officer 
Training Policy Officer 
Transformer Designer 
Translator 
Translator Typist 
Transmission Engineer 
Transport Manager 
Trials Engineer 
Trimmer
Trouble Shooter 
Turbine Technician 
Type Engineer 
Typist
Typographical Draughtsman/Draughtswoman
Works Draft Technician 
Works Engineer 
Works Laboratory Supervisor 
Workshop Technician 
Works Liaison Engineer 
Works Manager’s Assistant 
Works Radiologist 
Works Service Engineer 
Works Standard Engineer 
Works Technician 
Work Studier 
Works Study Engineer 
Work Study Engineer 
Work Study Technician
X-Ray Film Analyst
Utilisation Clerk
Value Analyst 
Value Engineer 
Valve Engineer 
Varityper Operator 
Varitypist
Ventilating Engineer 
Vessel Engineer 
Vibration Engineer 
Vibration Test Engineer
Wages Clerk 
Wages Supervisor 
Warranty Engineer 
Warranty Supervisor 
Weight Analyst 
Weight Control Engineer 
Weight Estimator 
Weights Engineer 
Welding Engineer 
Wind Tunnel Engineer 
Wind Tunnel Technician 
Wind Tunnel Test Technician 
Wiring Diagram Checker 
Woodwork Assessor 
Woodwork Technician 
Work Loading Engineer 
Work Planner 
Works Draft Technician 
Work Loading Engineer 
Work Planner
APPENDIX I I
Individual mambar’.s annual salary census form, filled in privately and 
given to the C.M. in a sealed envelope for transmission to the D.G.*
Master census form filled in annually (or when major changes in working 
conditions take place) by each C.M. and sent to the
* See note at foot of PAGE 2.
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* After 1973 both forms were sent, not to the 0,0., but direct to National H.Q.
APPENDIX III
T.A.S.S. WAGE DATA; A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
The material presented in Chapters II and III suggests that two areas 
of the union’s activity may be worthy of consideration in any statistical 
enquiry into changes through time in the wages paid to members of TASS.
These are:-
A. The high strike pay/selective strike policy resulting:
(i) in a much higher proportion of the union's funds being allocated to 
strike pay than was the case for any other union over the period under con­
sideration, and
(ii) in all strikes being official, and in general being selected by the 
leadership from a strike waiting list.
B. The .job vacancies/wages and conditions data bank,
advertising only those vacancies offering wages and conditions equal to or 
above the union's unilaterally-set minimum in the former, and providing fairly 
sophisticated wage information in the latter.
It seems appropriate, therefore, to construct hypotheses which, while 
drawing on work carried out by other researchers, encompass variables which 
go some way towards measuring the influence of the factors in A and B on the 
time-series of wage data for the union membership.
1. POSSIBLE APPROACHES
A rough dichotomy can be imposed on previous theoretical and empirical 
work in the field of wage explanation. On the one hand, there is that approach 
which can be called demand-determined, and on the other, that which can be 
called militancy-determined.
2.
1.1 Taking the latter first, various hypotheses have been put forward with 
respect to the link between militancy and wages, each usually containing 
its particular index of militancy. The work of H i n e s s t a n d s  almost 
entirely alone during the 1960s as a model based on a militancy approach. 
Hines* measure of militancy - the rate of change of unionisation of the 
labour force weighted with respect to the initial level of unionisation -
(2)even if not subject to dispute,^  ^ is inappropriate in the present context 
in that it is not possible to define and quantify the particular 'labour 
force' relevant to the dependent variable to be explained - some index of the 
rate of change of wages of the union's membership.
( '5)
A more apposite approach stems from the work of G o d f r e y w h o s e  
militancy measure is the number of strikes per period or the change in the 
number of strikes per period. Godfrey argues that not only are his results 
of greater explanatory value than those of other researchers, notably
(4)Phillips, Lipsey and Parkin,'  ^but that his statistical procedure is also 
better.
Be that as it may, Godfrey's approach is followed here. It is admitted 
however, that the a priori argument for expecting the number of strikes 
per period (or perhaps any such strike-based variable) to be positively 
associated with the rate of change of wages is not the only causal sequence 
that might be adduced. For example, it could be held that the number of 
strikes rises as employer resistance to wage claims increases, hence it 
might be expected that strikes will be negatively correlated with the
1. See, for example, Hines,'Trade Unions and Wage Inflation in the U.K., 
1893-1961' Review of Economic Studies, XXXI, 1964.
2. See Purdy and Zis, 'T.U’s and Wage Inflation in the U.K. - a reappraisal', 
in Laidler and Purdy (eds), 'Inflation and Labour Markets', 1974.
3. See Godfrey's essay in Nobay and Johnson (eds), 'The Current Inflation’,
1971.
4. See, for example, Lipsey, 'The Relation between Unemployment and the 
Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the U.K., 1862-1957' in 
Gordon and Klein, 'Readings in Business Cycles', I963.
3.
dependent wage variable. However, given the qualitative evidence surrounding 
the centrally-controlled strike selection practised by TASS, Godfrey’s 
causal sequence is accepted here and his independent variables, the number of 
strikes per period and the change in number of strikes per period, are expected 
to be positively associated with the rate of change of wages.
From the material presented in Table III, p. 50 , it is possible to 
construct other militancy variables, although none are as 'clean' as the 
simple strikes variables. The amount spent on disputes each year could, 
for example, be used to proxy militancy but with some reservations. Assuming 
a standard weekly payment to all strikers, then expenditure per annum 
would measure the breadth of strike activity in terms of the number of strikers 
in the period as well as the length of strikes in terms of the number of 
weeks on strike. Thus strike activity of 200 strikers for one week would give 
the same monetary result in terms of strike expenditure as would activity 
of 10 strikers for 20 weeks. But the average expenditure per striker would 
be different. Thus the average expenditure per striker could be used to 
test the employer resistance hypothesis; the longer the time spent on strike 
the greater the degree of employer resistance, hence it would be expected 
that the average expenditure per striker would be negatively associated with 
the rate of change of wages.
Before considering the actual relationships underlying the total 
expenditure on disputes each year, i.e. are there qualifications to the 
standard weekly strike pay assumption, it should be noted that by dividing 
total dispute expenditure per annum by the number of strikes in that year, 
nothing of significance is added to our knowledge, since the resultant 
would not distinguish between broad strikes and long strikes. The resultant 
would only be significant if it could be argued that broad and long strikes 
measure the same thing, for example, either militancy or employer resistance, 
and it is not clear why a strike of 100 men for two weeks should count for 
either greater militancy or employer resistance than one of 10 men for two
4.
weeks. However, if average expenditure per striker per annum were divided 
by the number of strikes per annum, this composite variable would seem to be 
as close as available statistics allow to an all round militancy variable.
The greater the value of the composite variable, the greater would be the 
degree of employer resistance; many short, sharp strikes would be expected 
to be positively associated with the rate of change of wages and few 
protracted strikes negatively associated.
To turn to the question of the standard weekly strike payment assumption, 
the annual totals for dispute expenditure are built up by adding up the 
monies spent on strike activity each year. The union pays 100^ net wages 
to strikers.However, the gross wage^^^ will vary due to, inter alia, 
geographic location, age and time. How does this affect the standard 
weekly payment assumption? There is no simple expedient to take into account 
possible differences over time in the relationship between gross and net wages 
due to tax changes etc. and no allowance for such differences has been 
included in the calculations which follow. Nevertheless, within limits, 
the annual totals for dispute expenditure will be related to the gross wage 
structure payed to TASS members in each year and since there is no evidence 
from thé wider research carried out on the union that, for example, younger 
members were more strike prone than older members, or vice versa, or that the 
age distribution of the membership changed significantly over time, or that 
there was a peculiar geographic distribution or change in distribution of 
strikes, the annual totals can be assumed to relate to a relatively constant 
cross-section of the membership. If this assumption is close to reality, 
then the only other step required to relate dispute expenditure in, say,
1970 with 1951 is to deflate the former by some deflator, say, the Retail 
Price Index, based on 1951.
5. Allowance is made in the statistics for changes in strike pay.
6. See below, p. 8..
5.
While none of these qualifications necessarily remove all of the 
problems inherent in using annual dispute expenditure in independent 
variables, there is no reason given the paucity of empirical data on 
militancy and employer resistance, not to so use dispute expenditure.
Thus the independent militancy variables are:- 
S - No. of Strikes per annum
As - Change in no.of strikes 
^ / M  - Average Expenditure per striker
/M - Average expenditure per striker per strike.
S
(* deflated with respect to the R.P.I.)
1.2 DEMAND-DETERMINED APPROACH
The theoretical and empirical work carried out by researchers such 
as Lipsey and Parkin remains central to this approach. While the original 
Phillips' Curve is not currently viewed as having much predictive value, it 
does not follow that demand variables can be dismissed at either the 
aggregate or disaggregate levels.
The standard proxy variable for the level of aggregate demand in the 
econony is the rate of registered unemployment, as in the Phillips' Curve.
This independent variable is used here since it has not proved possible 
to define and quantify one of more immediate relevance to the labour market 
segment from which the dependent wage variable is drawn.
Another demand proxy used by some researchers is the number of reported 
job vacancies per period and this approach at least has the merit from the 
point of view of the present study, of providing some foundation for 
introducing a variable relating to the second of the two components of 
the union's wages policy - the job vacancy/information bank component. For 
a number of reasons it has not proved possible to quantify a TASS vacancy 
index based on the number of adverts carried in the Vacancy List, for example.
6,
In particular, adverts do not normally specify the number of vacancies and 
it is not clear that by adding up the number of adverts (not to mention 
problems of double counting when adverts appear for a number of months), 
an accurate index need emerge. However, since the data bank is used in the 
main by individual members looking for information on specific jobs, another 
way of indexing this second component of the wages strategy might be through 
the phenomenon of job-change. This often appears in the literature as quit- 
rate analysis, the usual problem being the separation of quits due to 
redundancy from those due to excess demand as in the backward sloping 
section of the Phillips' Curve, The analysis is further complicated by 
the probability of internal labour market adjustments being different under 
different market conditions. In effect, while it is possible in theory 
to separate out the various adjustments, it is not possible in practice.
The usual solution is to assume that, for example, quits due to excess demand 
always outweigh those due to redundancy or to weight the index to take 
account of the various components that make it up.
With respect to the present analysis, the former approach is adopted 
although given the nature of the proposed index some of the more serious 
difficulties are not encountered. The proposed excess demand index is the 
'number of completed transfers per period'.
(7)For one reason or another,^  ^ the union count the number of members 
who change their 'work area' each year. When a member leaves a 'work area', 
the shop steward records this on his subscription form which is sent to 
headquarters, indicating the reason for leaving, e.g. redundant, transferred 
to another 'work area', leaving to take up a new job. There is thus a 
series of statistics available for 'Transfers Out' which does not include 
redundancies, but which does include 'quits' to take up new jobs and
7. Probably to trace 'lost' members.
internal labour market adjustments between 'work areas', i.e. within the 
same plant, but not within a particular 'work area', though it is not 
possible to separate out external from internal changes, i.e. quits from 
inter-'work area' adjustments.
When the 'transfers out' take up their new appointments, the bulk of 
them 'transfer in' via the subscription list of the new shop steward and 
headquarters also maintain a statistical series on 'Transfers In'. The fact 
that Transfers Out are always greater than Transfers In is to be expected; 
some transfers out will be to jobs outwith TASS negotiating areas and some 
will be to unorganised areas and thus some will allow their membership to 
lapse.
While a priori arguments can be made out for using either series in
( 8 )the present analysis, attention is concentrated at present on Transfer In. 
This series measures "completed transfers" and it seems reasonable to suppose 
that all wage changes engendered by such job changes will be recorded and 
form part of the time—series on the dependent variable.
The problem of quits due to redundancy is not encountered and it 
seems reasonable to argue that "completed transfers" due to slack labour 
market conditions - either internal adjustments or defensive job changes 
to avoid redundancy - will represent such a small part of total 'completed 
transfers' that they can in effect be discounted. Thus the total number 
of completed transfers for period, T, is expected to be positively associated 
with the rate of change of wages of the union membership.
For reasons similar to those involved in using the rate of unemploy­
ment rather than the absolute number of unemployed in the Phillips' Curve,
it is expected that "completed transfers as a proportion of the membership"
Twill in practice prove a better explanatory variable and thus ^ .100 is 
expected to be positively correlated to the rate of change of wages.
(s) The series for Transfers Out is not, in fact, complete
8.
Thus the independent demand variables are:-
U - the rate of Unemployment per annum 
T— .100 - completed transfers as a proportion of the membership.
2. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
As indicated earlier, the union has maintained a sophisticated data 
collection and dissemination network for nearly 50 years. Central to this 
has been the collection and use of wage data. This has been compiled on an 
average-wage-for-age basis paralleling the union's unilaterally set minimum- 
wage-for-age scales, such that changes in age groupings in the former reflect 
changes in age groupings in the latter, and this means firstly, that there 
is no simple single "average wage for union members" and secondly, that 
periodically the groupings by age were changed, e.g, for some years an average 
was worked out for "over 50 year olds" while for others it was for "30 year 
olds and over". It has been possible, however, to isolate a time-series for 
the "30 and over" age group, the bulk of the membership, and this is analysed 
for the period 1951 to 1970,
In most of the studies previously quoted, the dependent variable was 
either the Wage Rate or Gross Earnings. In this study the Wage refers to the 
average gross weekly wage paid for a standard working week excluding overtime 
as reported in the corresponding members annual census taken in October 
each year.
The formula used to convert the annual data to rate of change was:- 
: .
T 30 “ W^_^ .100
U3O refers to union members JO years old and over.
This variable was refined as follows:-
-  ii
O
where W is the rate of change (calculated as for U30) of the average
weekly earnings of male manual workers, Oct./Oct. each year, taken from
(9)British Labour Statistics.^
W, the difference between the two rates of change, must in some
sense represent factors particular to the relevant TASS members.
The possibility that rather than W, some function of V, e.g. log(W ) 
or (W etc, would be more appropriate, is also a consideration. Thus 
the following independent variables were considered
and the transformations log ( and ( and W
and the transformations log ( W) and ( W)^.
3. ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
3.1 STRIKE POLICY 'GEF/ON'
In Chapter III it was suggested that the period 1951 to 1962 could
be characterised as one in which TASS 'followed* the manual workers, while
in the period 1962 to 1970, the union set its own targets. A dummy variable, 
having a value of zero for the years up to and including 1961 and a value of 
one thereafter, was included to test for this difference.
3.2 INCOMES POLICY 'OFF/ON'
A selection of dummy variables was included to test for the impact 
of incomes policy. Various judgements were made as to which years policy 
could be considered 'on/off or 'hard/soft'. The three variables included 
took the following form:-
VAR. 1951 to 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 to 1970
1.
2.
3.
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
(9) British Labour Statistics, Tables 41 & 42 supplemented by Year Books
iU.
4. RESULTS
The results shown in Table A are typical of the total number of
regressions undertaken.
No combination of the independent variables , either lagged or
o
unlagged, provided much explanation of the dependent variable
o _
or of the transformations of or V, and these lines of enquiry were
dropped and attention was concentrated on the dependent variable W,
It will aid exposition of the results to state here that neither 
T A— , 100, A s  nor the dummy variables were found to be statistically signifi­
cant.
Thus Table A records results obtained from regressions relating to 
the equation
W = ç/(s. U. t)
For no regression which was fitted was the coefficient of t
significantly different from zero, i.e. no time trend in W was detectable.
A constant term was invariably found to be necessary.
Regressions 1, 2 and 3 in Table A are a typical selection of results
from fitting any two unlagged independent variables, and provide little if
any explanation of the variation in W . The economic rationale for lagging
the independent variables is one which is standard in the literature on
explanations of wage changes. None of the regressions undertaken using any
2
one lagged independent variable produced a value of R greater than 0.28,
so they have not been tabulated.
Regressions 4 to 9 represent all possible combinations of two lagged
variables from the four under consideration and of these lines, line 8
is clearly the best by a considerable amount. Adding each of the other
two lagged variables separately to the regression of line 8 results in
2 —^ 2
lines 11 and 13j R increases but R decreases in both cases and it is thus
11.
held that there is no point in preferring 11 or 13 to 8. The further
2 “2
combinations represented by lines 10 and 12 give R and R lower than line
8.
Regression 14 represents the regression of all four lagged variables
—  2 —2
on V and as with lines 11 and 13, though R increases, R decreases compared
with line 8,
Regression 15 is the result of adding one autoregressive variable
to the two variables in line 8. The autoregressive term was included after
inspection of the time-series of W which displays a cyclical character albeit
V derives from the difference between two distinct time-series. The
2 —2
inclusion of the autoregressive term lifts R and R by about 33^ and thus 
seems clearly worth including. The results of adding in the transfers
Ip
variable — .100 and a two-year lagged autoregressive variable to line 15
produce a negligible increase in R and a decrease in R and it is held that
they contribute nothing further to the analysis.
The equation of line 15 is the best that it has been possible to 
devise:-
= 0.0924 - 0.4779(w)^_p - 0,007l(-^)^_p - 0.0363U^_^
Standard Error 
of Coefficient 0.636 0.0014 0.0096
t value -2.92 -4.96 -3.78
R = 0,728
R^ = 0,666
5. INFERENCES
J
All significant at at least the 2^ 
level
All the coefficients in the equation are significantly different 
from zero at at least the 2^ level, so it is reasonable to infer that each 
term represents a real effect. Taking them in turn:-
12.
i) -o .o362u ^:^
This demonstrates that the higher the rate of unemployment nationally 
o o
the more likely is to be greater tha and vice versa. In other
words, at times of high unemployment, the rate of growth of the wage income
of TASS members tends to be slower than for industry as a whole. Two
explanations, among others, can be offered. Firstly, given the craft cluster
of the membership and thus their place in the industrial process (dsign
and development as opposed to production), the intensity of fluctuations
in demand may be greater on the membership than on the labour force in
general. This need not be reflected in more violent swings in employment
for TASS members particularly if employers hoard the skills they represent,
but rather influence the settlements obtained by union activity. It is
possible, of course, that because of the craft cluster, the membership is
subject to a (slightly) different cyclical pattern of demand than are workers
generally which is not taken into account in the equation.
Secondly, and perhaps not unrelated to the level of demand, is the
question of the precise nature of the wage settlements achieved. Any 
tendency for flat rate increases to become the norm for all workers including 
TASS members, in times of high unemployment would provide a causal explanation 
for the working of the  ^term in the equation. While there is no evidence 
that any such tendency existed and while no statistically significant results 
were obtained when testing the suggested 'pattern following' (l953 to I96I) 
as against the 'pattern setting' (1962 to 1970), the possibility nevertheless 
exists that 'pattern following' may have had such an effect and may have 
continued to operate in the later period.
ii) -0.007l(-^)^_^
As in i) above, the more spent per member on strike per strike, the
o O
more likely W^^ is to be greater than W^^g, and vice versa. This result
is as expected and confirms the qualitative evidence detailed in Chapter III, 
section 4 , that long strikes were the result of employer resistance and 
that short, sharp strikes chosen for their 'pattern setting' quality from 
a strike waiting list were central to the militant wage strategy. Thus a 
many strikes strategy constrained financially, entails selection so as to 
minimise the possibility of costly disputes.
ill) -0.4779 (W )^_i
This confirms that W is in successive years alternatively large and 
small, as can be seen by examining the data. In other words, if in one year 
TASS wages increases are larger than for all industry, the following year 
the two rates will be closer together or the all industry rate increase will 
be larger. Simply, this could result from TASS 'following' all other workers 
or the reverse. The presumption must be, given the qualitative evidence, 
that the former is the case - TASS followed the manual workers and 
reinforced this by pattern setting and following across the membership.
In concluding this Appendix it is appreciated that the extent of the 
statistical enquiry carried out is not very great, and that a more detailed 
enquiry might pay rich rewards. Nevertheless, the results obtained, if 
limited, are certainly interesting.
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